By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Former US presidential envoy Keith Kellogg has proposed forming a new international defense alliance, including Ukraine, due to perceived ineffectiveness of NATO. Kellogg, along with other former Trump-era officials, criticized NATO for failing to adequately respond to major global security challenges, such as the conflict with Iran, labeling it a “paper tiger.” This critique stems from NATO allies’ refusal to support a US-led effort to secure the Strait of Hormuz, prompting a discussion about a fundamental rethinking of US alliances and potentially redrawing defense alignments to include countries like Japan, Australia, and Poland, alongside Ukraine.
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The notion that NATO is being called “cowards” by someone advocating for a new alliance, potentially including Ukraine, highlights a significant disconnect between traditional security structures and the evolving geopolitical landscape. At its core, NATO is fundamentally a defensive alliance, designed to protect its member states from external aggression. The idea that member nations are obligated to jump into every conflict initiated by another member is a misunderstanding of its purpose. It’s a mutual defense pact, meaning an attack on one is considered an attack on all, triggering consultation and potential collective action, not an automatic global engagement force.
The criticism seems to stem from a perception that the United States, or a faction within it, is pushing for engagement in conflicts, such as one involving Iran, and is frustrated by the reluctance of NATO allies to automatically follow suit. This reluctance is often framed as cowardice, a stark contrast to the perceived need for decisive action. However, many European nations view these potential conflicts differently, especially if they are perceived as originating from American initiative without prior broad consultation or consensus within NATO.
The proposal for a new alliance, which would reportedly include Ukraine, Japan, Australia, Germany, and Poland, suggests a desire for a more agile or perhaps more offensively oriented bloc. This, in turn, raises questions about the commitment and understanding of these potential members. Countries like Japan and Australia, while strong allies, have their own regional security concerns and are not traditionally part of European security frameworks. Germany and Poland, while NATO members, have their own historical and strategic considerations, and their willingness to join a new alliance that could draw them into conflicts initiated by the U.S. is far from guaranteed, especially given past experiences with American foreign policy shifts.
The argument is made that the U.S. has, at times, encouraged European nations to be more independent and assertive, only to then expect them to unquestioningly follow U.S. leadership. This perceived policy flip-flop erodes trust and makes it difficult for potential allies to commit to long-term, potentially costly, ventures. The idea of an alliance that could force members into wars, particularly when U.S. policy can change dramatically from one year to the next, is seen as a risky proposition for any nation contemplating such a commitment.
Furthermore, the very premise of NATO’s relevance in the current context is being debated. While it was established to counter Soviet aggression, its role in addressing current global security challenges is being questioned. The suggestion that NATO wasn’t built to address global security beyond its immediate geographic scope implies a need for a new framework that is more adaptable to contemporary threats and opportunities. However, the mechanics and implications of such a new alliance, especially one that is perceived as being driven by specific U.S. interests, are a major point of contention.
The notion of forming a new alliance, rather than working within or reforming existing structures like NATO, is seen by some as a distraction or a divisive tactic. Why create a new entity if existing alliances could be adapted? The argument that countries can be members of multiple clubs suggests that the focus should be on making existing alliances effective, rather than splintering them. The perceived inability or unwillingness of the U.S. to adequately support Ukraine, despite NATO’s stated purpose of countering Russian aggression, further fuels the debate about the effectiveness and commitment of existing alliances.
The argument that the U.S. failed to adequately respond to Russia and that Kellogg recognizes this is a significant point. The perceived lack of robust support for Ukraine from the U.S. is seen as a failure that undermines the credibility of its alliance structures. This is juxtaposed with the idea that the U.S. might be looking to offload the financial and military burden of supporting Ukraine and other potential conflicts onto new partners, which is viewed as a self-serving motive.
The criticism of NATO as “cowards” for not joining a particular war, especially one initiated without broad consensus, is seen as a misunderstanding of the alliance’s defensive nature. The core principle is defense, not automatic participation in offensive actions. The invocation of NATO’s Article 5, which triggers collective defense, has only happened once, following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and this is often cited to emphasize that its activation is not taken lightly and is tied to specific circumstances.
Ultimately, the proposal for a new alliance, including Ukraine, and the strong language used against NATO, suggests a frustration with the current state of international security cooperation. It points to a belief that existing alliances are not sufficiently responsive, adaptable, or willing to engage in necessary actions, and that a new approach is required to address what are perceived as pressing global threats. However, the practicalities, trustworthiness, and ultimate goals of such a new alliance remain highly uncertain and are met with considerable skepticism.