By Matt Underwood It’s quite remarkable how a small group of Ukrainian personnel, numbering around ten, armed with drones and leveraging the Delta battlefield-management system, managed to simulate the obliteration of two NATO battalions in a war game. The scenario painted a stark picture: 17 armored vehicles “destroyed” and dozens of simulated strikes executed in mere hours. This isn’t just a hypothetical outcome; it’s a potent demonstration that has clearly resonated, sparking a torrent of thoughts and reactions that highlight a significant shift in modern warfare.
The immediate takeaway for many is the sheer battlefield experience Ukraine brings to the table. This isn’t theoretical knowledge; it’s hard-won expertise from years of intense conflict. Coupled with their prowess in drone technology, this makes Ukraine an exceptionally valuable ally, a sentiment that fuels the argument for increased support and, crucially, learning from their innovative approaches. This is the new reality of asymmetric warfare, and ignoring it would be a grave mistake.
The future of warfare, as many see it, is increasingly leaning towards aerial drones and remote-controlled robotic infantry. This raises fundamental questions about the relevance of traditional, incredibly expensive assets like aircraft carriers when faced with swarms of explosives-laden drones. The effectiveness of such colossal investments in the face of rapidly evolving, decentralized threats is becoming a significant point of discussion. War games, in this context, are not just exercises; they are vital diagnostic tools, revealing vulnerabilities and driving necessary improvements.
The performance in this war game directly underscores the impact of battle-hardened personnel. Militaries with extensive, real-world combat experience appear to possess a distinct advantage over those with less practical training. This isn’t to diminish the technological prowess of any nation, but to emphasize that the human element, forged in the crucible of conflict, remains a critical determinant of success. The “new asymmetric style warfare” is proving to be a powerful equalizer.
There’s a palpable sense of unease about the escalating capabilities in drone warfare, with China often cited as being leagues ahead, particularly in terms of manufacturing capacity for small drones. The thought of DIY drone versions causing localized disruptions due to EMP technology is not just a sci-fi concept anymore, but a plausible concern. This rapid technological advancement, fueled by necessity and innovation, is transforming the battlefield in ways that were perhaps only dreamt of in the past.
The changing landscape of war necessitates a commitment to learning and adaptation. Ukraine’s willingness to train Canadians in drone warfare is seen as a positive step, but it also prompts a broader question: should Ukraine be integrated into NATO? The argument is made that their inclusion wouldn’t just benefit Ukraine’s security but would significantly bolster the alliance’s combat readiness and strategic depth. It’s a powerful suggestion that the perceived strengths of NATO might be inadvertently overlooking crucial lessons being taught by their Ukrainian allies.
The notion that NATO might have learned little from the conflict in Ukraine, clinging to outdated doctrines of superior technology and limited, smart munitions, is a recurring critique. The potential for panic in Europe in the face of substantial losses in this new style of warfare is also a concern, highlighting the need for a serious reassessment of existing strategies and preparedness. The war game’s outcome, while simulated, serves as a stark warning.
There’s a strong consensus that NATO and the EU should be thoroughly examining Ukraine’s war strategies and adopting them as quickly as possible. The effectiveness demonstrated by Ukraine, particularly in its unconventional approaches, cannot be overstated. The idea that Ukraine needs to join NATO, not just for its own protection but for the enhancement of the alliance’s combat effectiveness, is a compelling one that suggests a fundamental reevaluation of geopolitical alliances and military readiness.
The timing of this revelation, occurring within a training exercise rather than a live conflict, is seen as fortunate, allowing for crucial lessons to be absorbed without the devastating cost of actual warfare. The prediction of such drone-centric warfare from decades past is also noted, underscoring the fact that this shift wasn’t entirely unforeseen, yet its current manifestation is proving to be particularly impactful.
The potential for a frightening future is amplified by the thought of synchronized drone warfare with other advanced technological threats, such as autonomous soldiers. This hypothetical, while stark, speaks to the rapid pace of military innovation and the need for constant vigilance. In this evolving geopolitical landscape, the desire to restore past glory, as seen in Russia’s actions, may be inadvertently paving the way for unexpected power shifts.
The effectiveness of new defensive technologies, like Britain’s DragonFire laser, against swarms of drones remains a question mark, highlighting the ongoing arms race in this domain. However, the immediate and most practical benefit for NATO is Ukraine’s hard-won expertise in drone warfare. Their experience makes them an invaluable training resource, and maintaining a strong relationship with them is no longer a matter of preference but a strategic imperative.
