By John Q. Hosedrinker 
The Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) conducted a special operation resulting in a naval attack in the port of Novorossiysk. Underwater drones, “Sub Sea Baby,” were deployed to detonate a Russian 636.3 “Varshavyanka” class submarine, causing critical damage and rendering it inoperable. The submarine, which housed four Kalibr cruise missile launchers, is estimated to cost up to $500 million. This operation, a joint effort between the SSU and the Naval Forces of Ukraine, further hindered Russia’s naval capabilities.
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Ukrainian “Sub Sea Baby” drones hit Russian submarine in Novorossiysk for the first time in history, marking a significant moment in modern warfare. It’s a stark reminder that the landscape of conflict is evolving rapidly, with technology making it cheaper and harder to defend against. The fact that Ukraine now has operational submarine drones is a game-changer, and one can only imagine the level of concern within the Russian naval command, particularly regarding the effectiveness of their sonar systems.
The echoes of the early 20th century are resonating, but in a much smaller, more accessible way. Think of the rise of air power, the emergence of torpedo boats, and the evolution of aircraft carriers, all mixed with modern technology like radar, sonar, and local AI guidance. This feels like history repeating itself, but this time, it’s on a smaller scale, and with potentially devastating consequences.
The challenge lies in the disparity between the cost of offense and defense. Trading expensive missiles for cheap drones creates an undeniable advantage for the attacker. The solutions, in some ways, are reminiscent of older tactics, adapted and scaled down. Think of Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), but with smaller, more readily available weaponry, like a shotgun or even a rifle. Lasers might become useful eventually, but that’s a longer-term solution and hardening these small drones is a challenge.
The recent event is a historic one in the context of the Ukraine conflict, but also in the grand scheme of naval warfare. The fact that the Russian Navy continues to face setbacks against a country without its own navy highlights the ingenuity and adaptability of the Ukrainian forces. The submarine targeted in Novorossiysk, a Kilo-class diesel-electric attack sub, thankfully didn’t contain any nuclear materials, which is a relief.
The key factor in all of this is time. Sometimes, you have to be patient and wait, while other times, you have to seize the moment. The implications of this event extend far beyond the immediate conflict, changing how naval operations, training and fleet design should be evaluated.
This situation reveals the complex nature of underwater warfare. Sonar systems, which are vital for detecting and tracking threats, are often not designed to identify small, slow-moving targets like these new drones. Even if the systems could detect them, the countermeasures available are limited. It’s a very different set of challenges when you have to track something moving like a large dolphin.
The U.S. military learned in Afghanistan how hard it is to counter entrenched urban guerrilla warfare. Drones were a big thing in part for that reason, as were robotic IED detection and the like. Now, Ukraine’s unfortunate situation is becoming a testbed for the next evolution of warfare. We are effectively seeing the return of trench warfare, with new weapons.
It’s fascinating to see the so-called “cheap drone craze” unfold, but it’s not actually new. Drones have been around for a long time. The technology has evolved considerably since the early days.
We are entering an era of increasing drone sophistication, starting with cheap, disposable models and evolving towards more complex systems with enhanced capabilities. At some point, nations will likely consolidate sensors on these advanced platforms and simply launch a missile or rocket from them to save money, creating a very dynamic strategic approach.
These are not the kind of drones that can carry a large amount of payload; their main purpose is to disrupt the current enemy, Russian forces, by attacking the armor, for example. Bigger, more powerful drones are vulnerable to standard air defenses, so a balance needs to be found between firepower and vulnerability.
It’s becoming clear that drones are a tool of war, and they’re here to stay. However, they’re not an unsolvable problem. The initial defense might even involve something as simple as fishing nets. The explosion needs to be distanced from the hull of the ship, and the cheaper the better.
The arrows and ballista have gotten better, but there is not yet a large number of ground-based tiny drones employing it as a tactic. We will always have it, easier to dig a hole than to set up actual fortified cover.
In conclusion, it will be interesting to see what future innovations will come up from this type of warfare, and to what extent it will change the landscape of the war.