By John Q. Hosedrinker 
A recent major NATO drill revealed significant unpreparedness for high-intensity drone warfare and real-time intelligence, according to The Wall Street Journal. The exercise, Hedgehog 2025, simulated a battlefield saturated with unmanned systems, where NATO forces struggled to adapt to the extreme visibility created by drones, leading to simulated catastrophic losses. In contrast, Ukrainian specialists, utilizing systems like Delta for rapid target acquisition and coordination, demonstrated a far more effective and agile approach. This stark contrast highlighted broader structural challenges within NATO, such as slow strike coordination and restricted data sharing, underscoring the urgent need to integrate Ukraine’s combat experience into Western military thinking and doctrine.
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It appears that in a recent NATO wargame exercise, Ukrainian forces achieved a decisive victory, reportedly destroying an entire British brigade. This outcome, while perhaps surprising to some, underscores a critical reality: actual combat experience is an invaluable asset, far surpassing theoretical training or simulated scenarios. The intensity and unpredictability of real conflict forge capabilities and adapt tactics in ways that even the most sophisticated wargames often fail to replicate.
The notion that war games are often designed to create an imbalance, forcing one side to adapt and think outside the box, is a relevant context for this particular exercise. While the specifics of this instance might be debated, the underlying principle holds true: failure in a controlled environment is a pathway to improvement in a real-world scenario. The goal isn’t always to declare a definitive winner, but to identify vulnerabilities and prompt innovative solutions that might otherwise remain hidden.
Ukraine’s demonstrated proficiency, particularly in the realm of drone warfare, has clearly emerged as a significant factor. It’s becoming increasingly evident that this experience is not just beneficial for Ukraine but is a crucial asset that NATO countries need to learn from. Allowing this hard-won expertise to be lost due to Russian victory would be a strategic misstep, potentially leaving Russia as the sole holder of extensive, multi-year experience in this rapidly evolving domain.
The sheer speed at which Ukrainian forces have mastered drone technology is remarkable, and it’s often cited as surpassing that of many NATO nations, including the United States. This isn’t about diminishing other forces, but about acknowledging where current expertise lies. The ability to integrate drones effectively into tactical operations, as demonstrated in this wargame, represents a paradigm shift in modern warfare, moving beyond traditional engagements and static defenses.
This event highlights a potential gap in conventional military thinking. For years, military doctrines have been built around established principles, but the Ukraine conflict has accelerated the evolution of warfare, particularly with the pervasive use of drones. This isn’t about hiding behind walls anymore; it’s about a more dynamic, technologically driven approach where traditional advantages might be neutralized.
Indeed, the outcome of this wargame serves as a stark reminder that proficiency is forged through direct application. The idea that fighting forces losing drills multiple times will ultimately be better prepared for real conflict holds weight. These exercises, whether intended or not, push participants to consider unconventional strategies and exploit perceived weaknesses, mirroring the ingenuity Ukraine has displayed in its defense.
History offers parallels. Major military powers have experienced unexpected setbacks in simulated conflicts, which, while initially disheartening, ultimately led to crucial doctrinal adjustments. These simulations, even with their artificial parameters, serve a vital purpose in revealing vulnerabilities in established military doctrines and forcing a reevaluation of defensive and offensive strategies, especially in the face of emerging threats like drone swarms.
The Ukrainian forces’ performance in this exercise should not be viewed as solely a testament to their current capabilities, but also as a reflection of the harsh realities they’ve faced. The tactics and technologies they’ve developed on the battlefield are a direct result of necessity. It’s this practical application of knowledge that makes their experience so valuable to their allies.
It’s crucial to understand that these wargames are often deliberately structured to identify weaknesses. Therefore, the British brigade’s outcome might not necessarily reflect a permanent deficit but rather a deliberate exposure of potential vulnerabilities in their doctrine and training. The narrative surrounding such events can sometimes become exaggerated, but the core lesson remains the need for continuous learning and adaptation.
The lessons Ukraine has learned through its sustained defense are vital for NATO. They have been forced to innovate and adapt in real-time. Recognizing that “getting your backside kicked” in a training exercise is a potent learning experience is essential for Western European nations that may have been downplaying Ukraine’s combat effectiveness relative to established NATO standards.
