By John Q. Hosedrinker 
The Unmanned Systems Forces of Ukraine conducted an overnight operation on May 23, striking the Russian frigate Admiral Essen for the fourth time since early March. This latest attack, confirmed by the commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, also targeted other Russian military and energy infrastructure, including a missile corvette and vital oil terminals and storage sites in Novorossiysk. Previous strikes on the Admiral Essen, occurring in March and April, reportedly damaged its superstructure, radar, and bow sections, potentially impairing its ability to sail independently. Novorossiysk has become a focal point for Ukrainian long-range strikes, combining its naval base with significant energy export facilities.
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It’s quite something to hear that the Ukrainian forces have managed to strike the Russian warship *Admiral Essen* for a fourth time. It really makes you wonder about the effectiveness of naval defenses when a vessel can be repeatedly targeted. You’d think after the first, second, or even third hit, there would be some serious adjustments made. But here we are, talking about it again. It’s a recurring theme, isn’t it? Russia fixes a boat, Ukraine damages or destroys it. It’s a cycle that seems to be draining their resources and, frankly, their morale.
The idea of the *Admiral Essen* being transformed into a submarine is certainly a humorous, if morbid, thought. It would certainly make it harder to hit, though perhaps a permanent submersible state might be more fitting for a warship that seems to be on the receiving end so frequently. Some are even suggesting it should just be sunk at this point, perhaps to avoid the embarrassment of repeated strikes. Imagine the news report in Russia: “Chain smoker detained on the totally intact *Admiral Essen*, smoking rules reviewed… everything is going according to plan.” It’s a darkly funny image, but it highlights how the narrative can be so detached from reality.
There’s a certain respect to be had for Ukraine’s persistent efforts in striking this particular vessel. Hitting it four times and still calling it out by name feels like a deliberate, almost taunting, message. It’s a demonstration of capability and, perhaps, a way to psychologically wear down the adversary. You have to admit, Russia really does seem to be putting the “L” in “Loser” with this ongoing saga. It’s a great way to drain their morale, money, and resources, and the sentiment of “Slavi Ukraini!” rings especially true in this context.
The commentary around the *Admiral Essen*’s name also adds a layer of ironic amusement. Calling it *Admiral Fressen* or *Admiral Nachschlag* plays on the idea of it being continually “fed” with drone strikes or a second helping of damage. There’s even a suggestion it should be *Admiral Trinken*, perhaps implying it’s drowning. And then there’s the mention of Admiral Epstein, which, while a bit of a wordplay, brings up the more serious undertones of the situation and the potential implications of continued failures.
This repeated targeting of the *Admiral Essen* also speaks to a broader observation about modern warfare and naval obsolescence. In certain contexts, especially in a confined geographic area like the Black Sea, ships are increasingly vulnerable. The expense of repairing a damaged vessel, along with its ongoing operating and maintenance costs, makes repeated damage incredibly inefficient for Russia. A sunk ship, in a twisted way, might even free up some budget, though that’s a grim perspective. The sheer persistence and “awesomeness” of the Ukrainian forces in achieving this are truly commendable.
The discussions also touched upon some rather perplexing political alignments, particularly regarding why certain figures might appear to support Russia. There are theories suggesting financial ties, with one source hinting at the Trump golf operations being funded by Russia for decades. It’s posited that some individuals may not like being around more successful people, preferring those they perceive as “losers” to make themselves look better by comparison. This leads to the idea that powerful entities might have leverage through kompromat, including alleged files, which could compel certain actions or policies.
The perspective that some leaders simply don’t understand the distinction between Ukrainians and Russians, seeing them all as part of a monolithic historical entity, is also raised. In this view, they might see supporting Ukraine as akin to interfering in a former Soviet sphere of influence, a strategic misunderstanding of the current geopolitical landscape. It’s suggested that this kind of thinking is based on outdated perceptions and a flawed understanding of national identities. This isn’t a new sentiment, and it’s quite a stark contrast to the ongoing reality of Ukraine’s fight for its sovereignty.
The thought that some individuals are “owned and operated” by certain foreign entities, or that they are influenced by the prospect of gifts or personal gain from authoritarian leaders, is a recurring theme in these discussions. The idea of having something “on” someone, be it financial leverage or personal compromising material, is presented as a powerful motivator for maintaining a particular stance. It’s suggested that this is why certain deals appear skewed or why there’s a reluctance to fully commit to certain policies. The narrative paints a picture of complex, and often morally questionable, motivations behind international relations and political decisions. It’s a world away from the straightforward, yet incredibly effective, actions being taken on the ground in Ukraine, like the repeated strikes against the *Admiral Essen*.