By John Q. Hosedrinker Should he become the next Prime Minister, Andy Burnham is reportedly preparing to terminate the NHS’s £330 million contract with US technology company Palantir. This potential move is driven by concerns regarding the firm’s involvement in government technology and artificial intelligence strategy, amplified by its commercial ties to the Israeli Defense Forces and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. While supporters of the Palantir platform cite its contributions to increased operations and faster diagnoses, critics raise ethical objections and argue that cancelling the contract could disrupt patient care improvements. A crucial contractual break clause is set to expire in March, requiring any decision to terminate the agreement to be communicated by December.
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Andy Burnham is reportedly preparing to cut ties with Palantir in the NHS, a move that’s certainly generated a lot of discussion. The question of why Palantir was involved with the NHS in the first place is a significant one, especially given the current controversy. It appears that a substantial portion of NHS trusts, more than half in England, have been utilizing Palantir’s technology. The system’s impact has been noted, with claims of contributing to over 110,000 additional operations since its inception. Internally, an NHS memo even suggested that hospitals piloting the platform saw a roughly 12% increase in operating theatre utilization, and several trusts reported quicker cancer diagnoses and reduced delays in patient discharges.
However, the very nature of Palantir’s associations seems to be the stumbling block. The reported ties to the Israeli military and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have raised serious ethical and political concerns for Andy Burnham. For some, the idea of dropping Palantir feels like a drastic step that could potentially lead back to a less efficient healthcare system. There’s a debate brewing about whether this action is primarily a protest against the treatment of immigrants in the US and Palestinians, a choice some view as a bold political maneuver. The sentiment among some is that such a decision should be immediate and accompanied by a formal rebuke for ever allowing the company involvement in the first place.
Digging deeper into the technological aspects, there’s a call for a detailed technical appraisal of Palantir’s methodology. The desire is to understand not just *that* the technology should be avoided, but *why* its methodology is problematic. This includes an assessment of the perceived benefits that made it attractive to the NHS and other organizations, as well as proposed alternatives and reasons why they might be superior. The exploration of why such technology is even considered for a national health system, rather than just relying on “vibes,” is crucial for a comprehensive understanding.
The debate also touches upon the fundamental question of trust. When a company is involved in managing critical systems for a nation’s healthcare, a certain level of trust is paramount. It’s not solely about identifying the “best” technically, but also about who controls sensitive national data. Concerns have been raised that this could involve giving access and control of a nation’s data to a company backed by potentially adversarial nations. This echoes a broader trend in Europe, where governments are increasingly severing ties with US tech companies due to similar geopolitical concerns. The actions of the current US administration in leveraging access to data, including sanctioning lawmakers and attempting to influence pricing for pharmaceutical products, highlight these vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, the ethical foundations and aspirations of key figures associated with Palantir, described by some as having “Bond villain type ethics,” are part of the public discourse. The ownership and control of the technology are deemed as, if not more, important than its technical capability to deliver on a contract. For a national infrastructure like a health system, and especially for sensitive health data, the reputation of both the company and its home country in terms of human rights and data protection is crucial.
The argument that public opinion is a vital consideration in a democracy is also strongly present. Even if a company offers significant capabilities, if the public views them unfavorably, it can lead to electoral consequences. Therefore, dropping a publicly unpopular company can be a rational political decision, extending beyond immediate technical benefits. The analogy of offering lemonade from a stand run by a figure like Hitler, despite offering the best lemonade, is used to illustrate that people may choose not to financially support organizations they find objectionable, regardless of material considerations. This sentiment is seen as the driving force behind much of the public’s distaste for their tax money going to Palantir.
The core of the controversy, for many, isn’t about the technical prowess of Palantir or the efficiency gains it might offer. Instead, it centers on the implications of embedding a “dangerous foreign actor” in critical infrastructure. The concern is not about any particular ethnicity but about a company whose leadership has expressed views that are seen as deeply problematic, including white supremacist ideologies and a desire for global dominance through advanced technology and weaponry. The perception is that Palantir’s perceived benefits are merely a means to gain access and influence political environments.
Despite the efficiency claims, the underlying issues of data ownership and control remain central. While it’s stated that the data remains owned by NHS England, the broader reliance on US suppliers across various sectors is acknowledged. However, the argument is made that this reliance is a consequence of globalization and that the UK government is already deeply integrated with US technology and infrastructure. The contracts are seen as legal mechanisms to manage the absence of trust, precisely because trust cannot be guaranteed. The current situation is viewed by some as a path dependency with the US, and the question is whether to be ideological about it or accept it as a global reality.
The concern that the UK’s existing reliance on the US might lead to further dependency, especially given perceived failures of the current US administration to act as a trustworthy ally, is a significant point of contention. The influence and political power of the US medical sector and insurance companies are seen as creating a massive conflict of interest at a country-wide level. Therefore, any new contracts involving US companies, particularly in the context of the NHS, should be subject to intense scrutiny to protect against US influence and reliance.
The integration of Palantir’s technology into the NHS is seen by some as a strategic move with foreseen pitfalls, with plans for a “post-Palantir” period. The argument is that if Palantir can deliver a net gain in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and their technology can be emulated later, it can be considered a win. This perspective suggests a pragmatic approach where the immediate benefits are weighed against future possibilities, with contractual safeguards in place. It’s also noted that the NHS sought alternatives for three years, and Palantir was chosen as the most competent bid, having delivered the platform as ordered.
However, the counterargument emphasizes that historical reliance on US suppliers doesn’t justify further integration, especially with a current administration perceived as untrustworthy. The political power and potential conflicts of interest stemming from the US medical and insurance sectors are highlighted as critical concerns that necessitate robust protection of the NHS against US influence. This underscores the complex interplay of technological necessity, geopolitical considerations, and ethical imperatives shaping the decision regarding Palantir’s future in the NHS.