A Denver District Court judge has ruled that the Colorado Department of Corrections and Governor Jared Polis violated the state constitution by forcing prisoners to work. This ruling stems from a class action lawsuit arguing that such practices contravene Colorado’s constitutional amendment, which prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude with no exceptions. The court ordered CDOC to cease threatening and using segregation as punishment for not working and to end policies that “double charge” non-working inmates.
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A recent ruling has declared that Colorado’s Department of Corrections (CDOC) and Governor Jared Polis have, in fact, crossed a line, violating the Colorado Constitution by compelling prisoners to work. This judicial decision brings to light a significant constitutional question that has been simmering, especially in light of a specific amendment passed by Colorado voters. The crux of the matter hinges on a fundamental principle enshrined in both the U.S. Constitution and, more recently, in Colorado’s own foundational law: the prohibition of involuntary servitude, with a specific carve-out for punishment of convicted criminals. However, Colorado voters, in their wisdom, amended their state constitution in 2018 to explicitly outlaw slavery and forced labor, removing any such exceptions.
This means that the historical precedent, which allowed for forced labor in correctional facilities as a form of punishment, no longer holds sway in Colorado. The state’s own constitution now stands as a bulwark against such practices. The legal challenge, therefore, centers on whether the current practices within CDOC constitute a violation of this state-level prohibition, even if they were previously permissible under broader federal interpretations or older state laws. It’s a rather straightforward interpretation of the amendment itself: if the people of Colorado voted to make slavery and forced labor illegal, with no exceptions, then any state agency or official compelling such labor would indeed be in violation.
The complexity of “prison employment” is often underestimated, and it’s a fair question to ask what happens if a prisoner refuses to take on an assigned job. While the ultimate punishments within a correctional facility might seem limited to solitary confinement or basic sustenance, the reality of the system is that not every inmate is a worker. The input suggests that in many correctional settings, inmate worker positions are not universal, and the vast majority of incarcerated individuals do not participate. If an inmate declines a work assignment or is terminated from one, they are simply replaced by someone else. This implies a degree of choice, at least in theory, though the pressures and motivations for participating in such programs are clearly multifaceted.
Historically, these work opportunities are often highly valued by inmates. They provide a means of occupying their time, which is a significant factor in the monotonous environment of prison life. Furthermore, these jobs offer a way to earn a small amount of money, which can then be used for essential commissary items that are not provided by the facility. However, the core issue remains whether this “opportunity” can be framed as involuntary servitude when the alternative is still incarceration. The distinction between slavery and forced labor can be nuanced, but the Colorado amendment appears to have aimed at a broad prohibition. If holding someone in bondage, regardless of whether they are performing labor for the state or earning commissary money, is deemed slavery, then the inmates have a compelling argument for relief.
The ruling is particularly noteworthy because it highlights a perceived disconnect between the progressive ideals often associated with states like Colorado and the realities of its correctional system. The amendment itself, which outlawed slavery at the state level, was a necessary step that many find regrettable still had to be taken in the 21st century. The subsequent violation of this amendment by the state’s governor and corrections department has led to considerable disappointment and a questioning of the state’s commitment to its own constitutional principles. It’s a scenario where an intended advancement in civil rights has been seemingly undermined by the very entities tasked with upholding the law.
The debate over “states’ rights” often has a complex and sometimes uncomfortable history, particularly when linked to the institution of slavery. The historical context of the Second Continental Congress and the debates surrounding the Declaration of Independence, where a clause condemning the slave trade was removed at the behest of Southern states, underscores this point. “States’ rights” were, in many historical instances, invoked to protect the right of states to maintain slavery and its associated economic structures. Therefore, seeing this principle used in Colorado to uphold a constitutional amendment against forced labor is a noteworthy application, particularly when viewed as a check against an administration perceived as overstepping its bounds.
Beyond the constitutional implications, the practical realities of inmate labor also raise concerns about incentives and the potential for exploitation. In an ideal world, having prisoners engage in productive activities and develop skills could be beneficial. However, the input raises a critical point: it can create an incentive for the system to imprison more people for longer durations or to deny basic necessities unless individuals participate in work programs. This suggests a potential conflict of interest where the profitability or efficiency of the correctional system could be prioritized over the well-being and rehabilitation of inmates. Ideally, prison labor programs should focus on skill development and vocational training that truly benefit the inmates upon their release, and they should not be designed for profit by any party involved.
The compensation for inmate labor, when it occurs, is also a point of discussion. While the exact amounts can vary significantly, the suggestion that it is often around $10 per day, or even less, indicates that it is not intended to be a living wage. The purpose might be to provide a small incentive and a means for commissary purchases, while simultaneously avoiding significant public backlash from higher wages. However, even these modest earnings can be crucial for inmates, particularly when basic necessities like toothpaste are not provided and must be purchased. The experience shared about an incarcerated individual struggling to afford basic hygiene items, despite working, highlights the potential inadequacy of these wages and the harshness of the system.
In conclusion, the judge’s ruling in Colorado represents a significant affirmation of the state’s constitutional commitment to prohibiting involuntary servitude. It compels a re-examination of how correctional facilities operate and ensures that the will of the voters, as expressed through the state’s constitution, is respected. The case underscores the ongoing tension between historical practices, evolving legal interpretations, and the fundamental rights of all individuals, even those incarcerated. The focus must now shift to ensuring that correctional labor practices are not only compliant with the Colorado Constitution but also genuinely rehabilitative and ethical, prioritizing the well-being and future prospects of the individuals involved.
