By John Q. Hosedrinker 
The United States and Israel reportedly planned for Kurdish militia forces to invade Iran early in the ongoing war, aiming to incite a rebellion against the Islamic Republic with significant US and Israeli air support. This plan, however, was ultimately canceled due to media leaks, lobbying by allied nations, and growing wariness among the Kurdish groups themselves regarding their prospects and the reliability of their allies. The intended surprise invasion, which involved tens of thousands of Kurdish fighters crossing from Iraq with joint strikes against Iranian security forces, was meant to break the fear barrier among the Iranian opposition. Ultimately, concerns over Iranian countermeasures, the opposition of Turkey and Gulf states, and Kurdish demands for political guarantees led to the abandonment of the operation, leaving Israeli leadership disappointed.
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It appears that a rather ambitious plan, reportedly hatched by the United States and Israel, to leverage Kurdish forces for an invasion of Iran has unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, collapsed. The whispers from various reports suggest that this intricate scheme, which seemingly relied on the Mossad having meticulously cultivated the groundwork for years, ultimately faltered not so much due to leaks, as some might assume, but more profoundly due to an endemic and well-earned distrust. The initial working title, something along the lines of “let someone else do our dirty work for us,” probably didn’t inspire a great deal of confidence from the outset.
The core of the issue, as it’s being understood, is that the US and Israel have a rather extensive history of utilizing Kurdish populations for their strategic objectives, only to then leave them to their own devices, often in precarious situations. The TV reports mentioned the Mossad’s alleged long-term involvement, with foreign sources indicating that both the Mossad and the CIA have been supplying weapons to the Kurds for some time. This included a supposed presentation of the plan by Mossad chief David Barnea to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and discussions in Washington DC prior to the current conflict. The implication is that this was an ongoing strategy, not a sudden development.
The narrative that emerges is that the Kurds, having received weapons from both the US and Israel, ultimately decided to step back from the brink. And honestly, looking back, this might very well be for the best. The US State Department, in particular, has a rather notorious track record of what can only be described as backstabbing the Kurds, time and time again. This pattern stretches back through various historical events, from the Treaty of Sevres, through the protracted Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts, the aftermath of the first and second Gulf Wars – where promises of national sovereignty were allegedly made only to facilitate Turkish incursions into Iraq – the Kirkuk Crisis of 2017, and most recently, the situation in Syria in 2019.
It’s important to recognize, as some have pointed out, that the notion of the Kurds as a monolithic entity is a significant oversimplification. There are numerous regional and sub-regional differences among various Kurdish groups, often with deep-seated historical rivalries between villages that are surprisingly close to one another. This inherent complexity is crucial to understanding why a unified, unquestioning participation in such a high-stakes operation would be unlikely.
The expectation that the Kurds would readily deploy their considerable military prowess and unwavering loyalty, while the US and Israel would merely offer promises and then conveniently abandon them once their objectives were met, seems to be a cornerstone of how some in these regions have historically operated. This cyclical pattern of betrayal, as it’s been described, leaves little room for genuine trust. How can anyone expect to achieve anything significant in the Middle East without a reliable pool of allies to ultimately betray?
The current situation is often viewed as a direct consequence of a certain leadership style, one that prioritizes transactional, short-term gains over long-term trust-building. This approach leaves no one feeling secure. Why would the Kurds trust any administration, especially one with a reputation for shifting alliances and broken promises? The regional actors, it seems, are increasingly unwilling to be subjected to such machinations, particularly when the perceived beneficiaries are specific nations.
Furthermore, the United States itself has, in recent times, demonstrated a tendency to withdraw support abruptly, as was witnessed in previous instances. This history makes it entirely understandable why the Kurds would be hesitant to engage in another potentially disastrous venture. The involvement of Turkey is also a significant factor. Turkish intelligence, which has a close working relationship with the CIA and maintains strong military ties with the US, reportedly received information about the alleged US-Iran plan from Kurdish agents within their own communities. Given that any independent Kurdish entity, particularly one situated near its borders, is viewed as a threat by Turkey, Ankara’s stance was clear: military action would be taken if Kurdish forces were mobilized. This warning effectively forced the shelving of the plan, at least for the time being. Alienating a close ally with such deep insight into one’s military and intelligence structures is a remarkably counterproductive strategy.
The sentiment is that the current political climate, particularly under certain administrations, fosters an environment where trust is eroded. The idea that the US and Israel could expect the Kurds to march into Iran and face potential repercussions, having already been let down multiple times in the past, is seen as unrealistic, to say the least. Some recall discussions about previous promises made to other groups, promises of help, immigration, and protection, which were taken at face value, only to be subsequently abandoned. While some populations might be more susceptible to such tactics, many around the world are far more astute.
The notion that Iranian Kurds would eagerly join a fight against their own government, even if they disapprove of the current regime, is also being questioned. A functioning Iranian state, however imperfect, can offer a degree of protection against potential intervention from neighboring countries like Turkey. The surprise at the existence of “distrust” in this context is met with a sardonic disbelief, given the extensive history of broken promises.
The parallels drawn to other geopolitical situations, where intelligence operations and strategic investments have led to miscalculations and ultimately, military failures, are noteworthy. The idea that either the US or Israeli leadership, or both, were operating under the assumption that this plan would succeed without significant resistance, or without considering the wider regional implications, points to a substantial failure in strategic foresight. It’s almost as if they were all pointing guns at each other in a circle, waiting for someone else to make the first move.
Ultimately, the core issue appears to be the Kurds’ reluctance to be once again subjected to being “carpet-pulled” from underneath them by foreign powers. The idea of trusting any US administration, let alone one perceived as unreliable, is a bridge too far. The strategy of taking weapons and then simply disengaging, a tactic attributed to the Kurds in this instance, seems to be a pragmatic response to a long-standing pattern of being sold out.
The underlying sentiment is one of frustration with a foreign policy that seems to repeatedly misjudge regional dynamics and alienate potential allies, or in this case, leverage existing ones with little regard for long-term consequences. The hope is that this failed endeavor will serve as a stark reminder of the importance of building genuine trust and honoring commitments, rather than relying on ephemeral promises that ultimately leave everyone involved worse off. The Kurds, in this instance, seem to have made a wise decision to avoid being burned for what would have been, by many accounts, the umpteenth time since the end of the First World War.