By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Mediazona and the BBC Russian service have identified 109,625 Russian military personnel killed in Ukraine between February 24, 2022, and May 23, 2025, a figure likely underrepresenting the true toll. This count, compiled from publicly available sources and meticulously verified by volunteers, includes significant numbers of volunteers, mobilized soldiers, recruited prisoners, and officers. The database, first published in February 2025, is regularly updated; at least 2,009 additional deaths have been confirmed since the beginning of May. The high number of casualties reflects the ongoing intense fighting, particularly in Donetsk Oblast where Russia has maintained the offensive since late 2023.
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Over 109,600 Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine have been identified by a media investigation. This staggering figure, while representing only confirmed deaths from publicly available sources like obituaries and news reports, likely underestimates the true toll. The actual number of casualties is almost certainly far higher, considering the difficulties in verifying deaths in active combat zones and the potential for underreporting.
The sheer scale of these losses is profoundly shocking, especially when compared to the Soviet-Afghan war. The apathy and complicity of many modern Russians, in the face of such immense sacrifice, is a striking contrast to the resistance witnessed against the Soviet regime in other conflicts.
Many believe the real death toll is considerably higher – possibly double or triple the confirmed number. This is because soldiers killed during reckless, wave-like assaults may be officially listed as missing in action (MIA) rather than killed in action (KIA), avoiding the financial obligations to their families. This deliberate obfuscation further obscures the true extent of Russia’s losses.
The war’s objectives, initially framed as a swift seizure of Ukrainian territory, have proven hopelessly unrealistic. Despite considerable losses, Russia has not achieved its aims. Moreover, the strategic situation for Russia continues to worsen. The initial gains have now been significantly reversed in some areas.
The initially perceived gains in land and resources may prove temporary. The occupied territories, while containing valuable resources like rare earth minerals, are likely to be contested in any eventual peace settlement, making the sacrifices seem all the more pointless. In fact, the situation is far more bleak now than it was two years ago, with Russia even losing territory. The dynamics of the battlefield have fundamentally shifted; Ukraine has transformed Russia’s crossing zones into kill zones, using a comprehensive layered defense involving artillery, drones, and constantly replaced minefields.
Russia is increasingly reliant on foreign mercenaries from countries like Iran, Pakistan, China, and North Korea to bolster its depleted ranks. The initial expectation of a quick, bloodless victory, seemingly mirroring the American experience in Iraq, has been cruelly shattered. The conflict seems driven more by a genocidal intent than by a rational pursuit of territorial control, illustrating the stark difference in Russia’s commitment to Ukraine compared to its involvement in Afghanistan.
The public’s response within Russia is complex. While a significant portion believes in the narrative of a defensive, just war, fear of government retribution – including lengthy prison sentences for public criticism – significantly inhibits dissent. This fear, coupled with the government’s control over information channels, allows the Kremlin to shape public perception, regardless of the realities on the ground.
This phenomenon mirrors patterns seen elsewhere in the world; even with open and independent media, it’s relatively easy to manipulate public opinion. The initial hopes that graphic images of Russian losses would spark widespread opposition have proven unfounded, highlighting the significant societal control mechanisms at play in Russia.
Historical comparisons are relevant here; while protests against the Soviet Union did occur, their scale differed from what one might expect given the immense loss of life. Yet, the Soviet system, despite its control over information, eventually collapsed, highlighting that even under oppressive conditions, resistance can manifest. The collapse of the Soviet Union was not entirely a direct result of the losses in Afghanistan but rather a confluence of factors, including internal dissent and economic pressures, which were only partly fueled by public discontent. Boris Yeltsin’s rise to power, characterized by his initial criticism of the Soviet Union and participation in protests for reform, further supports the notion of eventual resistance against an oppressive regime. The fact that Yeltsin was a long-time member of the Communist Party doesn’t diminish his role in challenging the established order. His eventual opposition to the coup and his subsequent actions directly contributed to the collapse of the USSR. The long-term consequences of the war in Ukraine and its impact on the Russian political landscape remain uncertain. One thing is certain: the human cost, in terms of Russian lives, is immense and deeply disturbing.