By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Despite the secretary of state’s favorable reception, some American politicians offered words of reassurance. These remarks, akin to the Persian poet’s sentiment that “This too shall pass,” suggested that any criticisms or tensions, even those as sharp as Vice-President Vance’s at the previous year’s conference, would ultimately be temporary. This approach implied a belief in the transient nature of current diplomatic challenges.
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The sentiment circulating among top Democrats is that Donald Trump’s tenure in office is finite, with a significant push to reassure European allies that his presidency is a temporary setback. The underlying message conveyed is that while Trump may be a disruptive force, he represents a phase, not the entirety of American political identity, and efforts are underway to mitigate his impact and secure a more stable future for international relations. This reassurance, however, is met with understandable skepticism, given the profound damage perceived to have been done to global trust.
A key point being made is that Trump, while a singular figure, is enabled by a wider political ecosystem. This includes a Republican-controlled House, Senate, and Supreme Court, suggesting that the challenges extend beyond the individual president. The argument is that the erosion of institutional integrity, the subversion of checks and balances, and the politicization of the judiciary have occurred under his watch, creating a landscape where trust is difficult to reestablish, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office. This perspective suggests that Europe’s apprehension is rooted in a systemic breakdown, not just a personality issue.
Furthermore, the narrative emphasizes that Trump is not an isolated phenomenon but rather the visible face of a broader, concerning movement. This “cancerous MAGA movement,” as it’s sometimes described, implies that even after Trump is gone, the underlying ideology and its supporters will remain. This leads to a cautious outlook from European partners, who question whether the election of a new administration will truly represent a fundamental shift or merely a pause before a similar political force re-emerges. The cyclical nature of American politics, where perceived progress is often followed by a resurgence of conservative forces, fuels this distrust.
The call for structural reforms to prevent future similar crises is a recurring theme. This includes strengthening congressional authority, ensuring the judiciary operates independently of political pressures, and establishing mechanisms to uphold agreements made by previous administrations. Without these safeguards, the argument goes, there is little concrete reason for Europe to place its faith in the long-term stability of American policy. The concern is that a few years of stability under a new president will be negated by the potential return of a figure or movement that undermines international commitments and democratic norms.
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s perspective highlights the connection between domestic economic inequality and the rise of authoritarianism. Her emphasis on addressing wealth disparity and delivering tangible gains to the working class is presented as crucial for preventing a slide into a more isolated world governed by authoritarians. This suggests that the allure of populist leaders is often fueled by economic grievances, and until these are addressed, the potential for similar figures to gain power will persist, making long-term reassurance a complex challenge.
The pessimism regarding the Republican party’s willingness to change is palpable. The view is that the party’s core tenets remain entrenched, and sufficient Republican representation will likely persist to obstruct progressive policies. Coupled with concerns about the judiciary’s perceived political leanings and the Democrats’ own potential for self-sabotage, this paints a picture of an ongoing struggle for stability. Consequently, Europe is seen as acting pragmatically to reduce its dependence on what is perceived as an unpredictable American political landscape, with other nations likely to follow suit.
Some express genuine surprise if Trump even remains in office for the full three years, citing concerns about his physical and mental well-being. While this might suggest a shorter timeline for his departure, it doesn’t necessarily alleviate the deeper concerns about the underlying political currents that propelled him to power and continue to sustain his movement. The focus remains on the sustainability of American democracy and its ability to consistently uphold its international commitments.
The critique also extends to the perceived failure of American institutions to hold Trump accountable, both during his initial term and potentially during a subsequent one. The notion that Republicans are wholeheartedly supporting him implies a significant portion of the political system remains aligned with his brand of politics, even if he himself is no longer in office. This breeds a sense of profound distrust, suggesting that “America” as a reliable partner cannot be assumed, even when specific administrations change.
A significant apprehension is whether Democrats, upon regaining power, will fall into patterns of seeking bipartisan compromise that ultimately dilutes their agenda and allows for the eventual return of similar figures. The history of American politics is cited as evidence that a perceived “healing” phase often leads to a re-empowerment of the very forces that caused the initial damage. This skepticism about the effectiveness of the Democratic party to enact lasting change is a major barrier to reassurance.
Beyond Trump himself, the role of billionaires and their influence is also raised as a persistent threat. The argument is that these powerful economic actors are a driving force behind the political instability, and their influence will not disappear with Trump. Therefore, Europe is advised to protect its own interests from the machims of American billionaires who, by extension, are seen as enabling the political climate that causes concern.
