By John Q. Hosedrinker 
Romania’s presidential election has been targeted by a significant influence campaign and cyberattacks, allegedly orchestrated by a state-sponsored actor, likely Russia. A far-right candidate, Calin Georgescu, experienced a sudden surge in popularity fueled by a coordinated social media campaign using paid influencers on TikTok, violating Romanian electoral law. Intelligence reports revealed the theft of electoral website data and approximately 85,000 attempted hacks targeting electoral systems. The released documents, prompting investigations and a potential impact on the upcoming second round of voting, highlight the scale of this interference attempt.
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Romania’s recent presidential elections have been rocked by revelations of a significant influence campaign, seemingly orchestrated from outside the country, coinciding with a wave of Russian cyber-attacks. The scale of the operation is alarming, raising serious questions about the integrity of the electoral process and the vulnerability of democratic systems to foreign interference.
The focus of the alleged interference centers on the surprisingly successful campaign of Calin Georgescu, a far-right, NATO-skeptic candidate previously unknown to most Romanians. His sudden surge in popularity during the first round of voting appears to be directly linked to a sophisticated social media campaign, primarily conducted on TikTok. This campaign involved a vast network of seemingly coordinated accounts, posting near-identical pro-Georgescu content with remarkable frequency. The sheer volume and consistency of this activity point towards a highly organized operation, far beyond the capabilities of a typical grassroots effort.
Adding to the suspicion is the timing. Thousands of TikTok accounts, some dating back to 2016, suddenly sprang to life in the two weeks leading up to the election, flooding the platform with positive messaging about Georgescu. The accounts’ activity – posting and commenting nearly every three minutes from different IP addresses – suggests a deliberate, automated campaign designed to maximize reach and impact. This carefully orchestrated influx of pro-Georgescu content effectively introduced him to a large segment of the electorate before they could properly assess his background, his past statements supporting Russia and opposition to NATO, or his connections to existing power structures. The fact that he successfully characterized himself as a political outsider, when in reality this was demonstrably false, highlights the effectiveness of this misinformation campaign.
Independent intelligence assessments have confirmed the existence of this social media operation, concluding that it was likely coordinated by a state-sponsored actor. Further adding to these concerns, declassified documents released by the outgoing president indicate that one TikTok account alone paid $381,000 in just one month to users promoting Georgescu’s candidacy. This payment was made in violation of both TikTok’s rules and Romanian electoral law. Georgescu himself has denied any knowledge of this operation or any spending on his campaign. His claim of zero campaign spending seems demonstrably false given the evidence of substantial financial investment into his online promotion. The fact that this information was released just days before the second round of voting adds to the sense of urgency and concern surrounding the situation.
Beyond the social media campaign, Romania also faced a significant wave of cyber-attacks targeting its electoral infrastructure. Intelligence reports point to roughly 85,000 attempted hacks aiming to access electoral data and manipulate election-related content. The sophistication and scale of these attacks, using advanced methods to maintain anonymity, are also consistent with state-sponsored cyber warfare. The attacks were notably persistent, even continuing on election day itself. This suggests a deliberate attempt not just to steal data, but to actively influence or potentially even disrupt the election process itself.
Although Russia denies any involvement in the election interference, the evidence paints a compelling picture of extensive foreign meddling. The sheer scale and coordination of both the social media campaign and the cyber-attacks point towards a well-funded and sophisticated operation, far beyond the capabilities of a non-state actor. The fact that Romania has been designated an “enemy state” by Moscow further strengthens the suspicion that the country was specifically targeted as part of a broader strategy of destabilizing pro-Western governments. The timing of the information release, only days before the second round of voting, has led to heightened political tensions and public protests.
The ongoing investigation into these events is crucial, not only for determining the extent of Russian interference in the Romanian elections, but also for understanding the broader implications for democratic processes worldwide. The apparent success of this influence campaign, despite its deceptive nature, serves as a stark warning about the power of sophisticated disinformation campaigns to sway public opinion and undermine democratic institutions. The question remains as to why this information wasn’t released before the first round of voting, allowing for potentially more effective countermeasures. The fact that the revelations come so close to the second round leaves open the possibility of further complications and uncertainty regarding the results. The situation highlights a pressing need for greater vigilance, improved cybersecurity measures, and enhanced public awareness to combat future attempts at foreign interference in democratic processes.