By Matt Underwood Europe is undeniably looking to chart a more independent course in its defense strategy, a sentiment that has been amplified by recent events, particularly Donald Trump’s audacious push to acquire Greenland. This move, interpreted by many European leaders as a clear signal of shifting priorities from the United States, has underscored a growing feeling that reliance on America for security might no longer be the bedrock it once was. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, speaking at the Munich Security Conference, aptly captured this sentiment, stating that “some lines have been crossed that cannot be uncrossed anymore.”
The tremors of this shift have been felt for some time, especially with Donald Trump’s re-election, but the Greenland episode served as a dramatic punctuation mark, deepening European anxieties about Washington’s commitment to the NATO alliance and, by extension, to the continent’s security. While U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio offered some conciliatory remarks in Munich, aiming for a warmer tone than his predecessors, his speech notably sidestepped key issues like NATO, Russia, and the ongoing war in Ukraine – areas where significant divergences in perspective between the U.S. and its European partners have emerged.
With the war in Ukraine now entering its fifth year and Russia increasingly perceived as a direct threat by its European neighbors, leaders across the continent have made it clear that they intend to accelerate their own defense capabilities and reduce their dependence on the U.S. This renewed focus on self-reliance, ironically, aligns with the stated desires of the Trump administration, which has indicated an expectation for Europe to assume greater responsibility for its conventional defense, while the U.S. would maintain its nuclear umbrella and commitment to NATO’s mutual defense pact.
The concept of a stronger “European pillar” within NATO has gained considerable traction, with leaders like German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer publicly endorsing the idea. However, this push for a more robust home-grown defense is also viewed as a pragmatic hedge against any future U.S. leader who might decide to withdraw security commitments from Europe. Chancellor Merz articulated this sentiment, stating that “This new beginning is right under all circumstances. It is right if the United States continues to distance itself. It is right as long as we cannot guarantee our own security on our own.”
In a further indication of the unease surrounding U.S. security guarantees, Merz has also initiated discussions with Macron regarding the prospect of a European nuclear deterrence. Currently, France possesses the sole independent nuclear deterrent in Europe, as the UK’s Trident missile system is developed and maintained by the United States, highlighting the existing technological dependencies.
The crucial question now facing Europe is whether these stated intentions will translate into tangible actions – whether they can effectively procure and develop new weapon systems, address critical gaps in their arsenals, particularly in areas like long-range missiles, and foster genuine coordination in their defense efforts. While the signs are a mixed bag, there are certainly encouraging developments.
Fueled by both the escalating threat from Russia and the implicit pressure from the U.S. administration, European nations have indeed increased their defense spending. A significant agreement within NATO mandates raising core defense spending from 2% of GDP to 3.5%, with an additional 1.5% earmarked for other security-related investments. European Commission President von der Leyen highlighted this trend, noting that defense spending has surged by nearly 80% since the lead-up to the war in Ukraine.
Furthermore, European countries are actively forming consortia to develop complex weapons systems. Recently, defense ministers from France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Sweden signed a letter of intent to advance the European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) project, aimed at developing “deep strike” missiles. Simultaneously, at a NATO defense ministers’ meeting, several European coalitions committed to collaborative projects in areas such as ballistic missile defense and air-launched munitions.
Despite these positive steps, some high-profile pan-European defense projects have encountered significant hurdles. The future of the Franco-German-Spanish fighter jet project, for instance, has been in limbo for months due to disagreements over the division of work among the involved companies. Debates surrounding EU defense projects have also been characterized by wrangling over whether they should exclusively involve EU companies or be open to international partners, with France advocating for “buy European” provisions while countries like Germany and the Netherlands prefer a more open approach.
Amidst these discussions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy vividly brought the harsh realities of modern warfare to the Munich conference, showcasing stark visuals of Russian attacks, including thousands of drones and missiles launched in a single month. His poignant observation that “weapons evolve faster than political decisions meant to stop them” resonated deeply, underscoring the urgency for Europe to accelerate its defense evolution. The underlying sentiment is a growing recognition that while the U.S. has been a crucial security partner for decades, this reliance has also contributed to a chronic underinvestment in Europe’s own defense capabilities, creating an imbalance where American hegemony underwrites European security while Europe appears to maintain a semblance of independent posture. This is a complex dynamic that is now being fundamentally re-evaluated.