The fear that Americans will repeatedly elect figures like Trump, regardless of their performance, is a significant source of European anxiety. The cycle of electing a Democratic president for a period of perceived safety, followed by a return to more conservative or populist leadership, creates a fundamental uncertainty. This suggests that the problem is not merely about individual politicians but about a deeper, recurring tendency within the American electorate and its political system that undermines predictability and reliability.
The enduring nature of the insults and actions taken during the Trump administration is also a point of concern. The damage to relationships, the disrespect shown to allies and democratic institutions, and the divisive rhetoric are seen as leaving a lasting scar. Even if Trump is gone, the memory of these transgressions and the individuals who supported them will persist, making a full return to pre-Trump levels of trust a considerable challenge.
The core of the issue, as articulated by many, is not simply that Trump will be gone in three years, but that the “illness” that allowed him to rise is still present and can resurface. The risk of dealing with the U.S. is amplified by the knowledge that the political landscape could shift dramatically again in just four years. This inherent unpredictability makes long-term strategic planning and alliances precarious.
The argument is also made that three years is simply not enough time to undo the damage or implement the necessary systemic changes. Even if Trump departs, the existing institutions may not have been sufficiently reformed to prevent a similar crisis from occurring again. The lack of accountability for those who supported Trump’s actions or enabled them further solidifies this concern.
The idea that “everyone gave us a pass the first time” and that the U.S. did not learn from that experience is a harsh but pointed critique. The comparison to other nations that have dealt decisively with attempted coups or similar threats suggests a perceived failure of the American system to self-correct. This, in turn, leads to a conclusion that the world cannot afford to look the other way again, and that trust will not be easily rebuilt.
The effectiveness of the Democratic party is also questioned. The implication is that if Democrats are not actively working to dismantle the forces that enabled Trump, such as through impeachment or widespread investigations, their efforts to reassure allies will be perceived as hollow. The focus is on tangible actions that demonstrate a commitment to preventing a recurrence, rather than simply waiting for a presidential term to end.
The fear of an even worse successor to Trump is also a valid concern. While reassuring Europe that Trump will be gone is a start, the potential for a different, perhaps more strategically capable authoritarian figure to emerge adds another layer of complexity to the geopolitical calculus. This underscores the need for fundamental democratic resilience, not just a change of leadership.
The hope for a much shorter timeline for Trump’s departure is expressed by many, but the underlying concern remains. The observation that Trump “bombed seven countries in one weekend” highlights the potential for significant international damage even within a limited timeframe. This suggests that the immediate impact of a disruptive presidency can have far-reaching and lasting consequences, regardless of how long it lasts.
The persistent presence of Trump’s voters and enablers is a significant hurdle to rebuilding trust. The fact that millions of Americans supported him and his movement means that the underlying political and social divisions will not simply vanish when he leaves office. This long-term reality makes a swift return to pre-Trump levels of trust seem highly improbable.
The call for Democrats to “win the House and Senate” and actively work to remove Trump is a direct plea for proactive measures. It reflects a frustration with the perceived passivity and a desire for more immediate and decisive action to address the crisis, rather than simply waiting for a natural end to a presidential term.
The continued presence of a large Republican party that enabled Trump is seen as a significant obstacle to reassurance. The argument is that even with Trump gone, the structural and ideological underpinnings of his support remain, making the U.S. appear unreliable and volatile to its international partners. The demand for immediate impeachment and an inquiry into corruption underscores a desire for accountability and a fundamental cleansing of the political system.
The possibility of a “worse” leader emerging after Trump is a sobering thought that tempers any optimism about his departure. This highlights the need to address the root causes of political instability, rather than focusing solely on the removal of a single figure. The long-term implications of a weakened or compromised democracy are a cause for significant concern among international allies.
The criticism that the U.S. has a history of electing figures who then undermine democratic norms, only to claim they have changed and then repeat the cycle, is a powerful indictment. This pattern of behavior creates a deep-seated skepticism, making it difficult for the world to believe that meaningful, lasting change will occur. The conservative movement’s enduring strength and financial backing are cited as evidence of this ongoing challenge.
The sentiment that three years is simply too long for the current state of affairs to persist is a clear indication of the urgency felt by many. The immediate threat posed by Trump’s presidency, and the possibility of his re-election or the election of a similarly disruptive figure, creates a constant state of anxiety for international partners.
