By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Mexico faces deeply entrenched organized crime, ranking third globally according to the Global Organized Crime Index, with powerful drug cartels at its core. The recent killing of Jalisco cartel leader El Mencho unleashed violent retaliation, mirroring a historical pattern where neutralizing cartel leaders fails to dismantle organizations and instead ignites turf wars. This ongoing violence is fueled by systemic impunity, rampant youth unemployment, and a pervasive disregard for life among cartel members. While the government is implementing initiatives to address poverty and unemployment, a comprehensive strategy targeting the root causes of criminality, rather than solely relying on force, is crucial for breaking cycles of violence.
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It’s a somber realization, but the evidence strongly suggests that Mexico has, for a considerable time, been losing its battle against the cartels, a losing streak stemming from deeply flawed strategies, or perhaps more accurately, a lack of a coherent and determined fight. The very notion of a “war” implies engagement, a commitment to confronting the enemy with full force. When the government of Mexico has truly unleashed its power, the cartels have, in many instances, been overwhelmed, suggesting that a genuine confrontation is far from a losing proposition.
The critical issue for both the preceding and the current administrations has been a significant capitulation on confronting cartel influence. For a prolonged period, a discernible absence of decisive action against these powerful organizations has allowed them to flourish. This inaction, bordering on appeasement, has fostered an environment where the cartels have been able to operate with increasing impunity, consolidating their power and extending their reach across vast swathes of the country.
The previous administration, under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, or AMLO, is particularly cited for halting military and police operations against the cartels. It’s a difficult point to comprehend: instead of a robust offensive, there was a pronounced shift away from direct confrontation. This approach, characterized by a belief that a gentler touch would be reciprocated, proved to be a profound miscalculation.
The hope that cartels would simply cease their violent activities or return the favor for being left relatively unchecked was, as events have unfolded, entirely misplaced. Instead, they grew bolder, their influence expanding, and their control solidifying over significant territories. This period of perceived leniency allowed them to entrench themselves even further into the fabric of Mexican society and governance.
The situation was further exacerbated by a concerning trend of cartels openly financing political campaigns for members of the ruling party. Reports of candidates being publicly identified with cartel affiliations paint a stark picture of the depth of infiltration. This brazen display of influence and power within the political sphere undeniably compromises the integrity of the state and its ability to effectively combat organized crime.
While the current president, Claudia Sheinbaum, initially maintained a similar doctrine, likely due to a precarious hold on power in the early stages of her term, a gradual shift appears to be underway. As her position has solidified and a purge of loyalists to the previous administration has occurred, there has been a noticeable backing away from AMLO’s passive approach. This pivot, coupled with external pressures, may be contributing to a more assertive stance.
The recent actions, while extreme, represent the first significant blow against a cartel in nearly a decade, signaling a potential turning point. It’s important to contextualize these events; while the loss of life on both sides is tragic, the narrative of government defeat has been overstated. The government’s claim of 25 forces killed, with the majority being National Guard members in less heavily armed units, contrasts with the over 60 cartel members reportedly killed by the army, which possesses superior armament and armored vehicles.
Furthermore, the elimination of key cartel leadership, including El Mencho, his head of security, and his right-hand man responsible for logistics and finances, is a significant development. The subsequent disruption of the cartel’s ability to coordinate attacks and pay bounties suggests a leadership vacuum. The current quietude of the CJNG and its apparent rudderless state points towards internal turmoil, a direct consequence of these targeted strikes.
The successful dismantling of two additional important operative cells in Jalisco and Veracruz within a short span further underscores the government’s renewed assertiveness. This isn’t a story of losing a war, but rather of finally deciding to engage in one after a prolonged period of inaction. The notion of “hugs, not bullets” proved to be a strategy that was anything but bulletproof.
The underlying demand for drugs, particularly in the United States, acts as the primary fuel for this illicit trade, making it an institution that is incredibly difficult to dismantle solely through law enforcement. Addressing the root causes of drug use, such as improving living conditions and fostering happiness in areas where drug use is prevalent, is a crucial but often overlooked aspect. When the narco industry becomes the fourth-largest employer in Mexico, its economic and social entrenchment becomes undeniable.
The brutal capacity of cartels, often described as gangs of military-trained serial killers, is a chilling reality that makes the hesitancy and paranoia of those outside of Mexico understandable. The organized and global reach of these groups, armed with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and employing drones, presents a formidable challenge.
The concept of a coherent “strategy” is, for many, questionable. The deep-seated corruption within government structures has, for decades, been a more significant factor than any discernible plan to combat organized crime. The narco trade is not merely an external threat; it is deeply interwoven with the state itself, creating a cycle that is incredibly difficult to break.
The drug trade, fueled by insatiable demand and a willingness to engage in extreme violence, has effectively won the “war on drugs.” Mexico, tragically, has become a narco-state, a consequence of decades of misplaced priorities and a failure to confront the issue head-on. The ongoing conflicts are less about a government fighting to regain control and more about internal power struggles within cartel factions, often with the complicity of elements within the state.
The current administration’s apparent shift towards direct confrontation, while a welcome development, arrives after a prolonged period where the battle was effectively lost. The sheer power and influence of the cartels, their global operations, and their ability to infiltrate legitimate economies make them a force that governments consistently underestimate.
The notion that Mexico is “losing” the battle is, for many, an understatement; the war was lost years ago. The reality of a significant portion of the country, and indeed its government, being on the cartel’s payroll, paints a grim picture. The idea of supporting a neighbor in its fight is often discussed, but the complexities of corruption and vested interests make such support fraught with challenges.
Legalizing and regulating drugs, rather than relying on a century-old prohibitionist approach, is frequently proposed as a more pragmatic solution to dismantle the cartels’ financial power. The comparison to the American Prohibition highlights the recurring mistakes made in attempting to curb drug consumption through punitive measures alone, failing to address the fundamental demand and supply dynamics. The cartel-backed governments’ approach to this “war” has been nothing short of self-sabotage.