The fact that Ukraine, through no fault of their own, has become a leading force in drone warfare is a testament to their resilience and adaptability. It’s a positive outcome born from immense hardship, offering a glimmer of strategic advantage in a devastating conflict. However, the concurrent worry is that despite external support, NATO’s own military leadership may not be adapting quickly enough to the realities of this evolving battlefield.
The paradox of political leadership seemingly detached from the intelligence gathered from real-world conflicts is also pointed out. While the President may not prioritize Ukraine’s support, the military intelligence apparatus is keenly observing and learning from the data. This disconnect raises questions about the translation of battlefield intelligence into effective policy.
The notion that Europe and NATO should already be aware of these threats, given the presence of advisers and intelligence sharing, is a fair point. The headline of a war game scenario causing surprise suggests that perhaps the depth of the threat was underestimated or not fully integrated into strategic planning. It’s a reminder that even with extensive intelligence, understanding and adapting to new doctrines is a continuous challenge.
It’s essential to clarify that war games are not designed to perfectly replicate reality but to intentionally create challenging scenarios for learning and identifying weaknesses. The outcomes, while impactful, are often a product of controlled environments and specific objectives, aiming to foster improvement and highlight doctrinal gaps. The point isn’t necessarily to win, but to learn from defeat.
There’s a sobering acknowledgment that while Ukraine excels in drone warfare, Russia holds the second position, underscoring the broader threat. This necessitates a significant ramp-up in preparations and a refusal to underestimate even a diminished Russia’s capabilities. The rapid technological leap in warfare, where trillions invested in traditional hardware are now being challenged by seemingly simpler, yet devastatingly effective drone swarms, is a paradigm shift.
The “future of warfare” indeed seems to have “turned on a dime,” with the emphasis shifting from massive platforms to agile, adaptable, and often lower-cost systems. This is the consequence of nations fighting for their very existence, forcing innovation out of necessity, while others, perhaps sitting on the sidelines, have been slower to adopt these transformative approaches. The stark reality is that if war were to reach Western shores, the current preparedness in this new domain could be insufficient.
The prospect of a future where Russia and Ukraine, setting aside their differences, might present a formidable united front is a chilling thought, illustrating how unforeseen geopolitical alliances can emerge from conflict. The call for parents to speak to their young soldiers about unlawful orders also highlights the ethical dimensions of modern warfare, especially in the context of evolving command structures and battlefield autonomy.
The suggestion that NATO countries should permit their active military personnel to fight with Ukraine, without penalty, stems from the understanding that real-world combat experience is invaluable. The fact that Ukraine has been engaged in regional conflict for eight years prior to the full-scale invasion, and has now been fighting for its existence for two (or more, depending on how one counts), makes their current status as a battle-hardened force undeniable.
The repetition of the point that war games are intended to result in “losses” for the simulated side, to identify counter-strategies for worst-case scenarios, is crucial. It’s not about winning the simulation, but about understanding how to survive and overcome the threat in reality. The visible displays of drone technology, such as those seen in Chinese light shows, are interpreted not as mere entertainment but as deliberate signals of technological superiority and progress.
The argument that the US has already adjusted for drone warfare, making this particular scenario irrelevant, is a counterpoint that questions the premise of the war game’s impact. It’s suggested that NATO doctrine relies on air superiority, and if the Air Force wasn’t part of the simulation, its relevance to actual NATO strategy might be limited. The effectiveness of drones is also directly linked to the capabilities of the opposing air force, with a weakened air force making drone deployment more decisive.
The notion that a strong Air Force, comprising advanced aircraft like the F-35, could neutralize drone threats is presented as a more traditional counter-argument. However, the prevailing sentiment suggests that a significant shift in military thinking is overdue, and that clinging to outdated doctrines in the face of rapid technological evolution is a dangerous path. The increasing sophistication of extremist groups in adopting these combat styles also poses a significant challenge for interception.
The powerful driving force behind innovation is clearly the fight for survival. This stark reality has spurred a level of ingenuity and adaptation in Ukraine that is unparalleled in recent times. The observation that supporting this innovation, and acknowledging the rise of guerilla warfare and small drones, doesn’t necessarily serve the interests of the military-industrial complex, which often favors large, expensive contracts, offers a critical perspective on the dynamics of defense spending and innovation.
The ultimate outcome of this war game, and the broader implications of Ukraine’s prowess in drone warfare, points to a fundamental reevaluation of military strategies and alliances. It’s a clear signal that the future of conflict is here, and those who fail to learn and adapt will be left behind. The need for collaboration, learning, and embracing new doctrines is paramount, and Ukraine’s experience is proving to be the most potent classroom available.