By John Q. Hosedrinker 
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that Ukraine would receive long-range missile systems “very soon” after a US agreement to continue supplying weapons to Ukraine. Merz indicated these capabilities could be deployed within weeks, emphasizing the need for Ukraine to improve its defense capabilities. The announcement followed a friendship treaty signed with the UK, allowing for cooperation in procurement and production. While the exact details of the US plan for European allies to fund weapon supplies remain unclear, Merz insisted on clarity regarding the replacement of Patriot air defense systems being delivered to Ukraine.
Read the original article here
Merz says Ukraine to receive long-range missile systems “very soon,” and the anticipation is palpable. The “very soon” could mean anything, really. It’s the kind of timeline that makes you hold your breath, waiting to see what arrives and when. The specifics of the missiles themselves are a bit of a puzzle, too. There’s talk of Taurus, but it’s worth noting that it isn’t a long-range system in the same league as something like a Tomahawk or a JASSM-ER. However, considering Russia’s use of bases and its fleet of bombers and drones, the systems available to Ukraine need to be able to reach a wide area.
The discussion of these systems inevitably brings up the bigger picture, particularly the role of air dominance in this conflict. It becomes clear that Russian planes bombing front lines with relative ease is a key problem to address. The focus shifts toward potential targets for these new missiles, particularly key infrastructure such as factories, even those reinforced with decades of Soviet-era engineering. This ability to reach and neutralize vital Russian military assets is a huge shift in the war.
Of course, as conversations about advanced weaponry often do, the discussion drifts toward the potential for escalation. The presence of nuclear weapons is a concern that cannot be ignored. The nature of Russia’s potential use of tactical nuclear weapons becomes a grim point of speculation. The idea of using them to make a point, a calculated escalation, a strategic move to avoid collateral damage, rather than something meant to level a city.
The concern is that Russia, a nation that has been described as “shitty and poor,” might use these weapons. There’s a real fear of what happens if a nation feels backed into a corner. The discussion becomes a balancing act between providing Ukraine with the tools it needs to defend itself and avoiding actions that could push things towards the brink. It’s a tightrope walk that’s been heavily wargamed and debated at the highest levels of government.
The debate becomes quite animated, with some expressing the belief that the fear of nuclear weapons should not dictate policy. The argument is that surrendering to threats is not an option, and that appeasement has never worked. The claim that we can’t live in fear of a potential nuclear event is a valid point. The idea is that the aggression has already begun, and doing nothing only emboldens it.
The argument quickly flips as people debate the core issue, which is the question of how to respond to Russian aggression. The conversation gets heated as people wrestle with the question. Is it more dangerous to stand up to the aggressor, risking escalation, or to back down, allowing the aggression to continue? The conversation circles back to the central fear of nuclear conflict. Those arguments get quickly dismissed by the reminder of mutually assured destruction.
The question of which side is being pushed into a corner is posed. The point is made: Russia invaded Ukraine. This is followed by the reality that an authoritarian dictatorship threatening a nuclear attack cannot be allowed to dictate the world’s course. This would only give more power to the dictator and make it more likely that the use of nuclear weapons would be considered.
Eastern European nations, especially those who have long experience with Russia, are referenced as an example of knowing how to respond to aggression. They understand the importance of demonstrating a firm stance and not giving in to intimidation. This also prompts a re-evaluation of Western actions, particularly the historical reluctance to fully support Ukraine. The constant specter of nuclear threats is raised. There is recognition of the delicate balance required to support Ukraine without provoking a catastrophic escalation.
The discussion continues to explore the reasons behind this cautious approach. The question is why, in the past, certain countries were hesitant to provide Ukraine with the weapons it needed. There is the view that this was the result of carefully considered strategies, aimed at wearing down Russian forces, all while trying to avoid a wider war. The counterpoint to the argument is that a full-throated approach might have been more effective.
The conversation ends by observing that the situation has changed dramatically. The military in Ukraine is very different from what it was a decade ago, and the nation is now equipped to handle equipment from the West. The fear of a nuclear escalation, the strategies used to bleed Russia, the ongoing support from nations like the US, all these things will keep changing the course of this terrible conflict. The use of nuclear weapons remains a threat, but as one voice notes, they are only used once, while the threats, as we see, are numerous.