By John Q. Hosedrinker 
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has indicated that Russia’s ability to financially sustain its conflict in Ukraine is diminishing, stating it would be surprising if Moscow could maintain the war effort for an extended period. To hasten the war’s end, he emphasized the urgency of completely and decisively cutting off Russia’s revenue from gas and oil sales. This perspective aligns with recent statements from French President Emmanuel Macron, who also highlighted the need for increased sanctions and economic pressure on Russia, in conjunction with a renewed focus on cooperation with the US and prioritizing long-term, favorable conditions for negotiations.
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The German defence minister has issued a warning that Russia’s ability to sustain its war in Ukraine economically is limited. This statement, while intended as a serious assessment, has been met with a degree of skepticism, given that similar pronouncements have been circulating for years. The question arises as to what constitutes “long” in this context – is it a fleeting moment or an enduring state? The consistent messaging over an extended period, coupled with the ongoing conflict, leads some to question the timeline and effectiveness of such warnings.
The prevailing sentiment from some quarters is that Russia’s commitment to a full-scale war, regardless of the economic toll, can be sustained if the nation is entirely dedicated to the effort. While this commitment may undoubtedly lead to long-term economic and societal damage within Russia, the assertion that the country *cannot* sustain the war economically is viewed by some as an oversimplification or even a misstatement. Western leaders, it is suggested, should perhaps refrain from repeating phrases that have not demonstrably proven accurate. The implication is that Russia has already incurred substantial losses in troops, equipment, and finances, arguably exceeding those of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, a conflict that significantly contributed to the USSR’s eventual collapse.
There’s a persistent belief that Russia is on a path toward eventual collapse, and that the key for Ukraine is to continue holding its ground and maximizing the war’s cost for Russia. However, the narrative of Russia’s impending failure has been a recurring theme for years, leading to a degree of weariness and doubt about the immediacy of such an outcome. The argument is made that Russia might not be able to sustain the war economically, but this often overlooks the significant strategic partnerships it has forged. The extensive meeting between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in February 2022, resulting in a joint statement declaring a relationship “superior to the political and military alliances of the Cold War era” with “no limits” to their commitments, underscores a crucial element often downplayed in these assessments.
This strategic alignment with China, and potentially other nations, suggests that Russia’s economic resilience may be bolstered by avenues beyond what some Western analyses anticipate. While it’s true that such statements about an impending Russian collapse have been repeated for years, the current geopolitical landscape, particularly the “no limits” partnership with China, presents a complex dynamic that can’t be dismissed lightly. The idea of a simple quid pro quo, such as territorial concessions in exchange for peace, is often dismissed as wishful thinking, especially when viewed through the lens of leaders like Putin who seem to have strong alliances with figures like Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un.
The West’s response to such warnings should not be complacency, but rather a doubling down on support for Ukraine. The economic and manpower strains on both Russia and Ukraine are undeniable, and the return of Ukrainian citizens currently displaced could be a significant factor. News like the German defence minister’s warning, rather than being a cue to relax, should serve as an impetus to demonstrate unwavering support for Ukraine’s ultimate victory. This could potentially cripple the Russian threat for a generation, and it is hoped that the Russian populace, witnessing the immense cost, might eventually drive political change and permanently end the threat.
However, the notion that Russia’s collapse is imminent has been a recurring theme for several years. While Russia may possess a sovereign wealth fund with a year’s worth of funding, and potentially even leverage resources from Africa, the efficacy of sanctions and the flow of revenue from oil and gas sales remain critical factors. Germany’s role in this, particularly its past reliance on Russian energy, is a point of contention. The argument is that if Germany truly wants to stop the war, it needs to decisively cut off the funding source – gas and oil sales – as quickly and completely as possible. The fact that this realization is only being voiced now, years into the conflict, strikes some as a belated awakening.
Furthermore, the depth of suffering the Russian regime is willing to inflict upon its own population, and its historical precedent for enduring hardship, cannot be underestimated. Russia also possesses a substantial stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, a factor that complicates any scenario involving regime collapse or external intervention. The low debt-to-GDP ratio of Russia is often cited, leading to the question of whether it can sustain the war by taking on more debt, a possibility that seems readily available to them.
The effectiveness of warnings about economic unsustainability is called into question when Russia continues to appear solvent. The idea that Putin would retract from the war simply due to economic pressure, especially when faced with potential domestic pride in enduring hardship, is considered naive. The comparison to the Soviet Union’s collapse is made, but the circumstances are different, and the “bald Stalin” moniker suggests a leader not easily swayed by conventional pressures. While the increasing troop losses for Russia are a significant development, the belief that this alone will trigger societal rejection and a rapid change in trajectory is not universally shared.
The narrative of Russia being on the verge of collapse has persisted for years, leading to a sense that it’s wishful thinking rather than a concrete prediction. The effectiveness of sanctions, meant to cripple the Russian economy, is also debated, leading to frustration with repeated, unfulfilled predictions. The idea that Russia will pull back due to escalating costs is seen as contrary to the known characteristics of its leadership, which prioritizes national ambition over immediate economic comfort. The potential for a prolonged conflict, where both sides are kept in a state of precarious balance, is a valid concern.
Ultimately, the concern is that until the West takes more decisive action, such as significantly increasing material and aid to Ukraine, this war could drag on. There are considerable risks associated with forcing Russia into a collapse, including the potential for atomic escalation, a devastating civil war with the risk of weapons falling into the wrong hands, and the possibility of China’s direct involvement. The underlying sentiment is that Russia can remain solvent for longer than some Western nations can maintain their current levels of engagement or their “irrational” approach to the conflict. The influence of figures like Trump, in pressuring countries like India to alter their economic dealings with Russia, is sometimes highlighted as a more pragmatic approach to impacting Russia’s financial capacity. However, the recurring warnings about Russia’s economic unsustainability, while possibly containing a kernel of truth, have become so frequent that their impact is diminishing, leaving many to await tangible evidence of collapse rather than just pronouncements of it.