By John Q. Hosedrinker 
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has resolved to urge member governments to supply Ukraine with medium-range missiles (1000-5500km range), specifically citing their utility as a deterrent and for self-defense. This resolution, championed by the Ukrainian delegation, establishes a legal basis for such arms transfers. The decision follows a previous call for Ukraine to be authorized to strike deep into Russia, escalating the issue to a significant political level. This action builds upon recent US authorization for Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles to strike within Russia.
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NATO can provide Ukraine with missiles boasting a range of up to 5500 kilometers. This capability, falling under the definition of “medium-range missiles,” opens up significant strategic possibilities for Ukraine. The discussion around these weapons naturally evokes comparisons to other systems, such as the Tomahawk cruise missile, though its range is considerably shorter, capping around 2000 kilometers.
NATO’s capacity to provide such long-range missiles raises questions about the types of systems that might be suitable. Ballistic missiles certainly fit within the 1000-5500km range, but other options, like land-based adaptations of existing sea-launched cruise missiles, might also be considered. Adapting a system like the French MdCN for land use appears feasible, highlighting the potential for a range of solutions.
The availability of systems like JASSM, depending on the specific version and reported range, could also meet the required specifications. This highlights the diverse arsenal of options available to NATO, extending beyond the more widely discussed ballistic missile systems. The potential for even longer-range missiles exists, but such weapons generally fall into the category of ICBMs, typically reserved for nuclear delivery, and present different accuracy and strategic implications.
The impact of providing 5500km range missiles to Ukraine is substantial. Such weaponry could seriously compromise Russia’s logistical capabilities across vast swathes of territory. Even a 1000km range significantly extends Ukraine’s reach, impacting operational effectiveness. Striking deep into Russian territory with conventional warheads, rather than just employing them defensively, would shift the balance of power dramatically.
Concerns regarding the escalation potential are, of course, valid. The possibility of such long-range strikes undoubtedly carries risks. The decision of whether or not to provide these weapons is a complex one, involving numerous considerations beyond pure military capability. It is a matter of balancing the need to support Ukraine against the potential for heightened conflict.
While the excitement around providing these missiles is understandable from a Ukrainian perspective, it is crucial to maintain a realistic outlook. The provision of such advanced weaponry is not a given; it’s a matter of ongoing political and strategic discussions within NATO.
The potential targets for such missiles also deserve careful consideration. While targeting strategic military infrastructure is certainly a priority, other potential targets, such as Putin’s residences, often enter the discussion. While the symbolic value of such strikes might boost morale, their strategic importance might be less clear than the disruption of Russia’s supply lines and military infrastructure.
The broader geopolitical context is undeniably relevant. The potential for unintended consequences, particularly the possibility of escalating the conflict beyond Ukraine’s borders, must be carefully evaluated. The inclusion of North Korea in some of the discussions highlights the potential for unpredictable ramifications, underlining the need for carefully considered, strategic decision-making within NATO.
Ultimately, the decision of whether or not to provide Ukraine with missiles capable of striking targets up to 5500km away is a complex one that balances military effectiveness with the substantial risks of escalation and unintended consequences. While the capability exists, the decision of whether to utilize it remains firmly in the realm of high-stakes geopolitical strategy.