The current geopolitical landscape underscores the unique value Ukraine brings. While some argue that Ukraine’s tactical prowess with drones won’t elevate it to the “most powerful armed force in Europe” due to limited force projection, its tactical and operational contributions, particularly in drone application, are undeniable. The emphasis on defensive capabilities is a natural consequence of its ongoing struggle.
It’s also worth noting that some wargames are specifically designed to test different operational environments, such as contested conditions with no air superiority and a high density of drones. While this might not represent all of NATO’s potential operational scenarios, particularly offensive operations where air superiority is typically sought, it provides invaluable insights into fighting in conditions that Ukraine experiences daily.
The concept of “war-ending tech” is also a nuanced one. Beyond nuclear capabilities, the real game-changer is often the intelligent application of existing and emerging technologies, as Ukraine has shown with drones. The ability to disrupt, surveil, and attack effectively with these systems has fundamentally altered battlefield dynamics.
The idea that repeated failures in training indicate a lack of improvement is a valid point in some contexts, but wargames often serve a different purpose. They are meant to push boundaries, expose flaws, and ultimately improve overall readiness, even if it means experiencing simulated defeats. The British, for instance, have a history of “winning” certain wargames against allies, often due to pre-defined advantages, with the ultimate goal of public and political support for defense funding.
The notion of a swift military operation being easily executed, as once suggested in a different context, has been demonstrably challenged by Ukraine’s resilience. Examples of Ukrainian forces outmaneuvering and even capturing opposing armor in exercises, and Finnish reservists performing well against more established forces, suggest that raw power and budget don’t always equate to battlefield dominance.
The argument that Russia and Ukraine now possess the most combat-experienced armies in Europe, with over four years of continuous conflict, carries significant weight. This battlefield experience, particularly in drone warfare, could indeed give them an edge over NATO forces, raising concerns about potential Russian advantages in future conflicts, especially if they were to fully leverage their drone capabilities in a coordinated offensive.
The British military, it is argued, has undergone significant reductions, potentially leaving it less battle-ready than its wartime experience might suggest. Wargames, in this context, are not just about theoretical improvement but about assessing the real-world readiness of a significantly strained military force.
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has undeniably widened the experiential gap between Russia and Europe. The evolving nature of battlefield tactics, significantly changed since NATO last updated its training manuals, means that traditional doctrines may be insufficient. The challenge lies in effectively countering distributed drone operations, which are difficult to track and defend against, even with superior airpower.
The notion that Europe or China cannot catch up with the US due to a lack of combat experience is a complex one. While the US has had its share of prolonged engagements, the nature of warfare is continuously shifting, and direct combat experience, as Ukraine is demonstrating, is a powerful teacher.
The value of “losing” in wargames cannot be overstated. It provides the crucial opportunity to identify and rectify flaws in strategy and doctrine. Viewing these exercises as simple win-or-lose scenarios misses the deeper purpose of revealing areas for improvement.
It’s understandable that NATO nations are actively learning from Ukraine. The Ukrainians have had to innovate and adapt on the fly, and their hard-won knowledge is an invaluable resource. Similarly, Ukraine itself has learned from allied special forces, demonstrating a reciprocal flow of tactical expertise.
The question of why this learning isn’t happening more rapidly and directly, with increased observation by NATO and other nations, is a pertinent one. The potential for immediate, practical application of these lessons, rather than waiting for the war’s conclusion, could significantly enhance collective defense capabilities.
While Ukraine’s drone expertise is a significant advantage, claiming it will lead to the “most powerful armed force in Europe” might be an overstatement. Force projection capabilities and broader military capacity are also critical factors. Ukraine’s military will likely remain primarily defensive in nature.
The emphasis on the conditions of the wargame, specifically the lack of NATO drone and counter-drone capabilities, is crucial. It highlights how these exercises are designed to stress specific units and identify vulnerabilities, rather than necessarily reflecting an overall indictment of Ukraine’s military or a definitive statement on NATO’s future power.
The rapid advancement of drone technology, driven by the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, has compressed years of development into a short period. Both sides are pushing the boundaries of what is possible in drone warfare.
The assertion that the wargame was intentionally set up to favor Ukraine’s combat conditions, particularly in contested areas with heavy drone usage and no air superiority, is a valid point. While this provides Ukraine with a familiar environment to demonstrate its strengths, it raises questions about how applicable these findings are to NATO’s typical operational assumptions, which often prioritize air superiority.
