By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Overnight strikes on October 5th saw Russia deploy 549 weapons systems built with over 102,000 foreign-made components, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky accused nine countries, including the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, of failing to prevent their technology from reaching Russia, citing the use of foreign-made components in missiles and drones. He highlighted specific examples such as U.S.-made technology in Iskander and Kinjal missiles. The attacks resulted in casualties in Lviv and Zaporizhzhia, and overall, the attacks involved approximately 500 drones and 50 missiles striking Ukrainian territory.
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Zelensky reveals nine Western countries sending parts to Russia to build missiles and attack drones, which immediately sets off a lot of internal debate. Firstly, the very term “Western countries” seems a bit off. Four of the nine countries listed are actually in Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. It’s easy to see how that slip-up might occur, but it’s important to be accurate.
Next up, the whole concept of the situation is, unfortunately, not entirely surprising. Supply chains are incredibly complex and international, making it almost impossible to completely halt the flow of components. We’re talking about dual-use items – goods that can be used for both civilian and military purposes – slipping through the cracks. Even with end-user certificates and active monitoring, it’s a massive challenge. A reminder that even in the past, obtaining crucial resources was possible, like the U.S. buying tungsten from the Soviet Union. Could Russia, therefore, be doing the same with PCB boards?
The discussion quickly moves toward the core issue: the potential for war profiteering. It’s certainly a question that many people are asking, wondering if some companies are knowingly – or even unknowingly – facilitating the production of weapons for Russia. The money aspect makes the reality all the more plausible.
Middlemen play a significant role, as shipments often pass through third countries before reaching Russia. It’s not always a case of direct exports, but rather a more indirect route that complicates tracking. This opens the door for companies in these transit countries to buy components and then sell them to Russia at a marked-up price.
It is a global economy after all. And selling these components is big business. It’s a little like, if you have the money, we have the parts. It does raise the question of which components are involved. Some are likely basic electronic parts that are distributed globally and used for everything. It might be impossible to stop this practice completely due to the greed of the middlemen and the incentive to profit from the war.
The article raises some interesting points, such as how, for example, France might not be included on the list of nations because it might already be aware of the issue and not wanting to be involved in sending parts. This also makes you wonder about any existing sales of optics or other components to Russia. The question of stopping the flow is considered again, and it is noted that if a country is found to be sending parts, one warning, then a total cutoff of parts might be the best way to do it.
Logistics professionals have also mentioned issues with the flow of components, such as the requests for multiple Certificates of Origin for circuit boards. A simple drone can be constructed from many different sources using common components. If you are looking at specialized military-grade components, things get much more suspicious.
The general consensus seems to be that it’s incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to completely stop the flow of these components. Countries like Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan are often mentioned as transit points, as there are many flights between these countries and adversarial nations.
There are some that think Ukraine should just get nukes again. It may seem relevant to deter their enemies, but in fact, they can’t make nukes anyway.
The whole idea of how certain countries would react if they were caught sending items to Russia is interesting to consider.
The question of whether these countries knew or did not know what was happening is, of course, unclear. But again, the article highlights a difficult situation. The complexity of supply chains, the involvement of middlemen, and the potential for war profiteering make it a tough problem to solve.