In response to recent speculation, White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan confirmed the U.S. is not considering returning nuclear weapons to Ukraine. Current U.S. support focuses on providing Ukraine with conventional weaponry to bolster its defense against Russia. This decision counters Russia’s assertion that preventing such a nuclear rearmament was a justification for the invasion. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum saw Ukraine relinquish its inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees from the U.S., Russia, and the U.K.

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The US will not return nuclear weapons to Ukraine because the US never possessed them in the first place. The idea of a “return” is fundamentally flawed, stemming from a misunderstanding of the historical context surrounding Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These weapons were not given to the US; they were transferred to Russia as part of a complex agreement, the Budapest Memorandum, in exchange for security guarantees.

The assertion that the US should return these weapons ignores the reality that Russia, not the US, holds them. The Budapest Memorandum, while intending to provide security assurances to Ukraine, ultimately failed to prevent Russia’s invasion, highlighting the inherent risks involved. Russia’s actions demonstrate a blatant disregard for the agreement and international law.

Providing Ukraine with nuclear weapons, whether from US stockpiles or newly manufactured, would be incredibly destabilizing. All nuclear superpowers actively work against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, recognizing the immense danger such weapons pose. The potential consequences of introducing more nuclear-armed actors into the global landscape are far too severe to consider lightly.

This isn’t a situation where the US can simply hand back something it borrowed. The narrative of the US possessing and withholding Ukrainian nuclear weapons is inaccurate and misleading. The issue lies with Russia’s seizure of these weapons and its subsequent breach of the Budapest Memorandum. The focus should be on holding Russia accountable for its actions, not on a fictional return of weapons that never belonged to the US.

The suggestion that the US should assist Ukraine in developing its own nuclear weapons is also problematic, despite having historical precedent in the creation of Israel’s nuclear arsenal. While Ukraine possesses the technical capability and resources to build its own nuclear program, the international ramifications of such an action are enormous. This would likely violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, triggering significant international condemnation and possibly escalation. It would also dramatically alter the regional and global security landscape, potentially leading to a new and more dangerous arms race.

The prospect of Ukraine rebuilding its nuclear arsenal independently is certainly a possibility, particularly if existing security assurances and pathways to NATO membership remain unavailable. However, this path is fraught with peril, and should be carefully considered in the context of the potential for further regional and global instability. The potential benefits of nuclear deterrence must be carefully weighed against the inherent risks and significant international consequences.

Ultimately, the notion of the US returning nuclear weapons to Ukraine is a non-starter. The core problem isn’t about the US having or returning anything. The central issue revolves around Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memorandum and its subsequent aggression against Ukraine. The focus should instead be on addressing this aggression through existing international frameworks and deterring further Russian aggression, not creating an even more volatile security situation by introducing new nuclear players into the equation. The long-term implications for global stability are too significant to risk for a solution based on a false premise.