By John Q. Hosedrinker 
New Hampshire’s Secretary of State, David Scanlan, has stated that the state will not alter its election practices in response to President Trump’s executive order restricting mail-in voting. Scanlan emphasized that the federal government cannot override New Hampshire’s constitutional authority to conduct elections and that the state’s existing procedures ensure election security and transparency. This stance reaffirms New Hampshire’s long-held position that states, not the federal government, determine election rules and processes, particularly regarding voter registration and ballot accessibility.
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The recent directive from the Secretary of State in New Hampshire signals a clear stance against following a presidential order concerning mail-in voting, asserting that such an order is not legally binding on the state. This development highlights a significant point of contention regarding the authority of executive orders and the fundamental principles of states’ rights in the American governance system. At the core of this issue is the understanding that executive orders, while carrying weight, are not laws. They primarily serve to direct the actions of the federal government itself, and attempting to dictate state-level election procedures through such means is viewed as overstepping constitutional boundaries. The very essence of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves powers not delegated to the federal government to the states, seems to be the guiding principle here.
The notion that a president can simply issue an executive order to alter how states conduct their elections is fundamentally at odds with the established constitutional framework. The Constitution specifically delineates the limited areas where the federal government holds sway over state election administration, with the date of federal elections being a prime example. Beyond these explicitly defined federal responsibilities, the running of elections falls squarely within the purview of individual states. Therefore, an executive order that purports to dictate mail-in voting practices is seen not just as an overreach but as an unconstitutional attempt to usurp state sovereignty.
Furthermore, there’s a prevailing sentiment that mail-in voting itself is not inherently partisan and that attempts to restrict it could, in fact, backfire on the party attempting to implement such restrictions. The argument is that this practice benefits a broad spectrum of voters across the political divide, and limiting it could disproportionately affect certain demographics, potentially including the very voters who might be swayed by such an order. The idea that only one party benefits from mail-in voting is considered a mischaracterization, especially in light of the fact that prominent political figures, including former presidents, have themselves utilized mail-in voting.
The effectiveness and legality of such an executive order are being questioned from multiple angles. The core assertion is that executive orders are not laws and therefore cannot legally compel states to act in a manner contrary to their own established election laws or constitutional interpretations. The potential for such orders to be immediately challenged in court and found unconstitutional is a significant concern. This resistance is rooted in the belief that any attempt to circumvent established legal processes and state autonomy through executive decree is a dangerous precedent.
The observation that some states, particularly those with strong commitments to states’ rights or those aligned with a particular political ideology, might still consider complying with such an order is noted with a degree of skepticism. There is an underlying curiosity about how these states will navigate the legal and political ramifications of potentially adhering to an order that is widely perceived as unconstitutional. The potential for this to be perceived as “bending over” to appease a particular political figure is also part of the discourse.
A deeper dive into the practical implications reveals that restricting mail-in voting might not yield the intended political outcomes. The reasoning is that voters who rely on mail-in options, for reasons ranging from convenience to accessibility, might simply abstain from voting altogether if the process is made more difficult. This could, ironically, lead to lower voter turnout for the very party seeking to restrict the method. Moreover, the argument is made that mail-in voting doesn’t inherently favor one party over another, especially considering shifts in voting patterns and the reasons individuals choose to vote by mail. The idea that mail-in voting significantly benefits Democrats, as was perhaps perceived during a specific period, is seen as an outdated assumption.
The role of the United States Postal Service (USPS) in this scenario is also a point of discussion. The idea that the USPS, a federal agency, could be directed to alter its operations in ways that impact state elections raises questions about the boundaries of federal and state authority. While the USPS operates under the executive branch, its actions in relation to election mail are still subject to legal and constitutional constraints. The concern is that any perceived complicity or directive from the USPS to comply with a potentially illegal order could lead to further legal challenges and accusations of election interference.
Ultimately, the resistance from New Hampshire’s Secretary of State to the presidential order on mail-in voting serves as a strong affirmation of the principle of state sovereignty in election administration. It underscores the belief that the federal government’s authority in this realm is limited and that states retain significant control over how their elections are conducted. The situation highlights a broader debate about the balance of power between the federal government and the states, particularly when it comes to fundamental democratic processes like voting.