By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Hamid Rasaei’s Telegram post, interpreted as a veiled criticism of Mojtaba Khamenei as an “unrighteous son,” has sparked significant backlash. Media outlets and political figures alike have questioned Rasaei’s motives, suggesting his timing and religious allusions were intended to undermine the new Supreme Leader. This controversy also occurred on the same day Mojtaba Khamenei praised Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a figure Rasaei has consistently opposed. Rasaei has since defended himself, claiming the post was an older piece reshared and that he had previously supported Mojtaba Khamenei’s leadership.
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The notion of Iran’s president offering his resignation, citing a complete takeover by IRGC commanders, paints a stark picture of power dynamics within the Islamic Republic. It suggests that the civilian leadership, embodied by the president, has been entirely supplanted by the military wing, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This development, if confirmed, would bring to the forefront the long-held belief that the IRGC, rather than elected officials, has always wielded the true power in Iran.
The idea that the president was merely a figurehead, a “mouthpiece” for the Supreme Leader, is not a new one. For many observers, the president’s role has always been one of managing day-to-day affairs, subject to the ultimate authority and potential override by the Supreme Leader. The president’s existence, in this view, has often been perceived as a mechanism to provide the Iranian populace with an illusion of choice, and to project a semblance of democratic governance to international audiences, particularly those in the West.
This perspective suggests that the IRGC has, in reality, been the driving force behind Iranian policy for a considerable time. The notion of a civilian government acting as a “fig leaf” to conceal the true controllers of the country aligns with the idea that all candidates for civilian positions, including the presidency and parliamentary seats, are subject to vetting and approval by the clerical establishment, with the mullahs retaining the power to overrule presidential decisions.
The alleged resignation, therefore, could be seen not as a fundamental shift in power, but as a more overt revelation of the existing power structure. It implies that the IRGC, always possessing significant influence, has now officially consolidated its control, making the civilian government’s role even more nominal than before. This might be interpreted as the “thinly-held together mask” of civilian leadership finally falling off, revealing the military’s absolute grip on power.
The potential ramifications of the IRGC fully assuming control are viewed with apprehension, particularly concerning peace and international relations. The IRGC is often characterized as being more hardline and anti-peace, harboring deep animosity towards Israel and the United States. This suggests a future marked by increased hostility and a greater propensity for conflict, especially as the US might be more hesitant to re-engage militarily after a perceived unsuccessful venture.
Furthermore, the idea that the Supreme Leader might have already passed away, with the IRGC moving to solidify their control amidst this uncertainty, adds another layer of complexity. If Mojtaba, a potential successor, is also out of the picture, it could be seen as a consequence of internal power struggles, perhaps between factions advocating for dialogue with the West and those pushing for a more confrontational stance.
The narrative surrounding this alleged resignation also touches upon the effectiveness of external interventions. There’s a sentiment that actions taken by external powers, intended to provoke regime change, have inadvertently led to a more radicalized and militarily controlled Iran. The notion that “killing the prior leadership was fucking dumb” stems from the realization that such actions could pave the way for more hardline elements to seize power, potentially undoing any moderating influence that previously existed.
The perceived outcome of certain foreign policy decisions is also a point of contention. Some express disillusionment, suggesting that instead of achieving a more moderate or democratic Iran, the result has been the strengthening of a hardline military junta. The idea of replacing one form of clerical leadership with another, or a military regime with a similar ideological bent, leads to sarcastic observations about the perceived failures of certain foreign policy approaches.
Finally, the lack of independent confirmation for the resignation is a crucial caveat. While the report may originate from Iranian opposition media, the absence of verifiable information means that these claims should be approached with extreme caution. It is even suggested that this might be a deliberate maneuver by the IRGC to enhance their own legitimacy or to strategically position themselves within the broader political landscape. The situation, therefore, remains fluid and subject to further developments and corroboration.