By Matt Underwood The United States is reportedly set to transfer two NATO command posts to European leadership, according to a military source. This development signals a significant shift in the alliance’s structure, with the aim of fostering a more European-led NATO. One of these command posts, historically based in Naples, Italy, is understood to be a part of this transition. The other command post, located in Virginia, has raised questions regarding its placement and the rationale behind its handover.
The reasoning behind the Virginia command post’s relocation or transfer appears to be multifaceted. While the US Congress mandates continued NATO membership, the sentiment within some circles suggests a desire to reallocate American military resources more heavily towards the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific. This trend points towards a broader strategy of burden-sharing, where European nations will assume greater responsibility for their own defense within the NATO framework. It’s not about abandoning NATO, but rather about evolving its structure.
The decision to shift command responsibilities is viewed by some as a necessary consequence of perceived isolationist tendencies. When a nation’s leadership appears unreliable or prioritizes unilateral action, other countries may feel compelled to bolster their own military capabilities and supply chains, recognizing they cannot depend solely on an unpredictable partner. This can lead to a gradual reduction in overseas investments and a scenario where nations like Germany and France step in to fill the void, eventually taking on more prominent roles.
There’s a feeling that past actions, such as disputes over Greenland, may have strained relationships, making the inclusion of a US-based NATO command post in Virginia appear somewhat incongruous. The Norfolk command post, specifically, deals with the northern flank of NATO, including the Nordic countries and the UK. Reports indicate that the UK is taking on a significant role in managing this particular post. The Naples location, long associated with NATO operations, is seemingly less contentious in this transfer.
The idea of a more European-led NATO is not necessarily unwelcome to all. For some, particularly within the UK’s defense industry, it presents an opportunity for greater investment in their own capabilities and a long-term vision of pushing the US out of European defense entirely within the next five decades. This ambition is tied to a desire for a more robust and independent Europe.
A federal Europe that can rival global superpowers like the US and China, while promoting social democracy, is a vision some hold. If the US can indeed strengthen its alliances in the Pacific, focusing on countries like Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, then this shift within NATO might be seen as a sensible division of focus. After all, NATO’s primary concern has always been Europe, and it’s not expected that all European nations would rush to defend Taiwan.
However, the execution and communication surrounding this transition have been criticized as being poorly handled. The diplomacy, the phrasing, and the overall management of this significant shift have been described as “atrocious.” There’s a hope that despite the awkward rollout, the underlying intentions are sound.
Some observations about Naples suggest it’s a location suited for certain, shall we say, more assertive interventions within Europe. The humor surrounding the idea of charging rent for these command posts highlights the complex financial and political dynamics at play. The legal framework, with existing laws preventing a US president from unilaterally withdrawing from NATO without Congressional approval, adds another layer of complexity to the situation.
This means that any order to attack allied nations, like Canada or Greenland, would be considered illegal by military personnel. The recent experience of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU serves as a reminder of the challenges in achieving large-scale international agreements. For a truly collaborative defense, overcoming such hurdles is paramount.
From an American perspective, the proposed alliance of European nations, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Korea is seen as a powerful bloc. Many of these nations possess advanced defense industries or the potential to develop them, enabling them to share designs, production capabilities, and engineering expertise. This could, in theory, lessen the reliance on the US defense industry in the future.
There’s a frustration with leadership that seems unable to grasp long-term consequences. The idea of a five-year timeframe for such a significant shift in defense strategy is considered more realistic by some than a 50-year plan. Doubts are raised about Europe’s ability to develop the naval and air power necessary to counter threats from China without US backing.
This proposed coalition is essentially being termed “the free world.” The thought that these nations might refuse to supply American forces is a stark reflection of current geopolitical sentiment. The “Greenland debacle” and other perceived slights have fostered a sense of distrust, with Europe viewing the US as a potential threat rather than a consistent ally.
The question of why the US defense industry might struggle is linked to its perceived unreliability. If other nations cease purchasing weapons due to a lack of faith in the US government, then domestic defense industries would inevitably shrink. This combination of financial instability and lost credibility can significantly weaken a nation’s economic and strategic standing.
The idea that Japan or South Korea would completely disentangle themselves from US dependence is viewed as unlikely, given their need for the US to counterbalance China. Moreover, historical rivalries between Japan and South Korea cannot be ignored. Despite their own advanced capabilities, the US provides a crucial bulwark.
Japan’s shipbuilding industry is already a major global player, ranking third worldwide. While China leads in sales volume, Japan’s capabilities, along with South Korea’s, are impressive and rival China’s combined output. This suggests that a stronger European defense industry, supported by these Asian nations, is a plausible future scenario.
The level of resentment towards South Korea and Japan within the US is noted as being significantly less than that directed towards Europe. While there’s a general sense of closer ties with Europe, a significant portion of the American public harbors resentment over European nations not meeting NATO spending minimums and the perception that the US carries a disproportionate burden in supporting Western governance. This sentiment is seen as something politicians like Trump exploit.
Both Europe and the Pacific nations are considered less likely targets of the same political rhetoric compared to Europe. There’s less political fodder for certain leaders to exploit when it comes to those regions. The unreliability and perceived anti-democratic tendencies of the current US administration are leading nations to seek more stable partners.
The post-World War II global order is seen as effectively over, with a transition to a new era underway. The concern is that the US is not in as strong a position as it was for the preceding eighty years. The unique situation of the leading global power actively undermining the established world order is unprecedented.