By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Following a decree for general mobilization, Niger’s Chief of Staff, General Amadou Abdramane, declared the nation is preparing for war with France, asserting a shift from a prior state of non-belligerence. This declaration stems from repeated accusations by Nigerien authorities, including leader Abdourahamane Tchiani, that France is actively destabilizing the country and even supporting terrorist groups. France, however, has refuted these claims, with the French Armed Forces spokesperson dismissing them as “information warfare” and affirming no French involvement in Niger. Relations between the former French colony and France have sharply deteriorated since the July 2023 military coup, transforming a partnership into outright hostility.
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The Republic of Niger has announced a mobilization, seemingly to “prepare for war with France,” a statement that has understandably raised a lot of eyebrows and questions. It’s the kind of headline that makes you do a double-take, wondering if it’s a misunderstanding or perhaps a scenario from a movie. To even conceptualize a declaration of war from Niger against France brings forth historical parallels, or perhaps the lack thereof. It does beg the question, is this a genuine strategic move, or could it be rooted in internal political maneuvering, perhaps aiming to rally support against a perceived common enemy to distract from domestic challenges?
Niger, as a military junta dictatorship, has indeed undergone significant shifts recently, notably expelling French and American forces, as well as the UN, and subsequently aligning with Russia. This pivot is often framed as a move to bolster their defense against ISIS, a claim that has fueled further speculation. A recurring narrative emerging from these discussions is the assertion that France is somehow complicit in supporting ISIS, with the rationale that such militant groups couldn’t possibly achieve their current levels of operational success without external backing. This narrative appears to be a potent tool of propaganda, designed to cultivate animosity towards France and divert attention from the government’s own struggles in providing security for its populace.
The complexity of the situation in the Sahel region of West Africa cannot be overstated; it’s a deeply troubled area where the presence of jihadist groups like ISIS and JNIM, an Al-Qaeda affiliate with its own austere vision for the region, has been a persistent and destabilizing force for years. These groups have carved out significant territories in neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali, and also hold sway in parts of western Niger. France historically engaged in counter-insurgency operations in these countries, working alongside their governments. However, these efforts, while keeping the jihadists somewhat contained, never fully eradicated them. Over time, this prolonged conflict fostered frustration within the local military leadership, who often felt that French influence and the perceived caution of their civilian governments were hindering decisive action.
This simmering discontent culminated in Russia-backed coups across all three nations – Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger – which effectively placed the military entirely in control. Following these coups, France and its allies were expelled, and Russian mercenary groups, such as Wagner, were brought in. The subsequent approach by these new regimes has been markedly more brutal, particularly in areas suspected of harboring jihadist sympathizers. The absence of Western scrutiny regarding human rights has, according to many observations, led to a more heavy-handed and less discriminate response.
Unsurprisingly, the security situation has generally worsened since these transitions. The effectiveness of the rebranded Wagner forces is often questioned, with suggestions that they are not as capable as the French forces they replaced. Moreover, the notion that a change in leadership would magically enhance these countries’ warfare capabilities appears to have been unfounded. The jihadist groups, in turn, have expanded their reach, launching raids into neighboring countries like Benin. There are genuine concerns that Burkina Faso and Mali could face state fragmentation or even succumb entirely to the jihadist insurgency. The recent blockade of fuel supplies to Mali’s capital by jihadists and Burkina Faso’s reliance on gold exports via air to maintain power, despite its capital being encircled by jihadist-controlled rural areas, paint a stark picture of the ongoing instability.
In this context of escalating instability and a losing battle against insurgencies, these governments are increasingly resorting to conspiracy theories, with France being a prominent target. This narrative is used as a desperate propaganda tool to recruit soldiers and to motivate the population, particularly in rural areas, to resist the jihadist groups. It’s important to note that JNIM, for instance, actively tries to win over local leaders by presenting itself as an alternative, albeit ultra-conservative, Islamist governing body. Therefore, the announcement of preparing for war with France is viewed by many not as a genuine military intention, but rather as a manufactured crisis for domestic consumption.
The sheer geographical absurdity of a landlocked Niger preparing for war with France, a European power with a significant global military reach, also raises immediate practical questions. How would Niger even project power against France? The notion of Niger’s fleet of ships steaming towards France, or an attempted invasion of Normandy’s beaches, is met with a mixture of bewilderment and dark humor. When juxtaposed with France’s nuclear capabilities and Niger’s status as an impoverished African nation, the perceived imbalance is stark. Some suggest that perhaps the intention is a war not with France itself, but with NATO, a possibility that further escalates the stakes and the perceived recklessness of such a move.
The idea that France is actively supporting Islamic terrorists in Niger seems highly improbable to many observers, especially when considering France’s stated goals in the region, which include fostering stability to mitigate refugee crises and securing access to vital resources like uranium. Such an act would be counterproductive to these objectives. Instead, the prevailing sentiment is that the mobilization announcement is a fabricated conflict, a propaganda ploy by a regime struggling to maintain control and facing a losing battle against its own insurgents, despite the presence of Russian mercenaries. The hope is that the people of Niger will see through this deception and ultimately overthrow their current leadership.
The close relationship that has developed between Russia and Niger since 2023 has led some to characterize Niger as a Russian puppet state, implying that the call for war with France is orchestrated by Moscow. The potential activation of Article V of NATO, should Niger indeed launch an offensive against France, is another critical factor that makes any direct confrontation seem strategically disastrous for Niger. The notion of a nation facing a protracted and losing insurgency turning its attention to a major global power like France seems less like a strategic decision and more like a desperate gambit, possibly influenced by external actors seeking to sow further chaos and destabilization. The current situation in Niger, characterized by internal conflict and shifting geopolitical alliances, is a stark reminder of the fragility of governance in the region and the potent role of propaganda in shaping public perception.