By John Q. Hosedrinker 
The United States remains committed to diplomatic solutions and a negotiated settlement with Iran, despite the complexities of dealing with radical Shiite clerics whose geopolitical decisions are driven by theology. While acknowledging past difficulties in reaching successful agreements, the administration intends to pursue these negotiations as the immediate priority. Concurrently, the U.S. maintains a military posture in the region to protect its forces from potential threats, ensuring readiness should defensive action become necessary. Any future actions will adhere to U.S. law and congressional mandates.
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It’s certainly a noteworthy development when the Taliban announces they would support Iran if attacked by the United States. This declaration, however, comes wrapped in layers of complexity and perhaps a touch of irony, considering the historical dynamics between these entities and the broader geopolitical landscape. One might initially wonder what this “support” truly entails. Is it a genuine commitment to solidarity, or is it an opportunity for the Taliban to carve out their own strategic advantages amidst potential chaos? History offers a peculiar lens here; the Taliban famously withdrew into the mountains for twenty years, a strategy that, while unconventional, proved effective for their long-term survival. Could a similar playbook be in play if they were to offer “support” to Iran, perhaps by consolidating control over border regions for their own “safe keeping”?
The notion of the Taliban aligning with Iran, especially in opposition to the US, is likely to evoke a less-than-enthusiastic reception from the Iranian populace. Iran, it seems, finds itself in rather precarious company, with Russia and North Korea already in their orbit. The addition of the Taliban to this constellation of allies raises questions about shared ideologies or, more cynically, shared animosities. What could these two regimes, with their vastly different cultural and historical contexts, truly have in common beyond a mutual distrust of Western powers? The Taliban’s “support” might be framed as an endorsement, a simple “you’re doing great,” but the practical implications could be far more self-serving.
The Taliban’s operational style, characterized by blending with the local population in Afghanistan, might not translate as effectively within Iran. In Iran, they would likely stand out considerably, potentially forfeiting a significant tactical advantage. This raises further questions about the tangible nature of their promised assistance. If the US were to strike the Iranian regime, one can envision the Taliban potentially crossing the border, perhaps motivated by more than just ideological kinship. The image of them utilizing obsolete equipment, like the Humvees from years past, seems more farcical than formidable, prompting a cynical chuckle.
One has to ponder where the Taliban would seek refuge if their involvement in Iran proved untenable. Would they retreat to Pakistan once again, much like they did previously? What effective measures could they realistically employ, beyond symbolic gestures or perhaps, as some might sarcastically suggest, throwing rocks? Their “support” seems to be directed towards the Iranian regime, not necessarily the people, suggesting a pragmatic alliance rather than a heartfelt endorsement of Iranian aspirations.
It’s also worth considering the resources at the Taliban’s disposal. It’s not out of the realm of possibility that they’ve acquired some of the American-made military hardware left behind after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and they might be eager to deploy it. This very fact highlights a critical failure: the Taliban should have been dismantled, not left to wield national power. Their understanding of conflict is often reduced to a simplistic view of holy war, a mindset that could easily escalate any confrontation into a broader, more intractable conflict.
The idea of “guys with RPGs on donkeys” serving as a formidable defense, particularly against modern air power, is clearly not what Iran needs, especially if they are aiming for a robust air defense system. This is a far cry from the kind of strategic cooperation Iran once seemed to explore. In the aftermath of 9/11, Iran actually provided the US with actionable intelligence on the Taliban and even encouraged their allies, the Northern Alliance, to collaborate with American forces. There were even back-channel negotiations suggesting full denuclearization in exchange for normalized relations. However, this diplomatic opening was met with the “Axis of Evil” designation, a move that empowered hardliners in Iran, ultimately leading to more strained relations.
The question of financial support also arises. Are American taxpayers still footing the bill for the Taliban’s operations on a weekly basis? This continued funding, if true, is a perplexing and perhaps infuriating reality for many. The Taliban, when operating on foreign soil, are unlikely to fare as well as they did in Afghanistan. Their potential support for Iran might be limited to something as rudimentary as providing blankets, a far cry from meaningful military assistance.
This situation could also be the harbinger of a larger, more insidious problem. The radicalization and training of young individuals as pilots, potentially fueled by this regional instability, could have repercussions that manifest years down the line. By the time these threats materialize, the instigators of the current geopolitical turmoil might be long gone, leaving future generations to grapple with the consequences, perhaps ironically blaming whichever administration is in power at that time.
The notion of the Taliban employing a strategy of hiding and waiting for the opportune moment to seize power once foreign forces depart, a tactic honed over decades, is again a distinct possibility. However, the description of them as “bitch made” and less eager for martyrdom than commonly perceived suggests a potential disconnect between their public image and their underlying motivations, which might lean more towards self-preservation and strategic advantage than pure ideological zeal. The prospect of them being “kicked back to their caves” again is also a familiar narrative.
The presence of some American military hardware in their hands is a concerning point, especially when contrasted with the vast sums spent by the US in Afghanistan. This raises the question of whether lessons from previous military engagements have truly been learned, particularly concerning the efficacy of regime change wars and the subsequent management of abandoned military assets. The idea of Trump potentially using such a conflict as an opportunity to eliminate American military equipment gifted to the Taliban in one fell swoop highlights a peculiar and potentially dangerous strategic consideration.
It’s a strange world indeed when the Taliban, a group with such a contentious history, is being perceived by some as a voice of reason. This sentiment, coupled with the general feeling that the world is increasingly aligned against certain aggressive foreign policy approaches, paints a bleak picture of the future. The promise of a utopian future, perhaps envisioned as Star Trek, seems to have devolved into a more dystopian reality akin to The Expanse.
The historical animosity between Iran and the Taliban over border and water disputes is also a crucial, albeit ironic, backdrop to this current declaration of support. For years, the Taliban has allegedly failed to uphold agreements regarding water sharing, a critical issue for Iran given its water scarcity. This ongoing friction makes the Taliban’s current stance all the more perplexing. Furthermore, the geographical context of Iran, with its cities often situated within mountainous regions, presents a unique challenge for any invasion strategy, potentially complicating the Taliban’s own plans if they were to engage in a protracted conflict.
The reality of the Taliban’s past withdrawal, which involved extensive sheltering in Pakistan, underscores their reliance on external support for survival. Their resurgence was less a victory of insurgency and more a consequence of the US withdrawal and subsequent re-entry from Pakistan. The fundamental difference between Iran and the Taliban is stark; while the Taliban might adopt a strategy of withdrawal and protracted resistance, Iran’s urban centers are deeply integrated into its mountainous terrain, making a similar retreat for its leadership and citizenry a far more complex proposition. The idea of a limited constituency for such a protracted, ideologically driven war, especially when contrasted with the potential for widespread popular uprising if the leadership flees, suggests that even with Taliban support, Iran’s path forward, should it face external aggression, remains fraught with uncertainty.