Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas admitted in a speech that withheld tax funds from Israel would be used to pay Palestinian prisoners, including terrorists. This statement confirms that the PA continues its “pay-for-slay” policy, now disguised as social welfare payments, despite claims to the contrary. The US State Department reported that over $150 million was paid to terrorists and their families last year. This admission by Abbas has significant international implications, challenging Western countries’ justifications for funding the PA and potentially impacting future recognition of a Palestinian state.

Read the original article here

The Palestinian Authority (PA) appears to be deeply entrenched in, and actively solidifying, a policy widely condemned as “pay-for-slay.” This practice, which involves financially compensating individuals for committing acts of terrorism and supporting their families, is not merely a fringe element but seems to be woven into the very fabric of their governance. The sheer scale of the financial commitment is staggering, with reports indicating substantial sums allocated to terrorists and their families.

Millions of dollars are reportedly disbursed to convicted terrorists, including those who have been released from Israeli custody, and to the families of individuals who died during acts of violence. The PA had pledged even more significant amounts, suggesting a long-term commitment to this policy. This financial support effectively institutionalizes the act of terrorism, transforming it into a potentially lucrative, state-sanctioned endeavor.

The rationale often presented for these payments frames them as a form of social welfare for those who have lost breadwinners due to circumstances, including what is perceived as an unjust occupation. From this perspective, the payments are not necessarily seen as incentives for violence but rather as a safety net and a continuation of support for families impacted by conflict. This viewpoint suggests that the PA views its actions as providing for its citizens, irrespective of their past actions or alleged involvement in violent acts.

However, from an external viewpoint, and particularly from the perspective of victims and their families, this policy is unequivocally a direct incentive to engage in violent acts. The prospect of financial security for oneself or one’s family, contingent on acts of terrorism, presents a clear and compelling motivation for individuals to resort to violence. This financial incentive, regardless of the PA’s stated intentions, can be seen as a reinforcement of destructive behavior.

The figures being discussed are substantial, reportedly amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars annually. While some argue that these sums, when broken down on a per-individual basis, might not seem astronomically high in absolute terms, their impact is amplified by the economic realities of the region. For many, these payments represent a significant financial benefit, far exceeding average earnings, thus further solidifying the perceived reward for engaging in terrorism.

The argument that these payments are akin to a pension for fallen public employees, with families receiving a percentage of salaries, also surfaces. However, this framing is challenged by the fact that the recipients are often those convicted of, or linked to, acts of terrorism. The source of these funds, often tied to public employees, is a point of contention, raising questions about the PA’s priorities and its use of taxpayer money.

There’s a strong sentiment that such a policy, regardless of its internal justification or perception within Palestinian society, appears to the outside world as a direct endorsement and encouragement of violence. The idea that the government would systematically allocate funds to individuals for carrying out attacks against civilians is deeply problematic and fundamentally undermines any claims of a commitment to peace or security.

The notion that this policy could be easily dismantled is also questioned, with claims that a significant majority of the population supports it, viewing it as a form of social welfare. The potential collapse of the PA’s government if such a program were to be ended is presented as a complicating factor, suggesting a difficult political and economic landscape in which to address this issue.

The debate surrounding the “pay-for-slay” policy highlights a stark divergence in perspectives. While some may see it as a complex social support system born out of difficult circumstances, others view it as a clear and dangerous institutionalization of violence, directly incentivizing terrorism and prolonging the cycle of conflict. The lack of a clear condemnation from some quarters and the arguments made to contextualize or defend the policy only seem to reinforce the perception that this practice is being actively reinforced and institutionalized by the Palestinian Authority.