By Matt Underwood Iran has recently declared that the Strait of Hormuz remains open, with a significant caveat: ships linked to perceived “enemies” are not welcome. This statement comes amidst ongoing tensions and threats from the United States, painting a complex picture of maritime access and geopolitical maneuvering in a crucial global waterway. The implication here is stark: if you’re perceived as aligning with the US, especially in ways that involve dollar-denominated oil trade, you could find yourself on Iran’s restricted list. It raises the question of what the US has actually achieved through its assertive stance, especially when official pronouncements from its UN representative might not carry direct weight with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and their operational decisions.
The reality is that this situation effectively shutters the Strait to a vast majority of global shipping, upwards of 90%. The idea of implementing a toll or registration system for ships passing through, while perhaps a tempting administrative solution, is unlikely to gain traction or acceptance from Gulf countries or the United States. They are unlikely to agree to such a framework imposed by Iran.
We might anticipate a period of what can be described as “false de-escalation news.” This kind of messaging is often strategically released to temporarily stabilize or boost financial markets, aiming to create a sense of calm that might not reflect the underlying reality of the situation, at least in the short term.
It wouldn’t be entirely surprising to see coordinated actions, such as a volley of missiles and drones from the IRGC, potentially timed to occur before the opening of the US stock market. This kind of event could then be used as justification for a pronouncement of a successful military operation, a narrative that could be framed as a “mission accomplished” by figures like President Trump, perhaps within a couple of days.
An interesting tactic that could emerge is the re-flagging of ships. If vessel registrations are simply changed to countries not considered “enemy-linked,” effectively creating a shadow fleet, it would be a remarkably effective workaround. This approach offers a way around the direct restrictions, playing on the ambiguity of “enemy-linked” status and presenting a strong counter-response to the current pressures.
The dynamic is shaping up to be a clear “us or them” scenario. When mines are deployed, their indiscriminate nature poses a significant risk. The past claims of non-involvement with groups like the Houthis are questionable, especially when similar weapons are used to target civilian vessels that are deemed “enemy ships.” The sentiment expressed is one of intense frustration, with a desire for consequences that reflect the impact of decades of Iranian actions. The idea of being displaced and running for one’s life for eleven years paints a vivid picture of the deep-seated grievances fueling such strong feelings.
One can’t help but wonder about alternative scenarios. What if Iran simply allowed oil to flow freely for nations not aligned with the US? Would that prompt an aggressive response, like an order to pirate global oil exports, akin to a cartoon villain? So far, the immediate threat of widespread piracy hasn’t materialized, but the question of whether it could remains. There’s a conflicted sense of wanting to support Iran for standing up to perceived aggression, but then acknowledging that this is a clash between deeply entrenched ideologies and perhaps a degree of recklessness on both sides, making it hard to fully endorse either.
It’s often said that when two adversaries are locked in conflict, it’s not wise to intervene and stop them. The critical question then becomes whether Iran is still sufficiently coordinated to implement such a complex strategy. Who would be the arbiter of which ships are permitted passage? The prospect of tankers destined for Europe being allowed through would certainly be a welcome development.
The fundamental truth is that a war over the Strait of Hormuz would result in no winners. It would inevitably turn global trade into collateral damage for a conflict that most nations have no desire to be a part of.
The Iranian regime, in its current position, has very little to lose. This is the precarious situation the US has contributed to placing the world in. It’s also worth noting that one particular nation, starting with “I,” might be more inclined towards escalation, and it’s not necessarily Iran. However, as things stand, it appears increasingly likely that Iran might ultimately “win” the strategic conflict over Hormuz, a reality the US might find difficult to accept, signaling a significant strategic defeat for its global influence.
The core of the issue lies in who is losing more in this confrontation. There’s one country that actively sought to “win,” and it’s currently losing. The US has a tendency to view any nation that moves away from the petrodollar system as an enemy deserving of aggressive action. The implosion of the petrodollar system was always a foreseeable outcome; the US has been accumulating debt, much of which is spent on defense initiatives aimed at forcing other nations to continue trading in US dollars.
The shift in focus to transactions in currencies like the Mexican peso, and then to petrodollars, highlights a complex financial dance. This situation has also served to divert attention from other political matters, such as the Trump/Epstein files, and has bolstered the financial standing of military-industrial complex shareholders who are seeing increased demand for their products. Furthermore, it has weakened proxy conflicts, as the US may struggle to supply essential materials. The decision to lift sanctions on Russian oil, ironically, has provided Russia with more financial resources.
Our global power projection has also been challenged, demonstrating that even with advanced weaponry, supply chain limitations can hinder rapid deployment and sustained use against a comparable military. The withdrawal of THAAD systems from South Korea has implications for future agreements with China and Russia. These nations are leveraging this situation as a proxy conflict, gaining valuable intelligence. It’s also prompting discussions regarding reunification with Taiwan, though the ultimate outcome remains uncertain.
The responsibility for this escalating “Operation Epic Fuckup” is being placed squarely on Donald Trump, with questions arising about whether the Straits are truly reopened. It’s important to note that the US does not import a significant amount of oil directly from the Strait of Hormuz, and US-flagged tankers are virtually non-existent in the region. Israel, too, relies more on oil from Africa and South America. Therefore, Iran’s definition of “enemy-linked” becomes paramount, likely excluding nations like China and Japan from restrictions, while potentially imposing tariffs on others for free passage.
These are simply observations, not endorsements of the situation. The notion of implementing a toll and registration system for ships passing through is unlikely to be accepted by Gulf countries or the US. However, realistically, what recourse do they truly have if Iran has already demonstrated an ability to impede passage through the Strait? The assertion that the toll system won’t be accepted might be irrelevant if they are ultimately left with no other choice.
The suggestion that “stupid Iranians will never figure that out” sounds like rhetoric from someone within the administration. The issue extends beyond a simple fee; there’s a push for ships to conduct transactions in Chinese Yuan (CNY) rather than USD, a transition that many merchant ships cannot easily navigate. The anticipation of a future Iranian nuclear-powered aircraft carrier adds a layer of speculative irony to the ongoing tensions.
The requirement for all ships to undergo inspection and documentation checks near the Iranian coast is a plausible measure to prevent loopholes. However, the list of countries willing to align with Iran is currently quite small. The question of who “us” refers to in this context is critical. The notion of being either “with us or against us” is a familiar, albeit potentially oversimplified, framing of geopolitical alignments.
It’s important to challenge the notion that mines are simply indiscriminate. Modern mines are sophisticated, remotely activated, and can differentiate between various types of vessels. While they might not be able to “read a flag,” operators can indeed distinguish between a fishing boat and a large tanker. Iran’s strategy seems to involve guiding ships through specific, narrow passages closer to its coast, where passage can be controlled and potentially blocked if permission is not granted.
This tactic of seizing vessels is not new for Iran. In 2019, they seized a British tanker in response to the UK detaining an Iranian vessel, all without a formal declaration of war. This “ambiguity as policy” approach allows for escalation without outright conflict. The notion of “winning” is difficult to define when a nation can inflict significant damage and disruption without suffering equivalent retaliation.