By John Q. Hosedrinker 
The U.S. military successfully boarded the Aquila II oil tanker in the Indian Ocean as part of an ongoing effort to disrupt the Venezuelan oil trade and enforce international sanctions. This action follows the vessel’s pursuit from the Caribbean, highlighting Washington’s commitment to “quarantining” sanctioned ships and denying illicit actors access to global maritime trade. The Aquila II, which was carrying Venezuelan crude and falsely flying the flag of Panama, is linked to the “shadow fleet” utilized for sanction-evading oil exports and poses environmental risks. This interdiction is one of several recent measures taken by U.S. and European authorities to counter the operations of these tankers.
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The United States has once again taken the bold step of boarding a vessel suspected of being part of Russia’s clandestine “shadow fleet,” a network of ships reportedly used to circumvent international sanctions and illicitly transport oil. This action isn’t a sudden whim; it’s grounded in established maritime law, a principle that permits such enforcement actions against vessels engaged in smuggling operations, particularly those flagged by countries like Venezuela, Iran, and Russia. These shadow fleet ships often resort to deceptive practices, like flying false flags and maintaining fabricated registrations, precisely because they are under sanctions. Without proper insurance, which sanctioned vessels cannot secure, they are effectively barred from reputable ports and any waters friendly to nations that uphold international sanctions. This renders them useless for their intended purpose of transporting goods across global trade routes.
To circumvent these restrictions, these vessels resort to flying false flags, such as those of Guyana or Panama, without any authorization from those nations. This practice is key to the US boarding and seizure operation. Maritime law clearly allows for the seizure of a vessel flying a false flag. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), when a ship flies a false flag, its “flag state jurisdiction”—the legal authority a ship normally has under the country it is registered with on the high seas—is nullified. This effectively renders the vessel a “stateless vessel,” opening it up to the jurisdiction of any state that encounters it. The US Coast Guard can then assert jurisdiction over the vessel as if it were on US soil.
The legal basis for treating a falsely flagged vessel as stateless is quite straightforward. UNCLOS Article 92(2) clarifies that a ship sailing under the flags of two or more states, using them for convenience, forfeits the right to claim any of those nationalities in relation to any other state and can be assimilated to a ship without nationality. This covers scenarios where a vessel fabricates a registration and flies a false flag, or even switches flags while underway, as has been observed with Russian vessels. Such actions mean the ship is no longer under the protection of any legitimate flag state.
Once a vessel is deemed “without nationality,” either truly stateless or through this assimilation process, significant enforcement options become available. The Maritime Crime Manual, referencing UNCLOS, states that this designation “brings into play a series of otherwise unavailable enforcement options.” A primary option is the right of visit, which allows a vessel reasonably suspected of being without nationality to be stopped, boarded, and investigated to confirm its status. Following confirmation of statelessness, the enforcing state can assert jurisdiction over the vessel without the usual impediments associated with properly flagged ships. The exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state on the high seas is removed, making the vessel accessible to the jurisdiction of any state that chooses to assert it.
Historically, the countries whose flags were used without authorization by these shadow fleets might have been complicit or passive, perhaps under the expectation of future support from Russia. However, events have demonstrated Russia’s limitations in providing such support, diminishing the perceived value of these informal partnerships. This is particularly relevant in regions like Venezuela, where Russia’s capacity to offer substantial aid has been called into question. Even for administrations perceived as being lenient towards Russia, actions like these tanker seizures represent a significant escalation, signaling a hardening stance.
The broader strategic implications of these actions are subject to considerable debate. While some may view these boardings as straightforward enforcement operations, others speculate about underlying geopolitical strategies. There are suggestions that these seizures could be part of a larger effort to disrupt Russia’s ability to fund its military operations, potentially through a combination of direct pressure and attempts to influence other nations’ dealings with Russia. The complex interplay of domestic politics and foreign policy within any administration also adds layers of interpretation, with different factions potentially pursuing diverging objectives.
The “shadow fleet” operates outside the established norms of international maritime law, often defying sanctions imposed by a broad coalition of nations, including the US, UK, and EU. Vessels like the Suezmax tanker Aquilla II, which was sanctioned for illicitly transporting Russian and Venezuelan oil, have been intercepted while operating in defiance of established quarantines on sanctioned vessels in crucial maritime domains. The Pentagon has explicitly stated its intent to deny illicit actors and their proxies the ability to disregard American power in the global maritime space.
The legality of these boardings is further solidified by the fact that these vessels often operate under multiple “flags of convenience.” Even if Russia were to claim a vessel after it had been seized, or attempt to re-register it mid-voyage, the act of flying multiple flags, especially unauthorized ones, nullifies its legitimate flag state jurisdiction. According to UNCLOS, sailing under two or more flags for convenience means the vessel cannot claim nationality with respect to any other state and can be treated as stateless. This legal framework provides the US with a clear mandate to assert its jurisdiction, regardless of Russia’s subsequent claims or attempts to re-flag the vessel.
Furthermore, the practice of re-flagging a vessel while underway is not legally permissible under international maritime law and is precisely what UNCLOS addresses when it speaks of sailing under multiple flags of convenience. While a vessel can be re-registered in a new nation in port, doing so while at sea, especially after having flown an unauthorized flag, voids any claim to legitimate nationality. Therefore, Russia’s claims of ownership or protection over such vessels are legally flimsy, especially in the face of the US’s demonstrated willingness to enforce international law. The US’s lack of concern for Russia’s opinions in these matters further underscores their confidence in the legal basis for their actions.
Ultimately, the US boarding of another vessel from Russia’s shadow fleet is a testament to the application of established maritime law against those who seek to circumvent international sanctions and engage in illicit trade. The legal complexities surrounding false flags and stateless vessels are designed to prevent such evasions, and the US is actively leveraging these provisions to disrupt the operations of these sanctioned fleets. The broader strategic context, while open to interpretation, highlights a consistent effort to impede Russia’s economic capabilities through various means, including direct enforcement actions at sea.