During a virtual event with Finland, President Zelensky advocated for regime change in Russia, arguing it is the only solution to prevent future destabilization of neighboring countries. He emphasized that Russia must be coerced into ending the war it started, suggesting the confiscation of frozen Russian assets in the West as a means to achieve this. Zelensky’s comments followed unsuccessful direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow and were made after a devastating overnight attack on Kyiv. While Western nations have been hesitant to fully confiscate Russian assets due to legal and financial stability concerns, Zelensky pushed for their use in supporting Ukraine.
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No End to Russian Meddling Without Regime Change, Zelensky Says
The core of the matter is that according to Zelensky, there’s no foreseeable end to Russian meddling until there is a change in the Russian regime. The idea is that the current power structure, with its ingrained practices and goals, will continue to destabilize other countries and interfere with their internal affairs. But the question of what that “regime change” would even look like, and how it could come about, is a monumental one.
The Wagner group’s brief, but ultimately unsuccessful, incursion into Moscow comes to mind as perhaps the closest brush with regime change in recent memory. It was a stark reminder that Putin will not allow any internal challenges to his power. This suggests that any change would likely need to come from the outside, which is a difficult prospect, considering the West is wary of escalating the conflict and potentially triggering a larger-scale war. The West was even afraid to send certain types of weapons to Ukraine, due to the possible reactions from Russia. This reluctance points to the very real possibility of a dangerous escalation if the regime was truly on the brink.
The hypothetical of NATO invading Russia sparks a flurry of questions. If such a scenario were to unfold, and the Kremlin was overthrown, who would take the reins? Would a successor have the public support necessary to govern effectively? Would they be any less inclined to aggressive actions than Putin? These are huge unknowns. The comparisons to Germany after World War II are frequently discussed, but the context is so different. The Soviet Union was built by annexing formerly independent countries, which adds a very different layer of complexity to any potential change.
The complexities multiply when considering the domestic situation. There’s a distinct lack of internal dissent strong enough to trigger regime change at the present moment. Putin enjoys substantial public support, due in large part to propaganda, media control, and lack of competing voices. Furthermore, he has been able to manage difficult situations and to keep the Russian economy afloat despite the war. The fact is that the population is split. Some people have the resources to leave, while others who lack those resources are faced with propaganda and often fear the consequences of speaking out against the regime.
It’s understandable why the prospect of internal change is viewed as so challenging. There are no leaders, no organized movements, and no readily available resources to challenge the existing power structure, and Putin has made sure of it. The examples of individual protests are a disheartening illustration of this point: individuals face imprisonment, accomplishing little in terms of overall change.
Looking at the long-term picture, it’s hard to overlook the role of external influence. The idea of using the same tactics that Russia itself uses to manipulate other countries, like bankrolling opposition parties and stirring up civil unrest, is a possible strategy, but it is also a risky one, potentially leading to dangerous consequences. The question of whether it could even be done is paramount.
The obstacles to regime change are clearly significant. While there is expertise in regime change in other countries, a path to this goal remains unclear. A key factor is the strong support Putin currently enjoys within Russia. If the past is any indication of the future, the likelihood of the collapse of the Russian regime rests on internal forces rather than external intervention.
