By John Q. Hosedrinker 
The European Union’s energy ministers have agreed to ban Russian gas imports by January 1, 2028, in response to Moscow’s “weaponization” of gas supplies, despite the EU still being a major importer of Russian LNG. The bill, which has exceptions, will initially target existing contracts and is set to be approved by the European Parliament. Hungary and Slovakia opposed the bill, citing difficulties in securing alternative gas sources due to their landlocked status. The new regulation includes additional scrutiny for Russian gas, transition plans, and prior authorization regimes to ensure compliance.
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Europe moves to end all Russian gas imports, and it’s a development that’s drawing mixed reactions. Some see it as a long-overdue step, pointing out that it should have happened much sooner, perhaps even years ago. There’s a general sense that this move is ultimately positive, though the timing leaves something to be desired. The sentiment is that while late, it’s better late than never.
This brings up a fundamental question: where will Europe get its natural gas now? The good news is that there are alternatives. The United States, for example, has been criticized for certain aspects of its support for Ukraine, but it hasn’t been economically propping up Russia, which is a key distinction. Europe, conversely, had a deep dependence on Russian gas, and that dependence is only now being addressed.
The narrative of Europe’s response has been one of slow, incremental moves. The headlines often read like announcements of intentions rather than concrete actions. This prolonged approach is frustrating for some who feel that decisive action should have been taken much earlier, especially considering the devastation and loss of life in Ukraine. The frustration stems from the fact that it took the ongoing conflict for Europe to finally commit to significant energy sanctions.
The geopolitical ramifications are significant. Some commentators are concerned about Europe’s capacity to respond robustly in any future conflict involving Russia. The slow pace of severing ties with Russian gas has raised questions about Europe’s seriousness when it comes to defending its interests and values. It underscores the challenges of aligning various national interests within the EU.
The underlying concern here is that there could be a serious shortage of military-age people in the EU if conflict escalated. The response to the situation in Ukraine is regarded by some as tepid. There is a concern that if a peace deal is signed and sanctions are lifted, gas and oil could start flowing again, meaning Russia would have an easier recovery.
Europe isn’t a monolithic entity, and internal divisions and various national interests play a huge part in how quickly decisions are made. Furthermore, there’s a strong belief that the leaders, not the people, should be held accountable. Punishing the Russian leadership for its actions while trying to minimize the suffering of the Russian people is a balancing act, and there is no easy answer.
So, how will Europe actually replace Russian gas? The reality is that there are several sources. Alternative pipelines from countries like Norway, Algeria, and those in the Middle East and liquid natural gas (LNG) imported by ship are already being utilized. Qatar is another supplier, though its contribution is smaller. While the US also imports goods and services from Russia, it’s not on the same scale of dependence.
Official figures from late 2023 showed that Norway supplied the largest amount of gas to the EU, followed by the United States and Algeria. Russia, both through pipelines and LNG, still accounted for a portion of the EU’s gas supply, but the trend clearly indicates a shift away from Russian dependency.
When we look at the specific figures, Norway provides a massive 33.4% of the EU’s gas. The US supplies 16.5%, Algeria 14.4%, Russian pipelines still account for 11.6% and LNG 7.3%. There are other key players like the United Kingdom and Azerbaijan at 4.3% each, while Qatar also provides 4.3% and others 3.9%.
This transition is driven by a deep-seated desire to punish Russia for its aggression, its destruction, and the suffering inflicted upon Ukrainians. There is a sense of outrage at the atrocities committed, from the killing of civilians to the abduction of children and the torture of prisoners of war. The emotional response is significant: a desire to see those responsible held accountable, even if it means prolonged economic measures.
However, there is also the pragmatic reality of the situation. Some would prioritize Ukraine’s safety and peace over the idea of seeing Russia face justice. It’s a complex and fraught situation, forcing difficult choices.