By John Q. Hosedrinker 
According to reports, Mossad, with the involvement of the CIA, armed Kurdish militias using weapons seized from Hamas and Hezbollah as part of a plan to destabilize the Iranian regime. This initiative reportedly aimed to utilize Kurdish organizations within Iraq and Iran as a proxy ground force following Israeli strikes near the Iran-Iraq border. However, the operation was ultimately thwarted by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who exerted pressure on U.S. President Donald Trump and warned Kurdish leaders against cooperation.
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It appears there was a rather ambitious, perhaps even audacious, plan conceived involving Mossad and Kurdish militias. The core idea, as it’s being discussed, suggests that Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad, was involved in arming certain Kurdish groups with weapons that had previously been associated with organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah. This particular initiative, however, was reportedly halted by President Trump.
This situation runs somewhat counter to previous public statements attributed to Trump, where he suggested that the United States had armed and financed the Kurds, only for them to then supposedly abscond with the resources. The notion of Kurdish forces acting alone in any significant offensive, particularly against a nation like Iran, was never really a realistic prospect from the outset.
For any such operation to have a chance of success, it would have needed to be a coalition effort. This would have involved not just the Kurds, but also Israel, various Arab nations, and Western powers working in concert. The Kurds are known for their fierce fighting spirit, but their advantage against groups like ISIS was largely due to the conflict taking place on their own territory, giving them a home-turf advantage. To expect them to spearhead an invasion of Iran would have been an extraordinarily difficult, if not an unrealistic, request.
Furthermore, considering the historical context where the Kurds were instrumental in fighting ISIS and subsequently did not receive the promised statehood or significant territorial gains, they have very little incentive to engage in such risky ventures without concrete, written assurances of a homeland for themselves at the conclusion of any conflict. The perception seems to be that President Trump’s approach often involves attempts at various strategies, but not necessarily those that are most likely to yield effective results, leading some to believe he may have acted impulsively or without full consideration of the implications.
There’s a sentiment that the Kurds have often been treated as expendable assets, used for specific purposes and then discarded once their utility has waned, leaving them to realize they were merely pawns in larger geopolitical games. The level of misunderstanding regarding the true motivations and objectives of certain Kurdish groups is quite striking.
Specifically, the focus is on PKK-linked groups. These are not necessarily aiming for an independent Kurdish state in the traditional sense, nor do they expect long-term, direct intervention from the United States for nation-building. Their long-standing history includes conflict with entities like the IRGC, and this has been ongoing for decades, irrespective of receiving more advanced weaponry.
The primary desire from these groups, from this perspective, seems to be access to superior weaponry. The idea that they envision the United States establishing a country for them is considered a rather outlandish and widely spread misconception. The war against Iran, from this viewpoint, should have been approached with a three-pronged strategy: the United States would degrade Iran’s overall military capabilities, Israel would conduct targeted assassinations of key political and military leaders, and importantly, the local population within Iran would be armed and trained to effectively combat the IRGC on the ground.
However, this crucial third component – empowering the internal opposition – was reportedly never fully implemented. While the US and Israel may have succeeded in diminishing Iran’s capacity for large-scale warfare, they failed to sufficiently enable the internal Iranian resistance to actually challenge and overthrow the current regime. This, in turn, has allowed the existing leadership to retain power. The subsequent risk of Iran disrupting vital shipping lanes, like the Strait of Hormuz, then becomes a strategic waiting game, hinging on whether the regime can outlast the global dependence on oil from that region. If the regime had faced a robust armed opposition from within, its ability to sustain power and pose such a threat would likely have been significantly diminished.
Therefore, the failure to adequately arm, train, and support internal fighters within Iran is identified as a key reason why the conflict has become so protracted and seemingly unfavorable. This leads to the argument that perhaps halting such a plan, as President Trump reportedly did, was a mistake, and that allowing local forces to acquire weapons to counter the perceived “cancer” of the IRGC within Iran would have been the more effective course of action.
The comparison made, “Mossad gives Kurds technology for chemo for their nation, Trump says no,” highlights the perceived severity of the situation and the potential benefits of the plan. However, it’s also acknowledged that the entire concept, from its inception, may have been fundamentally flawed.
While land forces are undoubtedly necessary for regime change, the suggestion is that these forces should not have been primarily Kurdish. The argument leans towards advocating for American involvement, akin to a scenario in Iraq, rather than solely relying on Kurdish forces to undertake such a massive undertaking.
There’s also a notable degree of skepticism regarding the extent of President Trump’s direct control over Mossad, with the assertion that he often misrepresents or fabricates information to the American public. Conversely, the issue of Kurdish independence, a long-standing aspiration for many, is surprisingly unpopular or at least rarely discussed. In this context, while some may commend him for not proceeding with this particular “idiotic plan,” others feel he has actively sabotaged opportunities to achieve a more favorable outcome in the conflict with Iran.