The enduring support for Trump among a significant portion of the electorate is a fundamental reason for Europe’s lack of trust. The fact that these voters remain means that the political landscape has not fundamentally shifted, and the potential for a return to similar policies or leadership persists. This makes any reassurance about Trump’s eventual departure feel insufficient.
The criticism that Democrats are “utterly useless” and will do “absolutely nothing to reverse the damage” underscores a deep frustration with their perceived inability to enact meaningful change. The fear is that even with a change in leadership, the underlying systemic issues will remain unaddressed, and the U.S. will continue to be a source of instability.
The notion that four years of “performative scolding, calls for bipartisanship, and going along with stalling tactics” will inevitably lead to the return of figures like Trump is a pessimistic but widely held view. This suggests that the political establishment may lack the will or the capacity to implement the fundamental reforms needed to prevent a recurrence.
The statement that “knowing a dictator could be elected at any moment should be enough to ensure no one ever trusts the U.S. ever again” encapsulates the profound crisis of confidence. It highlights that the issue transcends the tenure of any single president and points to a fundamental vulnerability in the American democratic system that allies find deeply unsettling.
The core argument is that Trump’s departure is not a magical fix but merely an opportunity to *begin* addressing the underlying issues. The “assortment of losers, crooks, and bastards around him” and their ability to inflict damage with “little effective push-back, and zero punishment whatsoever” are critical points of concern. This implies that the problem lies not just with the leader but with the entire apparatus that allows such figures to operate with impunity.
The question of what comes after Trump is paramount. The idea that things will magically revert to a “pre-Trump normal” is dismissed. Instead, there is a focus on the continued presence of those who supported Trump and enabled his rise. The question of whether the government and media will continue to “bend over backwards for Trump” or for the “next authoritarian shitbag to come along” highlights the deep-seated fear of a recurring pattern.
The physical appearance of Trump is noted as a potential indicator of a shorter timeline for his departure, but this observation does not negate the more profound concerns about the political movement he represents. The enduring strength of the Republican party, the millions of voters who support him, and the billionaires who enabled him are seen as continuing forces that will not disappear with his exit from the presidency.
The plea for Democrats to “win the house and senate and remove his ass *next year*” reflects a desire for immediate action and a rejection of the idea of waiting out a presidential term. This suggests that the current situation is viewed as an emergency that requires a more forceful response.
The continued presence of “lots of Republicans” after Trump leaves office is seen as a significant factor that fails to reassure anyone. This implies that the fundamental political divisions and the support for conservative ideologies remain strong, making the U.S. appear unpredictable and unreliable to its allies.
The call for Trump to be “impeached and removed from office immediately” and for an “inquiry into the depth of corruption” reflects a desire for accountability and a thorough reckoning with the damage done. The understanding is that even if Trump is gone, the “Republican machine enabling him” will still be around and could return with similar destructive agendas in the future.
The prospect of a “worse than Trump” leader emerging is a chilling thought that underscores the fragility of the current situation. This implies that the problems are not limited to Trump himself but are rooted in systemic vulnerabilities that could be exploited by other actors.
The hope for a much shorter timeframe than three years for Trump’s departure is widely expressed. The reference to his actions of bombing multiple countries in a short period highlights the potential for significant international damage even within a limited presidential term. This underscores the immediate and ongoing risks associated with his presidency.
The observation that “most of the dickheads who put him in power will still be here” and will continue to pursue similar agendas is a stark reminder that Trump is a symptom, not the sole cause, of the problem. The call for Europe to protect itself and to avoid appeasing “US fascism” highlights a recognition that the struggle for American democracy is ongoing and that international solidarity is crucial. The admission that “a lot of us in the U.S. are trying to fix it from the inside, but it’s going to take a while” acknowledges the difficulty of the task and the need for patience and support from allies.
The repeated cycle of electing and then disavowing populist leaders, only to repeat the pattern, is a source of deep concern for the international community. The claim that “they claimed they’d changed after electing Obama and then elected Trump, said the same thing when they elected Biden” illustrates a perceived inability to break from a destructive cycle. This makes it difficult for the world to trust that the U.S. has learned its lessons and will consistently uphold democratic values and international commitments. The enduring strength and financing of the conservative movement are seen as key factors perpetuating this cycle, making the reassurance offered by Democrats seem insufficient.