By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Historian Eric Hobsbawm’s observations about a disconnect from the past and the potential for crisis under unchecked capitalism now resonate with the current geopolitical climate. The article argues that the Trump administration’s war with Iran, driven by a flawed belief in its own exceptionalism and influenced by external lobbying, has resulted in significant civilian casualties, economic disruption, and a severe blow to America’s global reputation. Despite superior firepower, the U.S. appears to have lost control of the conflict, with its resolution increasingly dependent on Tehran’s consent. This foreign policy misstep, coupled with a broader tendency to dismiss historical lessons, highlights a critical juncture for both the nation’s standing and its internal political landscape.
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It appears the prevailing sentiment is that in the current geopolitical maneuvering, Donald Trump has already lost the conflict with Iran, and the Iranian regime can credibly claim victory simply by surviving. The core idea is that the intended outcome – the toppling of the Iranian government and its replacement with a more favorable one – has not materialized and is highly unlikely to. This echoes a perceived delusion, similar to the post-Saddam Iraq scenario, where the architects of the aggression underestimated the resilience of the targeted state and its capacity to weather external pressure.
In fact, rather than weakening Iran, Trump’s actions may have inadvertently bolstered the Islamic Republic’s standing. In a nation where opposition to foreign interference often lends legitimacy to the ruling power, the current confrontation has provided the regime with an opportunity to showcase its endurance against an external adversary. This unintended consequence has led to the ironic situation where Trump’s approach has validated certain claims of Iranian strength and resolve, something the regime itself likely could not have manufactured.
The notion that Trump lost the war very early, perhaps within days, stems from the assumption that the initial plan was to swiftly decapitate the leadership and expect widespread popular support for the intervention. When this immediate capitulation did not occur, the strategy, lacking any apparent alternative, was essentially rendered defunct. The perceived absence of a “Plan B” highlights a fundamental flaw in the strategic thinking, suggesting an almost childlike expectation of immediate compliance rather than a nuanced understanding of geopolitical realities.
Furthermore, it’s argued that this episode has fundamentally altered the global oil market, specifically impacting the Strait of Hormuz. This suggests that the conflict, even without direct large-scale military engagements, has created significant and lasting shifts in critical global economic pathways, which can be interpreted as a strategic victory for Iran in terms of its ability to influence global commerce.
The current administration is characterized as being unable to grasp basic cause-and-effect relationships, leading to an administration that is, by this perspective, exceptionally unintelligent. The lack of a coherent plan from the outset appears to have predetermined the outcome, dooming the endeavor before it even truly began. There’s an anticipation that Trump will likely react with petulance, blaming the Iranians for employing strategy rather than immediately submitting to his will.
The core argument for Iran’s victory rests on their survival and their subsequent demonstration of the ability to hold the global economy hostage, particularly through control over vital shipping lanes. This leverage, it is believed, cannot be effectively countered by military means without potentially exacerbating the situation, highlighting a strategic advantage Iran possesses that transcends conventional military power.
The actions of Trump and Netanyahu are seen as having united the international community against them, despite America’s purported military superiority. This suggests a miscalculation of diplomatic and global standing, where aggressive posturing has backfired. The critique extends to a broader observation that Americans, while skilled in many areas, often exhibit a profound lack of understanding in foreign policy, stemming from a limited engagement with the world beyond their borders.
There is a strong sentiment that this conflict is fundamentally an Israeli war, and the US has no inherent reason to be involved. Trump’s perceived incompetence is seen as a potential quagmire, not only for international relations but also politically, potentially costing him votes and leading to Republican losses in future elections. This suggests a hope that a period of such perceived national “stupidity” might eventually be overcome.
The idea that Trump is a “loser” before even initiating such conflicts is raised, questioning why anyone would expect a different outcome. The subsequent deployment of troops is viewed as an inevitable consequence of this flawed approach, with a cynical observation that past generations have already depleted resources, and now the younger generation faces the ultimate cost.
The notion of Putin aiding Iran against the US and Israel is considered absurd, with the counter-argument being that Putin is actively assisting Iran with intelligence, making a bailout for Trump highly improbable. This highlights a complex web of international alliances and rivalries that undermine the simplistic assumptions of the conflict’s architects.
