By John Q. Hosedrinker 
During a recent briefing to senators, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Dan Caine explained that the US military did not use bunker-buster bombs on the Isfahan nuclear site because of the facility’s depth, which likely would have rendered the bombs ineffective. Intelligence assessments indicate that Isfahan houses the majority of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. While US B2 bombers targeted Fordow and Natanz, only Tomahawk missiles were deployed against Isfahan, which caused moderate to severe damage to the above ground structures of the facilities. Lawmakers acknowledge that the strikes may not have eliminated all of Iran’s nuclear materials.
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US did not use bunker-buster bombs on one of Iran’s nuclear sites, top general tells lawmakers, citing depth of the target.
Okay, so the story we’re hearing is that the US didn’t use bunker-buster bombs on one of Iran’s nuclear sites, specifically because the target was just too deep. I mean, that’s the core of it. There’s been a lot of noise out there, a whirlwind of conflicting reports, but the general’s statement boils it down to the practical limitations of the weapons. The whole thing is pretty interesting, and it’s worth taking a closer look at the details.
It’s easy to get lost in the back and forth. One minute you’re hearing about “obliteration,” the next, you’re questioning whether anything significant was even damaged. The official line, it seems, is to avoid admitting failure at any of the sites. The idea seems to be that using Tomahawks was a deliberate choice because of the depth of the target.
There’s a lot of speculation about the specifics. Some people are suggesting that the actual goal was to make the sites unusable, rather than destroying them outright. The idea is that even if the physical structures weren’t completely demolished, continued bombing could render them inaccessible. And that’s a very different goal than “obliteration.” I wonder if the official talking points will continue to align with that.
Here is the crux. This is also about managing optics. It’s a sensitive situation, so the official narrative is carefully curated. If it was reported that a bunker buster didn’t work, it could potentially diminish the international reputation of the munition. But if the administration started off by being honest, and simply stated that one of the Iranian enrichment sites couldn’t be damaged by the conventional weapons we have, then credibility would have been earned. The whole thing is a mess.
There are some who think that the whole situation is far more complicated. We know that bunker busters have been successful in past conflicts, but different geological situations require different approaches. The concrete in the Iranian bunker is different to what was used in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it’s a critical element in the argument against bunker busters. The use of granite, rather than limestone, would pose a huge difference to the effectiveness of the ordinance. The official explanation is that the target was too deep, which seems to fit with the other arguments.
And of course, in all of this, there’s a layer of political maneuvering. I mean, let’s be honest, a lot of the information coming out of official channels can be suspect. This makes it difficult to know what actually happened. If they failed, it’s difficult to imagine the adminstration will admit to any failures. The administration is constantly trying to make themselves look competent.
The whole thing feels like a game of smoke and mirrors. Some folks are saying, “We didn’t use those weapons, because the site was just too deep.” This would be an implicit admission that the initial attacks weren’t as successful as they were made out to be. The idea of avoiding any hint of failure is common in political situations, where image is everything.
So, if the story holds water, the US did not employ bunker-buster bombs because the target was simply too deep. But, the details, the explanations, and the motivations are all subject to debate. The story seems to be an attempt to manage perceptions, whether successful or not, and the truth of what actually happened will probably emerge at some point, probably years from now.