By Matt Underwood Iran’s “reformist” president, Masoud Pezeshkian, oversaw approximately 700 executions in the months following his election. This staggering number represents a significant portion of the record 1,000 executions reported in Iran during 2024, a figure representing the highest in three decades. The sheer scale of these executions calls into question the very meaning of “reformist” in the Iranian context, particularly when considering the regime’s established record of human rights abuses.
The claim of reform seems especially jarring given that these executions occurred across 86 prisons, including the deaths of 34 women and seven juveniles. Such actions directly contradict any notion of progressive governance, raising serious concerns about the nature of political change within Iran’s theocratic system. The significant increase from 853 executions in 2023 to over 1000 in 2024, with the majority occurring after Pezeshkian’s ascendance, further underscores this troubling reality.
The secrecy surrounding Iran’s judicial system complicates the accurate accounting of these atrocities. The fact that many executed prisoners remain unidentified, effectively disappearing after arrest, speaks volumes about the lack of transparency and accountability within the system. Even the temporary drop in executions during the parliamentary and presidential elections, to eight and 22 respectively, compared to a high of 170 in October, only serves to highlight the regime’s calculated control over the narrative rather than a genuine commitment to reform.
The sheer volume of executions, with 695 occurring after Pezeshkian took office, necessitates a critical examination of the term “reformist” as applied to his presidency. It’s hard to reconcile this mass execution of citizens with any meaningful concept of political or social progress. The idea of a truly reformist leader emerging from within the existing power structure, particularly one where the Ayatollahs control who runs for presidency, appears to be a significant oversimplification of the Iranian political landscape.
This level of state-sponsored violence isn’t merely a statistical anomaly; it’s a systemic issue deeply rooted in the Iranian political and religious framework. The fact that many of the executions involved individuals perceived as political opponents, demonstrators, and those who simply challenge the regime’s rigid social norms, points to the continued suppression of dissent under the guise of a “reformist” agenda. The government’s justification for these actions is never clearly stated, but the pattern clearly shows a ruthlessness that doesn’t align with any widely accepted notion of reform.
The comparison to the United States’ comparatively much lower execution rate, around 25 in 2024, further amplifies the severity of Iran’s actions. Even normalizing for population size, the disparity is shocking. While the US execution rate is undeniably a matter of serious concern, the Iranian numbers are on a vastly different scale, indicating a fundamentally different approach to justice and governance. The focus is not merely on the number of executions but also on the reasons behind them, with Iran’s executions frequently targeting political dissidents and those who violate the regime’s strict religious dictates.
The notion that any meaningful reform can occur within the current structure, one where the Supreme Leader and Council of Guardians hold ultimate power, remains a subject of debate and skepticism. The executions under Pezeshkian’s watch highlight the limitations of superficial changes within a system characterized by deep-seated authoritarianism and systemic violence. The reality is that while some might attempt to rebrand the regime’s image, the underlying brutality remains unchanged, creating a fundamentally flawed system that continuously violates basic human rights.
The question remains: If 700 executions post-election don’t constitute a failure of reform, what does? The very definition of “reform” in the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran requires serious reconsideration. The sheer scale of the violence, the nature of the victims, and the lack of transparency make it almost impossible to view Pezeshkian’s presidency as anything other than a continuation of the same brutal regime, albeit one with perhaps a slightly altered facade. The continued prevalence of state-sponsored violence makes any notion of genuine reform within the current system highly improbable.