By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Ukraine has developed two long-range cruise missiles since the start of the war, rivaling the capabilities of Europe’s only comparable system, the French MdCN, which currently exists only in a naval version. The Ukrainian RK-360L, with a range of 1,000 kilometers and a 260-kilogram warhead, is operationally similar to the MdCN but offers the practical advantage of ground-based launch from mobile platforms. While the French MdCN relies on technology derived from the SCALP system, the Ukrainian Neptune’s targeting precision has been proven in combat, and Defense Express notes that the Ukrainian missile is likely cheaper and faster to manufacture. Ukraine has also developed the FP-5 Flamingo and a domestically produced ballistic missile, expanding its offensive capabilities.
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Ukraine Builds the Long-Range Cruise Missile Europe Still Can’t Make
Necessity, as they say, is the mother of invention. And when a nation is fighting for its very survival, the urgency to innovate becomes a powerful force. This is precisely what we’re seeing with Ukraine. Pushed to the brink by an aggressive neighbor, Ukraine is demonstrating an incredible capacity for developing military technology, specifically the long-range cruise missile, a capability that Europe, surprisingly, still lags behind on.
While Europe, particularly countries like France, might argue that their strategic needs differ, the fact remains: Ukraine is building what Europe, for various reasons, has yet to fully master. The contrast is striking. While the EU gets caught up in bureaucratic processes, committees, and reviews, Ukraine is pushing the boundaries of what’s possible. This isn’t to say Europe is incapable; the EU has the resources and the know-how. The issue appears to be a complex interplay of priorities, strategic considerations, and perhaps, a reluctance to fully embrace the realities of modern warfare.
It is important to acknowledge the constraints. A major factor is the understandable fear of escalation. Europe’s leaders, conscious of the potential consequences of direct confrontation with Russia, may be hesitant to deploy such weapons, especially at a time when there is a huge push for de-escalation. Furthermore, there is a strong historical context here. France, for example, doesn’t face the same immediate threats as Ukraine and, with nuclear weapons, can deter conventional attacks. Their military doctrine and expeditionary focus also affects how it approaches defense.
However, the implication is that the EU is slow to respond and this must be changed immediately. The point is that the EU could make long-range cruise missiles, as they have demonstrated the capability to do so in the past. But due to a mix of political and military decisions, they have not made the same strategic choices as Ukraine. They have been slow to recognize that they are currently at war, as such they have been slow in mobilizing.
The difference is, as it’s been said, between “can’t” and “won’t”. The Ukrainian innovation is a testament to their will to survive. In the face of the ongoing invasion and the need to strike critical targets, they’ve focused on developing this capability, and fast. It’s important to note that Ukraine had great engineers during the Soviet period, and has, with war driving innovation, accelerated its progress.
The reality is, when survival is on the line, the motivation is high. If necessity is the mother of invention, then war is its midwife. Cruise missiles, like many other technologies, are no longer the exclusive domain of large, established military powers. With the right components, a talented engineering team, and a clear objective, they can be built. Ukraine’s focus, drive, and determination are creating new advanced armaments.
For the EU, it’s a different story. The European project involves bureaucratic hurdles, diverse national interests, and political considerations that naturally slow down the development of major military projects. While this may not be ideal, it’s a reflection of the complex environment in which they operate. The current geopolitical circumstances highlight that the EU needs to accelerate and push for change within its leadership to keep pace with technological development. It is time for a new era.
In conclusion, the Ukrainian example is a powerful reminder that necessity truly is the mother of invention. The fact that Ukraine is building a long-range cruise missile while Europe is still working through the process is a clear indicator of the different strategic priorities and levels of urgency. As they evolve and the war evolves, they will continue to evolve their tech innovations to win this fight. This has significant implications for the future of European defense, and for NATO as a whole.