By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Addressing the London Defence Conference, Valerii Zaluzhnyi urged Western allies to adopt a comprehensive “new state policy” for defense, arguing that NATO’s current model is outdated for modern warfare. This necessitates a fundamental overhaul of tactics, organization, doctrine, training, and budgeting, requiring significant time and resources. Zaluzhnyi highlighted Ukraine’s battlefield experience as a crucial learning opportunity, emphasizing the need for faster adaptation to technological advancements like drones and the limitations of solely relying on expensive, large-scale systems. He further stressed that Europe needs Ukraine’s substantial and experienced military as a crucial component of its future security architecture.
Read the original article here
Ukraine’s former commander in chief’s warning that modern warfare is far removed from NATO’s current operational methods highlights the significant impact of readily available drone technology on the battlefield. The widespread use of relatively inexpensive drones, particularly in defensive operations, has created a drastically different combat dynamic than what NATO currently anticipates. This is largely due to the sheer volume and affordability of these drones, effectively making them a ubiquitous and impactful tool.
The current conflict in Ukraine, lacking air superiority for either side, showcases this shift. The reliance on mass deployments of consumer-grade drones, coupled with the stalemate-like trench warfare, underscores how readily accessible and effective these relatively low-cost tools can be. This contrasts sharply with NATO’s typical operational model, which relies on fewer, more sophisticated platforms and personnel. This imbalance fundamentally alters the traditional cost-benefit analysis of military engagement.
This difference in approach directly affects the strategies employed. NATO’s doctrine often prioritizes air superiority to enable maneuverability and attrition before direct ground engagement. The current situation in Ukraine, however, demonstrates how the prevalence of drones, even without air dominance, can significantly impact the effectiveness of traditional military strategies, emphasizing the importance of anti-drone technology and cyber warfare capabilities.
The argument that this doesn’t represent typical modern warfare is valid. The Ukrainian conflict represents a specific context, a largely static frontline with limited air superiority, allowing drones to flourish in a way that wouldn’t necessarily translate to a full-scale NATO conflict. The lack of air superiority is the key differentiator; a NATO force, with its established air dominance capabilities, would likely engage in drastically different tactics.
The abundance of anti-air systems inherited from the Soviet era, coupled with a lack of stealth technology, further compounds the situation. This lack of air dominance has forced both sides to adopt different strategies, creating a unique and arguably atypical war scenario. NATO’s superiority in airpower would significantly alter this, allowing for precision strikes, suppressing enemy defenses, and potentially negating the impact of drones.
The current conflict, however, provides invaluable data for NATO. Observing the effects of cheap, readily-available drones, as well as the effectiveness of various countermeasures, allows NATO to refine its strategies and invest accordingly. This is not simply about acquiring more anti-drone technology; it’s about integrating such technology into existing strategies and training. The rapid technological advancements observed in Ukraine are forcing a reassessment of conventional military doctrines, especially concerning air power and the potential for asymmetric warfare.
Nevertheless, dismissing the significance of drones entirely is shortsighted. Even acknowledging the unique context of the Ukrainian war, the effectiveness of drones in disrupting operations, inflicting casualties, and targeting high-value assets is undeniable. The scale at which drones are being employed and their demonstrably high casualty rates cannot be ignored, regardless of the specific circumstances. Even with air superiority, the ease and effectiveness with which drone swarms can overwhelm existing anti-aircraft systems is a legitimate concern.
The inherent limitations of drones, such as vulnerability to air superiority and range constraints, are also factors to be considered. In a fluid, fast-moving conflict, drones’ effectiveness would be significantly reduced. The use of mobile warfare and rapid advances could render static drone deployments almost useless. Yet, the current conflict’s evidence proves the potential for disruptive influence even in limited conditions.
Therefore, while the current war does not completely define modern warfare, it demonstrably showcases a significant shift in military tactics, particularly the impactful role of relatively inexpensive drone technology. NATO’s response should not be simply to dismiss the Ukrainian experience but rather to carefully analyze its lessons, integrate technological improvements, and refine its strategies to account for the revolutionary change that readily accessible and effective drones have brought to the battlefield. The investment in anti-drone technology, cyber warfare capabilities, and adapting strategies to account for drone swarms, is crucial. Failing to do so will leave NATO unprepared for the realities of modern warfare.