Examination of debris from a Russian Oreshnik missile used in a November 21 attack on Dnipro reveals a component with a 2017 production date, contradicting Putin’s claims of cutting-edge technology. The missile’s components, including a control system linked to Roscosmos contractor NPTSAP, suggest production began around 2017-2018, likely utilizing older technologies and components from other Russian missile programs. This finding further supports accusations that Russia violated the INF Treaty. Ongoing analysis promises to reveal more details about the missile’s origins and development timeline.
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Missile debris analysis reveals a surprising truth about Russia’s touted Oreshnik missile: it’s far from the cutting-edge technology the Kremlin claims. The discovery of a component dated April 12, 2017, strongly suggests the missile, or at least significant portions of it, weren’t recently produced. This calls into question the narrative surrounding its capabilities and its implications for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty).
The lack of significant technological advancements in the Oreshnik compared to previous Russian missile systems further underscores this point. It doesn’t boast superior speed, increased warhead capacity, or a revolutionary range. In fact, the “novel” aspects of the Oreshnik seem to be largely absent. Claims of invulnerability to NATO air and missile defense systems appear to be overblown, especially in light of the age of the recovered components.
One could argue that the recovered component is from a prototype and not a final production model. However, it seems highly improbable that Russia would intentionally deploy a cutting-edge, state-of-the-art missile for a test, knowing it would be scrutinized. This strongly implies that the missile, or at least its critical control systems, are not a recent development. The initial panic in Western media concerning this missile might have been fuelled more by speculation than verifiable evidence. Later, it seems that Russia itself capitalized on this panic for propaganda purposes, presenting the Oreshnik as a new and formidable threat when the reality is far less impressive.
Furthermore, the connection between the Oreshnik and the earlier Rubezh missile system blurs the lines of what’s truly “new.” The possibility that the Oreshnik’s control system was adapted from the Rubezh, a missile already under development before the INF Treaty’s collapse, raises serious questions about the claims of an entirely novel weapon. The timeline and component dating suggest that the whole missile wasn’t assembled in 2017, only its control system, which was likely adapted from pre-existing technology. This would align with the argument that this was simply a prototype test and not a final, production-ready weapon.
The argument that the Oreshnik definitively proves a Russian violation of the INF Treaty relies on several assumptions. It presupposes that the missile was fully assembled and designed before the United States withdrew from the treaty in 2019, which is not conclusively proven by the available evidence. The missile’s capabilities, while potentially impressive in terms of evasiveness through the utilization of multiple warheads and a high-altitude trajectory, aren’t necessarily game-changing. The challenge of intercepting it, particularly with systems like THAAD, which may not even be deployed in sufficient numbers in Ukraine, might be the most significant aspect of the weapon’s capabilities. However, this is offset by its high cost of production, severely limiting its operational effectiveness. The cost-benefit analysis suggests that the missile would be used only sparingly, targeting high-value assets and strategically important targets. The cost would render its effectiveness questionable.
The Oreshnik’s “novel” aspect seems to be more about marketing and political maneuvering than technological innovation. It fits into a pattern of hyping Russian weaponry—from the Armata tank to the S-400 air defense system—that often falls short of the promised capabilities. The goal appears to be less about actual military dominance and more about spreading fear and uncertainty to leverage geopolitical gains through intimidation.
In conclusion, the analysis of the Oreshnik missile debris reveals a less-than-impressive technological achievement. While the missile might present some challenges for interception due to its flight characteristics, the age of its components, its high cost, and limited capabilities cast significant doubt on Russia’s claims of cutting-edge technology. The whole episode appears to be less a demonstration of technological prowess and more a successful act of propaganda. The weapon, therefore, serves primarily to bolster Russia’s image and its ability to project power on the global stage.