The idea that there is no “war-ending tech” other than nuclear weapons is a significant understatement. The effective deployment of advanced conventional weaponry, coupled with innovative tactics and intelligence, can decisively shape the outcome of conflicts without resorting to the catastrophic use of nuclear arms.
The argument that repeated failures in training, in and of themselves, indicate a lack of improvement overlooks the specific goals of wargames. These exercises are designed to provoke novel solutions and highlight deficiencies, even if it means a unit fails multiple times to achieve its objectives. The context of the exercise is paramount.
The comparison to a “special 3-day military operation” being a mere “3-day operation” if the US were to invade Ukraine is a bold claim. However, historical events and recent exercises suggest that underestimating an adversary, regardless of their perceived technological or military standing, can lead to significant miscalculations. The outcomes of past conflicts and exercises, like those involving Ukrainian forces capturing US OPFOR vehicles, or Finnish reservists performing well against US troops, indicate that factors beyond sheer military might are at play.
The question of which recent wars the US has “actually won” apart from Kuwait is a critical one that speaks to the complexities of modern warfare and the limitations of overwhelming military power in achieving strategic objectives. The successes in Afghanistan and Vietnam, for instance, are often cited as examples where conventional military superiority did not translate into decisive political or strategic victories.
The notion of “testing weaknesses in their doctorate” is likely referring to identifying gaps or shortcomings in military doctrine, training, and operational procedures, rather than a literal certification shortfall. While the UK has been involved in numerous conflicts since WWII, continuous underinvestment in defense can impact readiness. However, the argument that other European nations, perhaps Germany or Spain, might be more illustrative examples of this point than the UK, is a matter of ongoing debate.
The hypothetical scenario of Russian drones countering NATO airpower is a complex one. While NATO’s air superiority is a significant advantage, the increasing proliferation of sophisticated drone swarms presents a new challenge. The ability of F-35s to evade Russian air defenses in certain contexts is noted, but the effectiveness of drones in a distributed, decentralized battlefield where air superiority might be contested is a different proposition.
The argument that Russian drones would be ineffective against overwhelming NATO airpower, particularly in the early stages of a conflict before a stalemate develops, is a valid point. However, the nature of drone warfare, especially its ability to operate in contested or denied airspace and its adaptability to trench warfare and static lines, presents a persistent threat that airpower alone may not fully neutralize.
The historical successes of British infantry units in challenging circumstances, and the emphasis on quality over quantity in their naval forces, speak to a long tradition of effective military engagement. The idea that Europe needs Ukraine for numerous reasons, and the apathy surrounding this, is a significant concern. The shift in Russian strategy, potentially focusing on dismounted mechanized warfare due to the depletion of Soviet-era armor, is another factor shaping the conflict.
The counterpoint to the importance of combat experience is the need to survive and effectively transmit that knowledge. The experience of “throwing meat waves” is less valuable than the experience gained in reconnaissance, infiltration, and flanking maneuvers. Furthermore, the effectiveness of passing on this knowledge, particularly concerning issues like NCO retention, is crucial for any army’s long-term strength.
The calculation of “letting Russia bleed” to weaken it, even at the cost of Ukraine’s territory, is a grim but acknowledged strategic consideration. The potential for Russia to gain extensive experience in drone warfare, while seemingly a disadvantage for Ukraine, could ultimately lead to a more formidable adversary. However, the argument is made that NATO’s advanced long-range hardware would render this type of warfare less effective against them, drawing an analogy to a highly skilled water polo team facing a completely different sport.
The ethical implications of this “bleed Russia out” strategy are significant, and the desire for more direct intervention to protect Ukraine and alleviate refugee crises is understandable. The potential for political interference, such as from a Trump administration, is also seen as a complicating factor that might hinder decisive action.
The historical parallel of Germany’s success in WWII, attributed to their embrace of new technologies and tactics learned in the Spanish Civil War, while France clung to WWI-era doctrines, highlights the transformative impact of adopting new warfare paradigms. The current conflict in Ukraine represents a similar shift, and the Russians, through their extensive experience, are poised to emerge with the skills and tactics to dominate future conflicts. The willingness of Russia to accept high casualties without significant unrest is also identified as a potentially decisive factor, contrasting with the West’s greater aversion to such losses. This could lead to a return to attrition-based warfare, where sheer manpower and resilience become critical.