By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Texas inspectors approved Camp Mystic’s emergency planning just days before a catastrophic flood claimed the lives of numerous individuals, primarily children, at the all-girls camp. Despite compliance with state regulations, including evacuation procedures and staff assignments, inspection reports offered no details of those plans, raising questions about the camp’s preparedness. Tragically, the camp did not evacuate before the river surged from 14 to 29.5 feet within an hour, and at least 27 campers and counselors perished in the deluge. While state inspectors verified the camp’s emergency plans, they were not filed with the state, leaving the details of these critical documents unclear.
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Texas inspectors approved Camp Mystic’s disaster plan 2 days before deadly flood, records show, and the information is already swirling with frustration and disbelief. It’s hard to believe, and frankly, it’s infuriating. We’re talking about a tragedy, a flood that claimed lives, and the camp had the green light from the very people tasked with ensuring safety. It doesn’t sit right.
The sheer size and financial capacity of Camp Mystic should have dictated a higher standard of preparedness. It wasn’t a small operation. It had resources. The question becomes: did they do enough? This brings into question the American Camp Association’s involvement, or lack thereof. The fact that Camp Mystic wasn’t accredited by this organization, which focuses on safety and risk management, raises serious questions about the camp’s safety protocols.
The need for more stringent disaster plans, particularly for camps, is clearly evident. And the insurance companies will definitely be demanding it. This is a matter of life and death. Unfortunately, some regulations in Texas are often viewed as impediments, not necessities. It feels like history is repeating itself, especially considering other recent tragedies in the state.
The potential for lawsuits looms large, adding another layer of complexity to this already devastating situation. Some are even pointing out that the location of the camp itself might have been a serious oversight. Was it really wise to set up a children’s campground on a dry riverbed, especially considering the history of floods in the area? Some are comparing it to building a camp next to an active volcano.
The lack of a proper warning system is staggering. How can a facility like this operate without advanced weather alerts, flood-watch monitors, and air alarms? The fact that the county where Camp Mystic was located didn’t have weather alert sirens is a glaring omission. These warnings weren’t properly received. This is about protecting human lives. If rockets can reach space, surely we can implement and maintain proper water warnings.
The response from local authorities, with quotes from officials about not discussing warnings or the timing of evacuation, is deeply troubling. It’s like a replay of Uvalde, where the blame game began quickly. The sentiment is clear: there is a pattern of ignoring the obvious, deflecting responsibility, and potentially prioritizing other agendas.
There were definitely warnings from the NWS, a flood watch days in advance, and a warning closer to the flooding. Multiple communities in the flooded area had weather alert sirens, so why didn’t the county where this camp was located? This goes back to the core problem: the failure to prioritize safety.
There seems to be an individual that has the same energy as the Uvalde police. The lack of decisive action, specifically the failure to evacuate when faced with a potential disaster, highlights a culture of inaction. It brings up an important question: What is the worst that could happen if you evacuate 24 hours before predicted flooding, and then the flood never happens? The worst-case scenario is far better than the actual tragedy.
The history of the National Weather Service also deserves scrutiny. Staffing cuts during the Trump administration, and cuts at NOAA that had previously been understaffed, have the potential to influence data accuracy and consequently, the accuracy of forecasts. This is not to place blame, but instead to acknowledge that the data that is provided might not always be as reliable as it should be.
There is a consensus that the camp, regardless of what the government officials say, needed to be prepared, and a well-planned disaster protocol would have included staff training, monitoring the forecast, and a review of the evacuation plan. It should be routine, not an afterthought. This is a heartbreaking reminder of how important it is to take responsibility for the safety of children and the need to always prioritize their protection.