The description of the situation as “comic book stupid” underscores the perceived irrationality of the strategy, emphasizing that the Iranian people will never embrace pro-US sentiment, regardless of sanctions or conflict, and will not forget the hardship caused. The critique extends to a personal level, suggesting that leaders prone to avoiding military service are unlikely to achieve success in warfare and are perhaps using such conflicts as a distraction from other personal issues.
A critical point raised is the divergence of end goals among the various international actors. Iran aims for regime survival and national sovereignty. Israel seeks to neutralize Iran as a threat, potentially desiring chaos. Iran’s neighbors want stability. India and Pakistan have opposing interests regarding Iran’s internal stability. China desires stability and resources. Saudi Arabia and the UAE want an end to Iranian interference. Russia benefits from high oil prices and diverted Western attention from Ukraine. North Korea seeks attention. The rest of the world wants lower oil prices and to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The US and Trump’s objectives are unclear, leading to the fundamental question of how victory can be declared without a defined objective.
The argument is made that the US, having killed a top Iranian leader, cannot expect a peaceful resolution on its own terms. Any expectation of Iran ending a conflict under such circumstances is deemed highly unlikely. The fear is that deploying ground troops will lead to mission creep, transforming the situation into a decades-long trap, far more complex and protracted than previous interventions, with the potential to be the “downfall of its hegemony in the region” similar to the Suez Crisis for Britain.
Trump’s lack of support from those outside his immediate circle, coupled with insufficient time and manpower, is seen as a critical weakness. His approach is described as that of a “dope,” engaging with an adversary that possesses a form of unspoken immunity. The cancellation of a nuclear deal, when Iran was not seeking one but rather a return to its terms, is highlighted as a strategic blunder. The Iranian ability to “troll” Trump is presented as a source of their resilience, with the expectation that he will eventually be gone, leaving behind the consequences of his actions.
The idea that Trump, unable to tolerate losing, might escalate actions to project an image of victory is a significant concern. The ultimate arbiter of victory, in this view, is the loser deciding when the war is over. If Iran successfully utilizes the Strait of Hormuz, they will have effectively won. Further escalation is predicted to lead to the destruction of more oil infrastructure, indicating a dangerous cycle of actions and reactions.
The historical ramifications of such actions are pondered, questioning whether this is truly a war or something else entirely. There’s a sardonic comment about awarding a prize for first place in war, given the ongoing nature of the conflict and the potential for further loss of American lives, possibly as a distraction from other pressing issues.
The observation that in the Middle East, there’s no “losing in war” narrative, with even defeats being reframed as partial victories, is crucial. The Iranian regime, like others in the region, is unlikely to admit to suffering, instead emphasizing a narrative of success. While the war can be criticized for its failures, echoing the regime’s potentially warped perspective is seen as unhelpful.
The idea that the regime will not be toppled without a massive invasion, requiring a draft and vast resources, is presented. Even with such an invasion, the welcome received by occupying forces is uncertain, with the potential for destruction of civilian infrastructure. The fear is that any US invasion to secure the Strait of Hormuz will lead to Iran destroying remaining oil infrastructure in the Gulf states, a self-defeating strategy.
Trump’s attack is deemed “moronic” and “arrogant,” doomed from the start. The assassination of Iranian leadership, especially during negotiations, is described as unprecedented and a move that has put the administration and its close associates in a perilous position. The comparison to Venezuela suggests a misunderstanding of the situation, with a belief that Israeli objectives might be more about creating chaos than a clean regime change.
The historical parallels to past US interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq are drawn, questioning the likelihood of a different outcome and suggesting a repeated mistake. The argument is made that this conflict marks the end of American global dominance, with allies distancing themselves, the military exposed as vulnerable, and the petrodollar’s absolute reign coming to an end.
There is a critique that if the intention was to benefit the Iranian people, intervention should have occurred during popular uprisings when the regime was weaker. Instead, the timing appears to have allowed the regime to consolidate its power, with the implication that intelligence regarding these uprisings was either ignored or deliberately overlooked to pave the way for foreign intervention. The growing influence of Russia and China, potentially arming Iran, further complicates the situation and suggests a shift in global power dynamics.
Netanyahu’s intelligence is not questioned, but Trump’s is. It is suggested that Netanyahu, understanding the difficulty of a direct confrontation, used Trump as a pawn to achieve Israel’s objectives. The potential sacrifice of American lives for this perceived “BS” is a source of deep concern for those with military family members. The notion that Trump prioritizes personal gain over American interests is reiterated.