By John Q. Hosedrinker 
X’s new feature revealing user locations and account details has exposed widespread manipulation and fake accounts. Numerous accounts posing as Gazan residents, including some that solicited donations, were revealed to be operating from other countries such as Nigeria and Pakistan. Furthermore, accounts claiming to be journalists from Gaza were found to be based in locations like the United States and Turkey. The increased transparency has unveiled the extent of coordinated inauthentic activity on the platform, highlighting potential issues with political activism and misinformation campaigns.
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X exposes fake Gaza accounts from Pakistan – and the rabbit hole goes deep.
The recent revelations on X, formerly Twitter, are revealing a rather bizarre reality: the online battleground of the Israel-Palestine conflict is often less about Israelis and Palestinians, and more about Indians and Pakistanis. This has become apparent with Twitter’s location-tagging feature, which has exposed a surprisingly large number of accounts. Many that presented themselves as pro-Israeli or right-wing figures were actually operated from India or Pakistan. Even more strikingly, numerous accounts claiming to be Palestinians living within Gaza – voices desperately sharing their experiences – were found to be based in Pakistan. It is a stark reminder that the online world doesn’t always reflect reality.
Equally unsettling is the discovery that some accounts portraying themselves as left-leaning, anti-bigotry voices, often critical of Hindu nationalism, were actually operated from Pakistan or Bangladesh. Some of these accounts have even updated their location settings to “South Asia”, in an attempt to obscure their origins. The implications are concerning, especially when considering the mainstream media’s reliance on these accounts. If these accounts aren’t properly verified, the media will continue to use them as primary sources.
A point of contention that emerges is whether Israel can monitor or identify where devices are located, given that it controls the mobile network in Gaza. If Israel could detect where mobile devices are located, then would they know when a device is pinging from a different location? The answer to this is likely complex. Cyber intelligence capabilities may exist that can identify cell phones through compromised devices or SIM cards. However, it seems that such tracking is unlikely unless a high-profile target is involved. Meanwhile, there’s another angle to consider: some of the journalists on the ground in Gaza state that the accounts in question are operated by family members, who could be elsewhere. The complexities multiply when considering that leaving Gaza is often difficult, if not impossible, for many.
The implications of these revelations are further amplified when considering the role of mainstream media. Major news outlets like Reuters, CNN, the New York Times, and the Associated Press, often cite “independent journalists” as sources, even quoting from statements of Hamas claims. There’s a question as to how the joint statements released by these organizations look in light of the fact that the so-called “starving independent journalists” were not even in Gaza. The whole world is being manipulated by social media; some are paid to be trolls and others are lying and pushing inauthentic content.
It’s tempting to think that those pretending to be in Gaza might be using VPNs to hide their locations. While this is certainly possible, the reality might be more complicated. The idea that someone could avoid monitoring through a VPN is only partially true, as a sophisticated intelligence agency could potentially track activity. However, even if someone is using a VPN, it doesn’t automatically make their claims invalid. People could legitimately want to hide their location for fear of retribution from either side of the conflict. However, the use of fake accounts in order to spread misinformation and influence the narrative is a problem.
The motivation behind this activity is another point of discussion. There are potential bot farms paid by different entities, from Qatar and Iran to the Pakistani government. This illustrates how social media platforms can be tools for political manipulation and international instability, where both sides of the political spectrum are played. These bot farms exploit the extremes in order to divide foreign countries.
It’s also worth acknowledging that the situation within Gaza is complex. While it may seem counterintuitive, some of the scammers pretending to be Gazans are, in fact, Gazans themselves. This is to say that the lines between genuine experiences and outright deceit can become blurred, especially within a conflict zone.
Ultimately, the revelations expose a deeper issue: the way information is consumed and interpreted on platforms like X. If we’re being honest, the platform itself is a tool to manipulate people, and the fact that X’s leadership could or has manipulated information for their own purposes further complicates matters. It’s a space where foreign actors can manipulate narratives on both sides. The use of Twitter as a source of information is increasingly becoming a problem as the platform has become a breeding ground for misinformation and propaganda.