By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Russia is increasingly employing compact “Sprint-030” satellite terminals, designed to leverage existing Russian orbital infrastructure, thereby reducing dependence on Western systems like Starlink. Notably, these terminals are compatible with the “Express” series of Russian telecommunications satellites, many of which were originally built by European companies Airbus and Thales. This development signifies Russia’s effort to bolster battlefield connectivity by utilizing these Western-built satellites, which were supplied under contracts with the Russian government, including after 2014.
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It appears Russia is now leaning on a network of European-built satellites for its communication needs, a development that warrants a closer look. These aren’t quite the same as the ubiquitous Starlink satellites, and that distinction is quite important. Unlike Starlink’s low-Earth orbit constellation, which offers remarkably low latency – around 40 milliseconds – these geostationary satellites present a different picture. We’re talking about latency that can be close to a full second, which is a significant difference, especially for real-time applications.
While the satellites themselves were manufactured by European entities like Airbus and Thales, it’s crucial to understand that they are now under Russian ownership, or perhaps, as some might suggest, “stolen.” This means the situation isn’t directly analogous to Starlink, which can be managed and controlled by its provider. These are Russian assets, and therefore, under Russian command.
The reported upload speeds of 1 megabit per second are a considerable limitation, especially when compared to what’s needed for modern communication. For context, even streaming a 480p video can easily exceed that rate, meaning this network is quite restrictive. It’s akin to using an old-fashioned satellite telephone in the context of today’s advanced warfare, making the idea of it being a true “replacement” for Starlink rather misleading.
It raises a significant question about how these European-built satellites were supplied to Russia, particularly after events like the annexation of Crimea. Investigations into whether Airbus and Thales exported these satellites after sanctions were imposed would be essential. If violations occurred, there’s a strong argument for holding executives personally liable, a principle that seems crucial for sanctions regimes to function effectively.
The effectiveness of sanctions is certainly called into question here. The inability of Russia to access Starlink has likely contributed to a slowdown in their recent advancements, along with their efforts to control their own internet channels, perhaps fearing internal dissent similar to protests elsewhere. From a strategic perspective, this development, despite the limitations of the Russian network, is not entirely unwelcome.
It’s important to clarify that these 12 satellites launched by Bureau 1440 are, in essence, Russia’s own version of a Starlink-like system, even if the manufacturing involved European components. The fact that their construction was permitted after the invasion had already begun highlights a failure in the sanctions regime, one that will be challenging to rectify.
The inconsistency in how companies are treated is also a point of discussion. If Elon Musk’s Starlink is scrutinized for potentially aiding Russia, then a similar level of scrutiny should be applied to European companies involved in supplying technology. The argument is that if one is considered aiding the war effort, then the other should be too, or a re-evaluation of the initial stance is needed.
There’s speculation that Russia might have had these satellites all along, suggesting they chose Starlink over their own network for specific reasons, likely related to performance. The sudden emergence of this news might even be linked to Russian propaganda efforts. The capacity to geofence areas and deny service, which is a feature of systems like Starlink, is something that appears to be lacking in this Russian system.
The notion of being free from the whims of corporations or international law is appealing, but the practical limitations of a 1 megabit per second upload speed make this system of limited utility. It’s also worth noting that Russia’s access to Starlink has been significantly curtailed, with Ukraine now able to provide SpaceX with lists of controlled terminals, making the idea of this new network being a true “replacement” less convincing.
The loss of geostationary satellites, like the Express-AT1, due to system failures is a serious concern. Such events can have a widespread impact on coverage, and the inability to restore or even move a failed satellite into a graveyard orbit is a significant technical and operational challenge, especially in the high-stakes environment of space operations. The difficulty and cost associated with reaching geostationary orbit make any such failure particularly impactful.
While the idea of disrupting satellites with lasers might sound appealing, the complexity and the fact that these are Russian-operated systems, even if built in Europe, need to be considered. The article itself points out that the satellites are operated by Russia, making it a Russian system, regardless of its origins.
It’s suggested that these might be older satellites purchased before the current conflict, and their components are integrated into Russian systems. The analogy of a car manufacturer using parts bought years ago, even if the vehicle is later used in a conflict, is used to illustrate that the origin of the components doesn’t necessarily mean the system is under European jurisdiction.
The key difference in choosing Starlink over these older European satellites lies in performance, particularly latency. The 40ms of Starlink is far superior to the nearly one-second latency of geostationary satellites, a critical factor for battlefield awareness and supporting large numbers of troops with broadband internet. Starlink’s ability to provide unlimited bandwidth was a significant advantage for Russia, which historically struggled with communication efficiency.
The requirement for dishes to be actively pointed at geostationary satellites makes them less practical for use on moving vehicles without advanced gimbal systems. While these satellites might offer some basic communication, they are unlikely to match the capabilities of low-Earth orbit systems like Starlink, especially for applications like drone operations.
The timing of these purchases, particularly in 2015, after the annexation of Crimea, raises further questions about sanctions enforcement. If embargoes were in place, the sale of such technology should have been prohibited, suggesting a potential loophole or a lack of stringent enforcement. The idea of a hidden backdoor or a root certificate that could allow for remote control is a chilling thought, especially given the context of the conflict.
Ultimately, the distinction between a “bit” and a “byte,” or the difference between “mega” and “milli,” is important in understanding the true capabilities of these communication systems. Presenting figures in megabits per second can sometimes obscure the actual performance, leading to inflated perceptions of speed and capability.