By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy believes Polish President Karol Nawrocki’s actions regarding the revocation of his Order of the White Eagle are driven by internal Polish political rivalries. Zelenskyy stated that Nawrocki is leveraging this issue to gain an electoral advantage against Prime Minister Tusk, comparing it to a tactic used by Viktor Orbán. He also revealed that during their initial meeting, Nawrocki presented him with a book about the Volyn tragedy, an act Zelenskyy now views as part of this broader political strategy to sow discord.
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The assertion that President Zelenskyy sees a parallel between Poland’s current actions under President Nawrocki and those of Hungary’s Prime Minister Orbán, leading to a grim outlook, suggests a deepening concern over historical narratives and their impact on current geopolitical alliances. This comparison hinges on the idea that both leaders, in different contexts, are prioritizing contentious historical issues that risk alienating crucial partners, potentially at the expense of broader strategic goals.
The core of this tension, as understood, lies in Poland’s deeply entrenched sensitivities regarding World War II-era Ukrainian nationalist groups, particularly the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). For Polish society, the actions of the UPA, especially the Volhynia massacres, represent an unhealed historical wound, a “non-negotiable” point that evokes profound national grief and remembrance.
Despite these deep-seated historical grievances, Poland has demonstrably maintained its support for Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression. The imperative to prevent Ukraine from succumbing to Russia’s influence is seen as paramount, transcending even the historical disputes. However, the argument suggests that the naming of a military unit in Ukraine after the UPA, a move perceived as glorifying these controversial figures, forces a confrontation with this painful past, complicating future discussions about Ukraine’s integration into institutions like the EU and NATO.
The perceived disconnect lies in Zelenskyy’s apparent unwillingness to simply rename the unit, a seemingly straightforward administrative change that could alleviate Polish concerns. This is where the comparison with Orbán’s more overt pro-Russian stance becomes relevant, though it’s also noted that Nawrocki’s actions differ significantly in this regard. Unlike Orbán, Nawrocki has not engaged in dealings with Russia and has publicly condemned Putin as a war criminal, even being placed on Russia’s wanted list. This suggests that Nawrocki’s stance, while firm on historical issues, is not indicative of a broader alignment with Russian interests.
Instead, Nawrocki’s actions are interpreted by some as a calculated move to appeal to a nationalist base within Poland, playing to a segment of the electorate that holds strong views on historical injustices. Similarly, Zelenskyy is seen as potentially playing to his own nationalist base in Ukraine, particularly within the military, where UPA veneration is more prevalent. The concern is that this dual nationalistic posturing, while perhaps electorally beneficial for both leaders, distracts from the urgent reality of the ongoing war and the lives being lost.
The diplomatic approach taken by Ukraine under Zelenskyy is described as reminiscent of a “Soviet-style” diplomacy, characterized by a heavy-handed, cynical, and even hostile approach to partners, even allies. This perspective suggests a belief that Poland’s support for Ukraine is a foregone conclusion due to shared strategic interests, thus negating the need for careful diplomatic engagement. The implication is that Zelenskyy might be underestimating the enduring impact of historical grievances on Polish public opinion and political discourse.
The argument that Ukraine is essentially “sacrificing good relations in Poland” for internal political gains, specifically to bolster Zelenskyy’s standing with the Ukrainian army, highlights a potential miscalculation. The timing of this move, especially given the existing economic anxieties in Poland related to Ukrainian produce and grain, further exacerbates the situation. These economic factors, coupled with the historical sensitivities, have contributed to a visible shift in Polish attitudes towards Ukraine, making actions perceived as disrespectful to Polish memory particularly damaging.
The insistence that Poland will continue to support Ukraine because of the shared enemy in Russia is a common refrain, suggesting that this historical dispute might be a “sideshow” or “political posturing.” However, the depth of Polish historical memory, often characterized as holding grudges with remarkable tenacity, cannot be easily dismissed. This deep-seated historical consciousness means that grievances, even those from decades past, can significantly influence current political decisions and national sentiment.
The notion that Zelenskyy is “doing what benefits Russia” by “proving that Nazi cult in Ukraine is alive and well” is a serious accusation, suggesting that the UPA issue is being exploited to fuel Russian propaganda. While the broader European project aims to reconcile historical differences, it is argued that Ukraine will eventually need to address its own internal issues regarding the glorification of controversial WWII-era groups as part of its European integration process.
The characterization of Nawrocki as a “fascist president” and a “hooligan” who has committed alleged crimes is a starkly negative portrayal, contrasting with the observation that Nawrocki’s focus is on historical grievances rather than outright appeasement of Russia. Nevertheless, the argument that Ukrainians are “not civilized enough to be part of the European Union yet” due to their veneration of the UPA, a group responsible for atrocities, underscores the severity of the historical baggage.
The fact that Zelenskyy proceeded with the UPA commemoration despite knowing its sensitivity is seen as a significant lapse in judgment, a “slap in the face” to Poland, and a failure to show gratitude for their crucial support. The question of what Ukraine truly gains by this action, at the risk of alienating a key ally, remains a central point of contention.
While Zelenskyy views Nawrocki’s actions as an internal Polish electoral maneuver, many perceive it as a direct provocation. The plea to “defeat the evil foe first and then we can cry about past atrocities” highlights a pragmatic approach to the current conflict, contrasting with the emotional weight placed on historical issues.
The recurring theme is that both leaders are playing to their respective nationalist bases, creating a dramatic spectacle that, ironically, might be amplified by Russia to serve its own narrative. This leads to the conclusion that while Poland may continue to support Ukraine due to their shared enemy, the underlying tensions, fueled by historical grievances and current political maneuvering, could indeed lead to negative consequences, fulfilling Zelenskyy’s grim prediction. The fundamental disagreement lies in whether this is a strategic error by Zelenskyy, a calculated risk for domestic gain, or a deliberate provocation that misunderstands the enduring power of historical memory and its impact on international relations.