By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Hungarian President Tamás Sulyok signed a constitutional amendment mandating the early termination of his presidential powers, though he publicly disagreed with the parliament’s action, deeming it an abuse of power and detrimental to the presidency’s role as a check and balance. This move is part of broader constitutional changes initiated by Prime Minister Péter Magyar, who ousted former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and secured a significant parliamentary majority. These changes include limiting prime ministerial terms, effectively barring Orbán’s return, and dismantling institutions established by the previous government, such as the Sovereignty Protection Office, while also reclaiming state assets previously transferred to public-interest foundations.
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It’s quite noteworthy how swiftly some of the anticipated “hardball” tactics from the Orbán camp seem to have faltered, raising questions about their long-term effectiveness and potential legacy. The recent constitutional amendment, which has prematurely ended President Tamás Sulyok’s term, serves as a pivotal moment in Hungarian politics, and it’s fascinating to unpack the nuances of this development.
President Sulyok, in a video address following the parliamentary decision, expressed his reluctance to sign the amendment, labeling the parliamentary move as an abuse of political power that effectively strips the presidency of its role as a check and balance within the government. Despite his reservations, he ultimately signed the document, citing his constitutional obligations to do so. This action highlights a deeply ingrained respect for the rule of law, even when the circumstances feel imposed.
The amendment itself, passed by the Hungarian parliament with a significant majority, signals a broader constitutional overhaul initiated by Prime Minister Péter Magyar, whose party secured a decisive two-thirds majority in the recent April elections. This outcome clearly indicates a public mandate for change and a desire to reshape the country’s governance structure.
The premature termination of the presidency raises interesting questions about the nature of checks and balances in a parliamentary system. While the President is elected by the Parliament, and therefore by extension, the party or coalition that holds a majority, the concept of a president acting as an independent check on legislative power can be debated. In essence, if the parliament chooses both the government and the president, the president’s ability to act as a distinct counterweight might be inherently limited.
This situation underscores the ease with which constitutional amendments can be made when a party commands a supermajority. The ability to alter fundamental laws so readily can lead to speculation about future changes and the potential for further shifts in the political landscape. It appears that winning with a constitutional majority can indeed lead to a system being heavily rigged in favor of the victors, and in this case, the intended beneficiaries of such a system seem to have found it backfiring.
The rationale behind the presidential election process, where parliament elects the president, is rooted in the understanding that Hungary operates as a parliamentary system. In such systems, political power primarily resides with the parliament and the prime minister it elects. The role of the Hungarian president is largely ceremonial, focused on representing the country as the head of state and performing protocol duties, rather than actively intervening in day-to-day politics.
This model is not unique to Hungary; many other countries, such as Germany, operate under similar principles where the head of state has a more symbolic than executive function. Furthermore, the practice of parliament electing the president is not new in Hungary and has historically been the norm, aligning with the president’s non-executive role. The British system also shares similarities, where voters elect a party, which then selects its leader as prime minister, often with the public having a clear indication of who that leader will be before the election.
Looking ahead, there’s a discussion about potentially changing the presidential election process in a future, newly drafted constitution, possibly moving towards a national election for future presidents. This potential shift signifies a recognition of the evolving political dynamics and the desire to further democratize the selection of the head of state.
While some might interpret this as a straightforward move to consolidate power, it’s also important to acknowledge that Mr. Magyar campaigned on promises of significant change, including removing the current president due to past actions and inaction, particularly concerning sensitive issues like child abuse within foster homes aligned with the Fidesz party. His platform also included a commitment to drafting a new constitution with substantial civilian input, aiming to dismantle what he described as 16 years of Orbán’s autocracy. The current actions, from this perspective, appear to be in line with those campaign promises.
It is important to clarify the Hungarian president’s powers. While the president doesn’t possess an ultimate veto, they do have the ability to send laws back to parliament with remarks or refer them to the Constitutional Court if they believe a proposal contravenes Hungary’s fundamental law. If the court finds no issues or if parliament re-adopts the law, the president is then obligated to sign it into effect. This nuance differentiates the Hungarian president’s role from that of a German president, who some sources suggest does have veto power. In terms of constitutional authority, the Hungarian president’s position is often likened to that of the de facto role of the monarch in the UK, a figurehead with symbolic importance rather than executive control.
The situation has certainly generated considerable commentary, with some outsiders observing with a degree of skepticism, particularly given the complexities of Hungarian politics and the speed of these developments. The narrative of a significant shake-up is compelling, but the possibility of underlying agendas or continued manipulation by established political forces cannot be entirely dismissed without further evidence.
The idea of a veto power remaining in the hands of the “old party,” especially after an election that seemingly rejected their mandate, does indeed feel contradictory. However, as has been clarified, the Hungarian president’s “veto” is more accurately a power to return legislation for review, a mechanism that can ultimately be overridden by parliament. This mirrors aspects of parliamentary systems where the supreme authority rests with the elected legislature.
Ultimately, the recent constitutional amendment and the premature end to President Sulyok’s term represent a significant shift in Hungarian governance. The interplay between parliamentary power, presidential roles, and constitutional reform continues to unfold, offering a compelling case study in contemporary political evolution.