By John Q. Hosedrinker 
The Commission chief embarked on a seven-country tour of front-line states to reinforce the EU’s commitment against Russian aggression. This diplomatic initiative coincides with increased efforts by the U.S. President to mediate a ceasefire in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Key stops include Poland, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Romania, all strategically significant due to their proximity to Russia or Belarus. In Poland, the officials visited the Polish-Belarusian border, emphasizing the importance of defending the European border and garnering financial support for the project.
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Strong deterrence needed against ‘predator’ Putin, von der Leyen tells Poles, and this is a conversation we all need to be having right now.
The core issue here, as I understand it, is the failure of deterrence in Ukraine. The invasion happened, and that stark reality underscores the importance of preventing similar scenarios in the future. But, and this is a big “but,” simply focusing on deterrence can create a dangerous cycle. The constant talk of war and weapons benefits a certain class, doesn’t it? It keeps them in power, and keeps the money flowing. We need to look beyond the surface.
One of the most crucial points that comes across is that the EU’s perspective is often presented through the lens of constant crisis. Von der Leyen’s consistent characterization of Putin as a “predator” is striking. It’s a clear and direct assessment, but the question becomes, how do we respond? She insists on strong deterrence, but what exactly does that look like? The concern here is that “deterrence” becomes the only answer, the only tool in the toolbox, and in this case, it’s a tool that arguably has not worked.
We also need to acknowledge that diplomacy has its place. The failures of diplomatic efforts with Russia are well-documented, but the constant dismissal of diplomacy as “naive” is potentially counterproductive. History teaches us that even during the Cold War, when tensions were at their peak, dialogue – even if it was slow, difficult, and unproductive at times – was critical in preventing a much larger conflict. Diplomacy, however, is only useful if both sides are operating under the same basic rules. And frankly, that hasn’t been the case. Russia doesn’t seem to be interested in diplomacy, not in any form that is consistent with the west’s perspective on that framework.
The conversation about deterrence also needs to consider its potential unintended consequences. More deterrence may increase Russian military spending, not decrease it. This is the fundamental issue. The constant focus on militarization can easily create a self-fulfilling prophecy, which ultimately increases the chances of conflict, not decreases them.
Furthermore, it’s important to consider the broader context. Are there alternative strategies or perspectives that are not being considered? Is the focus on deterrence serving the interests of a specific group, like arms suppliers? There are always different motivations at play, even if the leaders have the best of intentions.
The idea of a permanent state of militarization and the profit motives are worth considering. The EU leadership, it’s argued, is reassuring its arms suppliers and keeping the political class thriving, regardless of whether that helps the situation overall.
Ultimately, the challenge is to find a balanced approach. It’s about recognizing the very real threat posed by Putin’s actions while also being wary of the dangers of escalating military buildup. It’s about not letting fear dictate our actions and instead, remembering the power of diplomacy. The problem is that both sides would have to agree on the rules of diplomacy for it to be effective.
While the need for a strong deterrent is undeniable, it’s equally important to acknowledge the limitations of a purely military approach. A more comprehensive strategy is required that integrates diplomacy, economic tools, and a clear understanding of the underlying dynamics at play. The challenge, as always, is to find the right balance. We also need to be critical about how we are framing the discussion. Is it useful to call Putin a predator? Maybe. Is it also useful to always act in a way that makes the threat seem ever-present? That part is less clear.