By John Q. Hosedrinker 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in *FS Credit Opportunities v. Saba Capital Master Fund* has further complicated understanding of the Court’s 2025 ruling in *Medina v. Planned Parenthood*. In *Medina*, the Court appeared to depart from established precedent regarding “implied causes of action,” the legal doctrine allowing individuals to sue to enforce statutory rights. The *FS Credit* decision, while addressing a different area of law, reaffirms the prior legal standard for implied causes of action, despite not citing *Medina* or explaining why the *Medina* ruling was handled differently. This lack of consistency suggests the Court may be manipulating legal rules to achieve politically preferred outcomes, particularly concerning abortion access, rather than applying established legal principles uniformly.
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The Supreme Court, in a move that has raised significant eyebrows and fueled considerable debate, appears to have crafted a peculiar legal rule, seemingly tailored to disadvantage Planned Parenthood. This isn’t just a matter of a standard legal interpretation; the circumstances surrounding the decision and its subsequent application suggest a deliberate, almost surgical, maneuver. The core of the issue lies in the doctrine of “implied causes of action,” a complex area of law that dictates when individuals or organizations can sue to enforce their rights when a law doesn’t explicitly grant them that right.
In a notable case, *Medina v. Planned Parenthood*, the Court’s Republican majority delivered a verdict that left many observers bewildered. South Carolina had, by all accounts, engaged in a clear violation of federal Medicaid law, directly impacting patients who relied on the services provided by Planned Parenthood. However, the Court’s ruling, in its effort to shield the state from accountability, seemed to create an exceptionally high bar for those patients seeking to enforce their rights through legal action. This decision felt particularly jarring when contrasted with an earlier ruling from the same Court, *Health and Hospital Corporation v. Talevski*, which had taken a more permissive approach to enforcing rights under similar legal principles just two years prior.
The stark difference in outcomes between *Medina* and *Talevski*, despite dealing with the same fundamental legal doctrine of implied causes of action, points towards a political motivation rather than a purely legal one. The facts in the *Medina* case centered on South Carolina’s decision to cut off funding to Planned Parenthood, a move that was widely seen as illegal under federal Medicaid law. The Court’s apparent willingness to overlook or reinterpret established legal norms in *Medina* suggests an underlying objective: to facilitate the defunding of an abortion provider. This wasn’t a neutral application of law; it was a decision that appeared to be shaped by an anti-abortion agenda.
Adding another layer to this perplexing situation is the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in *FS Credit Opportunities v. Saba Capital Master Fund*. While the factual background of *FS Credit* is distinct—it concerns securities law and the ability of investors to sue investment funds—the underlying legal question it addresses is remarkably similar to that in *Medina*. Both cases delve into the intricacies of implied causes of action. However, what’s particularly striking is that the *FS Credit* decision, despite dealing with the same legal concept as *Medina* (the most recent such case prior to *FS Credit*), conspicuously fails to cite *Medina* at all.
Instead, the *FS Credit* opinion draws heavily from earlier legal precedents that the Court had seemingly set aside or disregarded in *Medina*. More significantly, *FS Credit* explicitly endorses a legal rule that appeared to be rejected in the *Medina* ruling. This inconsistency and selective reliance on precedent create a strong impression of judicial manipulation, where the Court appears to be selectively applying or inventing legal doctrines to achieve desired political outcomes.
The complexity of implied causes of action is undeniable, often proving bewildering even for seasoned legal professionals. However, when examining the Court’s recent decisions in this area, a disturbing pattern emerges. The *Medina* ruling, in particular, seems to have established a new, stringent standard specifically aimed at limiting the ability of organizations like Planned Parenthood to seek legal recourse when their rights are violated. This departure from prior jurisprudence, coupled with the unexplained omission of *Medina* in the subsequent *FS Credit* case which revisits the same legal terrain, strongly suggests that the Court is not merely interpreting the law but is actively shaping it to align with the political preferences of its Republican appointees and the broader anti-abortion movement.
This approach raises fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the Court and its role in a democratic society. When the judiciary appears to be legislating from the bench, creating special rules to favor one side of a highly contentious political issue, it undermines the principle of equal justice under the law. The perception that the Court is serving political masters rather than upholding legal principles erodes public trust and can lead to a dangerous cynicism about the entire legal system. The argument is that instead of adhering to established legal doctrines consistently, the Court seems to be inventing or manipulating them to achieve outcomes that align with specific ideological goals, effectively functioning as a legislative body for certain political agendas. This is not impartial judicial review; it is judicial activism in service of a particular ideology.