The proposed strategy of directly targeting Iran’s power and oil infrastructure is seen by some as a more decisive and straightforward approach than protracted negotiations. The significant concern for Turkey regarding an independent Kurdistan is also brought up as a major geopolitical factor influencing such decisions. The narrative suggests that rather than being influenced by Israel’s alleged control over the US, the decision-making is being driven by broader, and perhaps less strategic, considerations, with Turkey’s anxieties playing a significant role. The repeated call to “BOMB THE IRGC!” underscores a sentiment of frustration with what is perceived as an overly cautious or ineffective approach.
The assertion that Trump lies frequently is not a new one. The potential for escalating conflict through airstrikes to foster a civil war within Iran is considered, though the reliance on Turkish support for effective targeting is noted as a significant limitation. The current functional independence of Kurds in Iraq is seen as a positive development, and it’s suggested that with sufficient weaponry, they could achieve a similar status within Iran.
However, the expectation that the Kurds would undertake an assault on Tehran is deemed unrealistic, as it wouldn’t align with their own interests or capabilities. Nevertheless, their involvement in more limited, supportive roles is still considered a possibility. The Syrian context is acknowledged as having evolved, potentially altering previous strategic calculations.
The idea that statehood for the Kurds was something the US could simply grant is dismissed; the best the US could have offered was public support, which would have likely strained relations with Iraq. While the Kurds have consistently supported US efforts and faced significant risks on their behalf, the territories they might desire are not within the US’s purview to bestow.
The notion that Israel would directly insert large troop numbers into Iran is considered impractical, given their military constraints and the need to maintain forces closer to home. Special forces for intelligence operations are one thing, but a full-scale deployment is another. President Trump’s past actions, particularly concerning the Turkish-Syrian border, are seen as evidence of his tendency to abandon allies. There’s a popular saying about Americans eventually doing the right thing after exhausting all other options, and this sentiment is invoked in relation to the situation.
The recurring theme of alliances with Western powers being temporary and transactional for the Kurds is a significant point. Their strategy is often described as utilitarian, taking whatever assistance is offered to advance their own aspirations for self-determination. The saying “no friends but the mountains” encapsulates this perspective.
The analogy of the Kurds being used and then discarded, like a “condom,” highlights a deep-seated mistrust stemming from past experiences. The complexity of the situation is acknowledged, with the potential for a massive civil war in a highly populated Muslim country being a significant deterrent.
It’s also pointed out that while the Kurds may share a hatred for the current Iranian regime, this doesn’t automatically translate into acceptance by the broader Iranian population, especially concerning territorial concessions. The prospect of a four-way civil war, while potentially destabilizing for the current regime, is not inherently seen as a universally better outcome, especially given Iran’s regional influence and the potential for other powers to exploit a collapse.
The argument is made that Israel might not be overly concerned with the potential for internal strife and mass casualties in Iran, suggesting that perhaps not proceeding with the plan involving the Kurds was a prudent decision, despite the immediate implications. The concern that these weapons could eventually be turned against their suppliers, as seen in past conflicts, is also a valid consideration.
The potential for Iran to retaliate by attacking vulnerable Gulf states, thus crippling global oil supplies and triggering a recession, is a serious concern that would weigh heavily against any escalation. President Trump’s current objective, in this view, is not to escalate but to find a way out of the situation that preserves his image and avoids unfavorable concessions. The idea that Turkey could have pressured Trump to halt the plan is considered more plausible than some other explanations, especially given Turkey’s deep-seated opposition to an independent Kurdistan.
The notion that Turkey “stomped out” Kurdish self-rule in Syria is supported, with claims that their autonomy has diminished, their forces have been integrated into the Syrian army, and they no longer control oil fields. The narrative suggests that the US essentially told them to surrender, allowing Syrian government forces to advance.
While Kurds in Syria may have more civil rights now than under the Assad regime, it’s argued that Trump has repeatedly undermined their position. This leads to a sentiment that they owe the US nothing but contempt, and any future engagement would be met with skepticism. The “fucking over the Kurds” is framed as a long-standing American policy, citing past actions in the context of the Iraq War and the non-existence of WMDs, despite Saddam Hussein’s documented use of chemical weapons against the Kurds.
The idea of a win-win situation where only one side benefits while the other is abandoned is questioned. The absence of a clearly defined Kurdish homeland, even after attempts to establish one, and their reliance on existing national currencies are presented as evidence that they are often seen as “useful tools and dreamers.” The economic realities of Kurdish regions in Iran, lacking independent economies or oil resources, are also highlighted as a factor.
While the current situation might be dire under the IRGC and their proxies, who openly express animosity towards the US, the concern remains that empowering certain groups could have unintended consequences. The contrast is drawn between secular aspirations and the potential for behaviors of leaders like Trump to push groups towards radicalization, especially when he is seen as aligning with Islamist figures.