By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Ukraine has formally raised concerns with the Indian government and the EU regarding the presence of Indian-made or assembled electronic components in Iranian-designed Shahed drones used by Russia. Investigations revealed components from Vishay Intertechnology and Aura Semiconductor, assembled or made in India, were found in these drones. While Indian laws may not have been violated, the issue has prompted Indian security agencies to sensitize manufacturers about export restrictions. Experts suggest that these components may have been diverted to Iran through third countries, highlighting the difficulty in tracking end use after legitimate exports.
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Ukraine Flags Indian-Made Parts in Drones Used by Russian Forces
It seems that Ukraine has identified Indian-made components within the Shahed-136 drones used by Russian forces. This is the core of the matter, a signal of potentially deeper issues. Specifically, according to reports, these drones contain a “bridge rectifier E300359” from Vishay Intertechnology, assembled in India, and a PLL-based signal generator AU5426A chip manufactured by Aura Semiconductor. The rectifier is used in the drone’s voltage regulator, and the signal generator plays a role in the jammer-proof antenna for its satellite navigation system.
The implications of this discovery are, to put it mildly, complex. The components in question – a bridge rectifier and a signal generator – are not exactly cutting-edge military technology. In fact, these are generally considered “dual-use” items, that is, they are designed for commercial applications and are widely available. India has regulations in place that prohibit the direct export of such dual-use components to sanctioned countries, including Russia. However, the path to these components ending up in Russian drones likely involves a network of third-party actors and countries. This presents a significant challenge for tracing the end-use of goods within the globalized trade system.
Now, let’s be clear, the presence of Indian-made parts doesn’t automatically mean that India is knowingly supporting the Russian war effort. It highlights the vulnerabilities in tracking the movement of commercial components. It’s important to note that similar findings involving components from Western countries such as the United States, the Netherlands, Malaysia, and China have also been found in Russian drones. This isn’t a problem unique to Indian-made parts. The fact is that the Shahed drones are assembled, in part, using commercial components. This also includes the fact that the drones themselves are of Iranian origin, but are now being mass produced in Russia.
There’s a lot of debate surrounding this issue. Some people are very critical, claiming that India is acting like a “rogue state.” They feel that India should align itself more closely with Western interests. Others argue that India is simply looking out for its own interests, navigating a complex geopolitical landscape. They point out that Western countries are also trading with Russia, even as they criticize India. And of course there are the hypocrisies of it all.
Moreover, there’s the question of whether sanctions are the answer. Sanctioning India or China, for instance, could have far-reaching economic consequences and may not be a particularly effective strategy. It is important to remember, that the original manufacturer of the components are not Indian, and did not supply the components to Russia. And let’s not forget, Ukraine itself is a beneficiary of Western support and weapons.
It’s also worth considering that these commercial-grade components can be purchased and repurposed by anyone. They aren’t necessarily designed to withstand the rigors of military use. Iran likely utilizes these components for their drones to reduce costs and maintain production, as they are readily available on the open market. In a world where technology and trade are so interconnected, it’s nearly impossible to completely block the flow of these types of components.
Instead of focusing on blaming one country, perhaps the better approach would be to find ways to cut off the supply lines. Perhaps the original sellers could be better monitored, and even the buyers. If the buyers know that there’s a chance of sanctions and fines, they may not do it. These parts are often sold multiple times. It’s incredibly difficult to trace the precise path these components take through the intricate web of international trade.
In the end, this situation highlights the complexities of the modern world. It showcases the limitations of sanctions and the challenges of controlling the flow of goods. More broadly, it’s a reminder of the need for greater transparency and accountability in the global supply chain. To make these types of components more difficult to use, one may have to implement strict guidelines, and perhaps even more invasive methods.