Russia and China vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution intended to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, despite revisions aimed at securing their support. The resolution, which had been significantly weakened, aimed to encourage international coordination for safe navigation and demanded Iran cease impeding freedom of passage. Russia and China argued that the resolution, particularly in light of U.S. threats, would have granted excessive authority for aggression and failed to address the conflict’s root causes. Gulf nations expressed dismay at the lack of action, while Iran thanked its allies for blocking the resolution, deeming it misleading.

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It seems we’ve reached a point where Russia and China have stepped in, using their veto power at the UN Security Council, to block a resolution that was aimed at reopening the Strait of Hormuz. This is a pretty significant development, and it’s sparking a lot of conversation about who’s really in the right here and what the motivations might be.

The core issue, from what I gather, is that this resolution was perceived as deeply biased. Many feel it unfairly paints Iran as the sole aggressor in the ongoing conflict, while downplaying or ignoring the roles of the US and Israel in initiating or escalating the situation. The argument is that Iran’s actions, like potentially closing the strait, are a response to provocations, and that if other nations simply refuse to support the aggressors, passage could be maintained.

In fact, there’s a sentiment that the resolution, especially after being revised, became so watered down and wishy-washy that it could have been used to justify almost any action by any country. This lack of clear direction and perceived bias is a major reason why both Russia and China felt compelled to reject it, a stance that some find surprising but ultimately understandable given the context.

It’s pointed out that Iran, in this view, actually possesses the authority to close the strait. The current “shit show,” as it’s been described, is largely attributed to the actions of the US and its allies. Both Russia and China are seen as having something to gain from the continuation of this particular situation, whether it’s economic benefits for Russia through oil prices and relaxed sanctions, or strategic advantages for China.

The idea of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, in this context, is tied to de-escalation. Some believe that a direct approach, possibly involving a call for specific parties to “back off,” is what’s needed. The current world order is viewed by some as being dictated by the whims of powerful individuals, leading to a sense of powerlessness for the general population.

The assertion that the US and Israel initiated the conflict is a strong one. There’s a feeling of regret and acknowledgment, even from within the US, that the country is in the wrong. This perspective suggests that accepting consequences for these actions is a necessary step, rather than attempting to force a resolution that overlooks the root causes.

Furthermore, there’s a critical view of those in power, suggesting they are enriching themselves and dismantling existing structures, all while hindering progress, including environmental transitions. This fuels a deep frustration with governments perceived as inactive or complicit.

The actions of Russia and China in vetoing the resolution are directly linked to their perceived benefits from the current geopolitical climate. China’s ships, for instance, appear to still have passage, and Russia is enjoying increased oil prices and a reduction in sanctions. Trump’s administration is seen by some as having inadvertently handed them a significant win by creating this situation. As long as China and India can secure their energy needs from Russia, the incentive to push for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz diminishes. The conflict’s detrimental impact on the US itself is also seen as a reason why some might not be eager to resolve it quickly.

The perception that the strait was open before the US intervention is a recurring point, leading to a strong hope among some non-Americans that the Republican party never wins another election in the US, linking them to potentially dangerous decisions regarding nuclear power. There’s a suggestion that more effective campaigning, perhaps focusing on perceived risks associated with certain leaders, could have prevented the current crisis.

The role of the UN Security Council itself is questioned, with some suggesting that powerful figures should be able to step in and broker peace, but that they might be revealing themselves as ineffective. The idea of these powerful men being unable to resolve conflicts is seen as a sign of weakness.

Conversely, there are those who are highly skeptical of Russia and China’s motives, labeling them as masters of propaganda. They find it baffling that anyone would believe their narratives, especially given their own human rights records.

However, the justification provided by Russia and China for their veto is explicit. They cite President Trump’s threats to Iran’s civilization as a key reason, arguing that the resolution would have given the US and Israel unchecked permission to continue their aggression. This is seen by proponents of the veto as a necessary check on perceived US overreach and a principled stand against what they view as US imperialism and complicity from some Gulf states.

The argument that the US is not acting in good faith, especially when viewed through the lens of “genocidal threats,” is central to understanding the opposition. The resolution is characterized as an endorsement of “US bullying,” with many UN speeches deemed “shameful” for failing to address who initiated the conflict and their objectives. The effectiveness of the UN itself is doubted due to the veto power.

While some acknowledge that Russia has a history of blaming victims, they still contend that the US and Israel are the instigators here. The resolution is criticized for potentially overlooking the role of countries like Saudi Arabia and the deep-seated enmity between Iran and its neighbors.

A significant concern raised is the potential for Iran to impose tolls or “ransom” for passage through the strait, which is seen as a violation of international law. The analogy is drawn to US actions towards Cuba, implying that Iran is using its leverage to obstruct essential resources, potentially leading to suffering in underdeveloped nations.

Some commentators express a disconcerting alignment between the US and Russia, pointing to diplomatic activities as evidence. While not siding with Russia, they acknowledge its significant gains from the current situation, particularly increased oil revenue used for its actions in Ukraine. China, despite its authoritarian government, is not seen as being in the wrong in this specific instance.

The sentiment that “this world is fucked” is palpable, with a recognition that the US is a major player in global problems. The unintended consequences of the war on people are highlighted, suggesting a disconnect between those in power and the reality faced by the general populace. The question of whether China and Russia genuinely care about the humanitarian impact is raised, juxtaposed with their own alleged transgressions.

The question of Iran’s authority to close the strait is debated, with international laws and territorial waters being brought into the discussion. The idea that Iran might possess nuclear weapons capable of attacking other nations is also brought up, suggesting a potentially different power dynamic than depicted in the resolution.

Iran’s long history of funding terrorist groups and destabilizing the region is presented as a counterpoint to the narrative of the US and Israel being the sole instigators of the current conflict. The resolution is seen as an attempt to shift blame, ignoring the clear fault lines that have existed for decades.

The veto is framed as a rejection of illegal American actions and a refusal to portray Iran as the aggressor. The notion that China’s energy needs are not being fully met due to the conflict is also mentioned, suggesting that they have a vested interest in the strait’s reopening, but are taking a principled stand against perceived US dominance. They desire a stable world order, not one dictated by the US and Israel.

There’s even a speculative comment that France might have vetoed the resolution if it wasn’t for the certainty of China and Russia’s opposition, highlighting the perceived one-sided nature of the proposal. The resolution is criticized for authorizing military force, with requests for it to be solely for defensive needs being disregarded.

The Democratic party is not spared criticism, with the entire party system being questioned. The argument is made that Russia and China are not acting out of altruism, but rather out of self-interest, recognizing how the closure of the strait cripples the West while benefiting them.

Ultimately, the veto by Russia and China on the UN resolution concerning the Strait of Hormuz is a complex event rooted in deeply held, often conflicting, perspectives on the current geopolitical landscape, the causes of the conflict, and the role of international bodies in resolving such crises.